Reflexive environmental law (REL) enables an understanding of how law builds potential for private company reflexivity. Reflexivity helps to avoid lock-in, and enhances learning and self-organization to resolve complex sustainability challenges. Thus far, REL theory has excluded traditional command-and-control regulation as a form of REL. This limits the potential of REL to understand how legislation can drive reflexivity and create more effective governance. Our framework expands the definition of REL and sets out six types of regulatory instrument found in legislation that may, or may not, constitute forms of REL. The framework comprises three reflexive drivers – autonomy, accountability, and adjustability – and, under these, eleven REL techniques. Through examples taken from European environmental legislation, we explain the drivers’ relationship with different regulatory instruments. This taxonomy empowers regulators and scholars to understand both the reflexive potential of regulatory instruments and the possibility to make instruments more reflexive in specific contexts.

This article examines the growth of the waste and recycling sector in Sweden since the 1970s and seeks to identify the conditions for market growth and underlying business dynamics. The article identifies a slow growth pattern at aggregate level in the 1970s, while a major shift toward higher growth rates took place only in the mid-1990s. Resembling the findings of existing studies of German and US industry counterparts, Swedish recycling companies grew larger in the 1970s and more knowledge-intensive from the 1980s. Our study concludes that the growth of the Swedish recycling industry has been driven not only by government policies addressing household waste but even more so by large manufacturing firms that have increasingly demanded more complex recycling services over time.

This paper re-examines the pollution haven hypothesis (PHH) by taking environmental regulation in ambient regions as a critical determinant concurrent with own regulation. Exploiting the Two Control Zones policy in China as a quasi-natural experiment, we find that both the curbing effect of the local environmental regulation and the spillover effect of ambient regions affect high-polluting foreign direct investment (FDI) location. Moreover, reallocated FDI results in redistributing instead of reducing pollutant emissions. Our evidence enriched by spatial spillover primarily supports the PHH in the context of China. It suggests a national-wide coordinated environmental policy with a unified goal performs better than separately implementing stringent regulations in highly polluted areas.

This paper conducts a novel empirical analysis of the effect of environmental regulation on local pollution emissions by taking 84 cases of local legislation among 31 provinces in China during 1990–2009. We combine the matching methodology and difference-in-difference method to estimate the causal effect of provincial environmental legislation. Our estimation uncovers that there is no significant pollution abatement effect, however, environmental legislation helps to decrease local pollution emission only for those provinces that have stricter enforcement. Such results remain robust while considering the time lag effect, different types of pollutants, choice of different comparison groups and using of synthetic control method. Generally, our study shows the importance of the enforcement for environmental legislation in China.

This article investigates corporate responses to environmental regulation of fish farming in Norway, the world's largest producer and exporter of salmon. We note a puzzling strategic divergence within the industry: whereas small firms have strongly opposed new standards, large and multinational firms have supported or even demanded stricter regulation. Traditional models for business response strategies can explain this divergence only partly. We develop a supplementary, explanatory perspective focusing on company size and predatory opportunities, to show how large and dominant corporate players can use environmental regulation strategically to strengthen their competitive advantages at the expense of small and weaker rivals. This highlights a neglected dimension of regulatory effects and motives behind corporate demand for strict and costly standards. It aso shows how environmental regulations may cause trade-offs with local development concerns, relevant to other natural resource-based sectors evolving from smaller-scale production towards full-fledged industrialization.

This article provides an economic investigation into the underlying causes of industrial wastewater emissions. We examine the direct and the structural break-induced effect of national environmental regulation on industrial wastewater emissions. The results show that strict environmental regulation can partially offset the energy-induced effects imposed by the scale effects of foreign direct inflows and cause positive behavioral responses by either limiting coal usage or improving upon coal usage technology and shift towards clean energy sources. We find the absence of scale economies in the provision of environmental services in the industrial sector due to the poor nature of the technical processes of industries. We further highlight the importance of raising the investment in environmental treatment and embracing trade liberalization in the improvement of industrial wastewater management.

Coal has fueled China's rapid growth in recent decades, but it also severely pollutes the air and causes many health issues. The magnitude of the health damage caused by air pollution depends on the location of emission sources. In this paper, we look into the spatial distribution of coal-fired power plants, which are the major emission sources in China, and investigate the determining factors behind the distribution. We find that the driving factors are economic development and expansion of electricity grid coverage; the latter factor plays a key role in provinces that are less developed but have abundant coal resources. This suggests a way to reduce health damages caused by air pollution without harming the economy: attracting coal-fired plants to less populated areas by developing trans-province electricity trade and grid coverage.

The scholarly work on China's environmental regulations in the context of “central–local” relations is dominated by the preference for a centralized approach. This article examines a centrally imposed and executed verification programme of locally reported pollution data, a rare and sustained central effort to enforce an environmental policy, namely the national pollution reduction target system. The programme was established in 2007 to curtail perceived widespread data falsification and to enhance the quality of emission data, the basis for assessing local compliance with targets. Based on an analysis of official documents and interviews with environmental officials and industry representatives, this article found that the verification programme appears to have reduced the overreporting problem with emission data, enhanced local monitoring and enforcement capacity, and to a certain degree deterred violations due to the increased frequency of national and local inspections. Nevertheless, significant challenges remain. Verification is highly resource intensive, it has involved little external oversight and public participation, the central authority has exerted significant yet unchecked discretionary powers, and poor data quality has remained an issue. Over time, the verification programme appears to have turned into essentially a “numbers game.” All those challenges indicate that a centralized enforcement approach is arguably ineffective in addressing China's long-standing problem of weak environmental policy implementation. This study also sheds lights on the classical “principal-agent” theory in the study of public bureaucracy. Not only does the principal distrust the agent, which is the main concern of the theory, but the agent also distrusts the principal.

This article argues that the rise of transnational regulation has a transformative impact on law. It examines the field of transnational environmental regulation to show that its proliferation challenges the continued appropriateness of representations of law as (i) territorial, (ii) emanating from the state, (iii) composed of a public and private sphere, (iv) constitutive and regulatory in function, and (v) cohesive and regimented. Instead, law is increasingly perceived as (i) delocalized, (ii) flowing from a plurality of sources, (iii) organizationally inchoate, (iv) reflexive and coordinating in function, and (v) polycentric. Together, these shifts in perception amount to a transformation that the article identifies as the transnationalization of law. The article then explores three responses to the transnationalization of law. It distinguishes responses motivated by a desire to reclaim the traditional conception of law from those that seek to reconstruct law at the transnational level and responses that advocate a context-responsive reconceptualization of law. Each response, it will be shown, creates a different set of opportunities for, and challenges to, the relevance of law for transnational regulation.

In recent years programs of private regulation have spread from North America and Europe to developing countries around the world. Though central to debates over public versus private international governance, little is known about the actual operations of these programs, especially in developing countries where weak state regulation has failed for decades to control environmental degradation. This paper assesses the effectiveness in Argentina of two prominent global private environmental regulatory programs'the chemical industry's Responsible Care® program and the Forest Stewardship Council. Argentina presents an intriguing country case because, despite conditions and policies that should support such programs, their implementation there has been stunted when compared against other regional cases. A focus on the demand and supply factors that shape these programs in Argentina reveals that market demand is a necessary but insufficient condition for regime effectiveness. Supply-side factors such as industry characteristics, public policies, and the institutional culture of firms significantly influence program implementation. Some transnational corporations helped export these program to Argentina; however, many others have shown opposition or disinterest, stifling program development. Also, feckless and unstable state agencies have created an institutional environment unfavorable even for private initiatives aimed at bypassing government interference.

This paper compares the economic efficiency of firm-agency governance structures for pollution reduction using transaction costs economics. Two governance structures are analyzed with the transaction costs approach: command and control regulation (CCR) and negotiated agreements (NAs). We propose that the choice of governance structure depends on the strategies firms pursue given the attributes of their transactions and their market opportunities. The application of transaction cost economics analysis leads to different choices of regulatory instruments. Firms in more mature, stable industries are likely to choose command and control, while firms in new, dynamic sectors are more likely to opt for negotiated agreements. Frequency of transactions is a key factor in firm choice.

In recent decades, urban encroachment and increasing environmental regulation have impacted California's dairy industry. A complicated set of environmental legislation affects dairies in the state, and can differ depending on location, creating the possibility for within-state pollution havens. This article details the regional, state, and federal environmental regulation of California's dairy industry, and examines data to see if it matches a hypothesis of regulation affecting dairy location. Using county-year data, we show evidence of changing dairy location within the state matching times of local legislative action. The Central Valley gained production, while the more regulated and urban-affected Los Angeles area lost. Large dairies have increased by 150 percent in the Central Valley, even as the number of small farms in the region declined by 40 percent. More rigorous analysis is necessary to discern the relative impacts of land prices and regulation on dairy location.

We consider private provision of an environmental public good and the link between voluntary pollution-abatement markets and the optimal level of mandatory environmental regulation. We show that voluntary abatement markets react to the level of mandatory abatement imposed and that an optimal regulatory policy must account for that reaction. We consider several assumptions about consumer behavior and find that the voluntary market's reaction to regulation depends on the motivating behavior of consumers. Whether the optimal level of mandatory abatement is higher than the level provided by traditional settings depends on the direction and magnitude of the voluntary market's reaction to changes in mandatory abatement.