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Using the changing legal bases for divorce, this chapter first canvasses how the traditional dividing lines between the so-called ‘progressive North’, consisting of predominantly protestant jurisdictions, and the ‘conservative South’ with predominantly catholic populations have faded away in family law – only to be replaced by a new dividing line between Eastern and Western European jurisdictions regarding the recognition of same-sex relationships and same-sex families. It then discusses whether ‘the family’ is part of the ‘European Way of Life’, proclaimed by the European Commission as one of its policy and strategy aims. However, different understandings of what a ‘family’ is create tensions which manifest, in particular, when the Court of Justice or the European Court of Human Rights hand down decisions which mandate the recognition of family forms, creating elements of an institutional European Family Law. The chapter concludes by expressing the hope that in the long term the tensions between different conceptions of family can be resolved within the existing frameworks in Europe and that a family in one country will also be a family in all other European countries.
Proactive transparency in the form of electronic provision of documents is required by law in the EU. It has long been acknowledged in law and technology studies that digital technology can have legal consequences when implemented to perform a legal function. Consequently, the technological design of document registers has the ability to limit as well as enhance access to documents. When technology can have such regulatory powers, incorporating it into a legal function requires closer attention as to how or why it is so. This article will provide a close analysis of the European Commission’s main Register of Documents (RegDoc) to study the implications of technological design for access to documents. Transparency is approached through a procedural view, highlighting its mechanisms. The article uses a HCI based walkthrough method for the case-study artefact critique of the RegDoc. The main findings suggest that there are two specific affordances of the RegDoc that limit access, especially for users who do not have pre-existing knowledge of the documents they are searching for. These affordances are, first, the scope of the dataset and, second, searchability. Overall, designing technology for legally relevant functions should take into account the wider legal framework that the technology aims to cater for. Attention should be paid to the affordances that can make a legal difference in a technology created to perform a legally relevant task.
Chapter 2 gives scholars and students across disciplines, but also policymakers, trade unionists, and social movement activists, a clear account of the arcane new economic governance (NEG) regime that European Union leaders adopted after 2008. The chapter avoids jargonistic academic language as well as the Euro-speak of the EU’s economic governance documents when describing the setup and operation of the NEG regime. This is important if one wants to understand its internal contradictions and change the operation and policy direction of the EU’s NEG regime.
The aim of the present contribution is to assess how infringement proceedings under Articles 258 to 260 TFEU have dealt with ‘systemic’ breaches of EU law by the Member States’ authorities. It will be argue that two, or possibly three, strands of case-law appear to specifically concern systemic breaches of EU law.
In its evaluation cycle, the European Commission emphasises the importance of good data and the systematic involvement of a plurality of policy stakeholders, including citizens. Findings from European Union policy evaluation should inform further law-making, encourage learning and provide accountability. Transparent and inclusive formal procedures and tools are seen as essential for securing citizen participation in risk regulation; however, the Commission faces numerous challenges in securing engagement, particularly concerning the complexity of policy issues and the formal procedures for institutionalised consultations. Considering the Commission’s work from a proceduralist perspective, the article engages with Vivien Schmidt’s notion of “throughput legitimacy” to explore recent procedural innovations emerging since the Better Regulation agenda that have sought to enhance accountability, transparency, inclusiveness and openness, ensuring fairer and more balanced input on EU policy performance. The article argues in favour of greater throughput legitimacy in ex post policy evaluation but recognises challenges to the promotion of evaluation tools and their use by citizens.
The European Commission’s 2020 draft Chemicals Strategy for Sustainability set the ambitious goal of achieving a “Toxic-Free Environment”. Those ambitions were harshly criticised by a team based in Germany’s Federal Institute for Risk Assessment (or BfR); they claimed that toxicological risks from chemicals had already been minimised and were optimally regulated. This paper outlines evidence to support the Commission’s implication that the European Union’s chemicals regulatory regime is suboptimal. It also criticises the BfR team’s contentions by reference to empirical findings (eg concerning tumours, congenital anomalies and the toxicity of mixtures) and by disentangling their conceptual confusions.
The question of how best to tackle anthropogenic climate change is a thorny one: besides scientific uncertainty regarding the consequences of climate change, another difficulty is that the recommendations of climate experts may clash with the priorities of citizens, interest groups and political institutions. With the European Green Deal, the European Union (EU) recently made significant advances in climate policy; at the same time, and as is well known, the EU and its institutions have long been criticised for their “democratic deficit” and for their failure to involve all civil society actors equally in EU law-making processes. This article sheds light on the legal framework governing civil society participation in EU law-making, and more specifically on the Commission’s consultations pursuant to Article 11(3) of the Treaty on European Union. It then critically assesses selected features of two consultations conducted by the Commission in connection with the European Climate Law, which it evaluates from the perspective of the EU primary law principles of democracy, openness and transparency. Through this analysis, and by suggesting how future climate consultations could be further improved, the article aims to contribute to the (still nascent) legal scholarship on civil society participation in environmental and climate policy.
This chapter aims to examine a topic that up to now has received scant, if any, attention: the use of customary international law (CIL) by the European Parliament, the Council and the European Commission. To that effect, the actions resulting from the exercise of different powers of those three institutions (such as proposals, acts of secondary law, parliamentary questions, statements before the CJEU and other courts) have been taken in consideration. The examination of the practice of the political institutions of the EU does not reveal significant differences between them. References to rules of CIL from their side are relatively rare and mostly included in instruments with an international dimension. They all tend to invoke precise rules of CIL when doing so is essential for substantiating their legal position. They also seem to be aware of the fundamentals of this source of international law. By contrast, the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission fail to demonstrate (here is another common feature) that the rules of CIL they invoke are well established or that practice and opinio juris, as constitutive elements of CIL, concur. It must be highlighted as well that no pattern has been identified in this empirical analysis on the use of CIL by the political institutions of the EU.
This chapter claims that the operation and success of a leniency programme are premised on a carrot-and-stick approach that is expected to lead to a race for confession, as the highest and sometimes only reward – depending on the design of the leniency programme – is for the first cartel member to defect and cooperate with the authorities. The main pre-requisites to instigate this race for confession are the threat of severe sanctions if a cartel is caught, a high risk of detection of a cartel, and a high degree of transparency and predictability in relation to leniency. The chapter then argues that the early leniency programmes of the United States and the European Union have been revised with these pre-requisites in mind. To illustrate the importance of the theory, this chapter than evaluates the most recent version of the respective leniency programmes. The chapter finishes with some thoughts on the similarities and differences between the two leniency programmes.
This chapter explores the key policy and law-making institutions in the EU – the European Parliament (the EP), the European Council (the EC), the Council of Ministers (the Council) and the European Commission (the Commission). The elements of the exploration will be taken from Article 13(2) TEU, where each institution is mandated to act ‘within the limits of the powers conferred on it in the Treaties, and in conformity with the procedures, conditions and objectives set out in them’. The chapter will outline the powers: what authority does each institution have, for what functions and how is it exercised? It will discuss their composition and identify supervisory relationships between the institutions.
To understand ‘Europe as a bureaucracy’, this chapter lays down a central principle underlying the EU’s bureaucracy – the notion of ‘institutional balance’. What is the EU’s institutional structure trying to balance? Answering this question is important to understanding how different institutions in the EU inter-relate. It also outlines the composition and powers of the main EU institutions and examines how these institutions produce law, examining the EU’s central decision-making process. As we will see, the practice of EU decision-making is often untransparent and complex. Yet these very features are difficult to avoid given the need to balance the different interests that have to be brought on board for EU policy to be both effective and legitimate. The EU’s bureaucracy creates inevitable trade-offs, the resolution of which depend on one’s normative view of what Europe is for.
In this study we test whether interest organizations that are confrontational towards EU institutions are less successful than their more cooperative counterparts in obtaining funding from the European Commission (EC). The transfer of public funds to interest organizations is a key dynamic in state-civil society relationships. Research shows that organizations, especially public groups, often heavily rely on public funds to the point that, without funds, many would cease to exist. ‘Don’t bite the hand that feeds you’ is thus a popular expression among leaders of organizations who apply for funds. Scholars document a widespread perception among group leaders that a confrontational attitude towards the state can lead to curtail of public funds. This perception is based on the assumption that state institutions use public funding to discipline confrontational interest organizations. We test this assumption using quantitative and qualitative data collected from a survey of 270 interest organizations who applied for EC funding between 2015 and 2018. Our findings suggest that, while almost half of our survey respondents feel that critical attitudes towards the EU would have negative consequences for their funding applications, empirically, confrontational and cooperative organizations have the same chances of obtaining EC grants. This finding is robust across different interest organization categories, including when non-applicants and mortality anxiety are considered in the analysis. The results add a new layer to resource dependency theory pointing at the incongruence between an organization’s perception of its relationship with public institutions and the observation of that relationship.
Chapter 6 discusses the functioning of a regional system of competition law during a time of populism. This chapter is focused on the EU competition law system. Four topics are addressed. The first is the EU legislative initiative, which is aimed to empower national competition authorities, i.e. the ECN+ Directive.It is argued that this directive is not likely to resolve the problems faced by national competition law regimes subject to populists’ government’s pressure. Second, the chapter analyses what is the reaction of the EU competition law system to developments at the national level brought about by populists’ governments. Both the reactions of the EU institutions (the European Commission and the Court of Justice) and national institutions are analyzed. The insufficiency of these reactions is examined and explained. Third, the chapter outlines and examines the deficit of trust in the decentralized system of enforcement of EU competition law and shows how the rise of populism can have consequences for the EU competition law system, including the functioning of the European Competition Network. Fourth, the functioning of the central level of EU competition law system is examined.
The chapter assesses the possible role of market investigation endowed with broad remedies, when a market suffers from competition problems and infringement cases under competition law provisions are infeasible or ineffective. It lays out a number of theories of harm, i.e., reasons why certain market features or behavior by market participants may lead to consumer harm compared to a relevant counterfactual. It identifies theories of harm in markets (i) where none of the firms is dominant and (ii) with a dominant firm but article 102 TFEU is not effective or applicable or (iii) a dominant firm may arise. It also argues that the European Commission should look for simple “intervention triggers” for a market investigation. While some of the identified harms are more likely or more pronounced in digital markets, a presumption that market investigations primarily addresses competition problems in digital markets is misguided. Finally, when sector regulation is, in principle, applicable, market investigations may fill a gap between standard competition tools and sector regulation.
Chapter 3 looks at the rules of the organisation. It concludes that the European Commission’s claim that international responsibility follows the internal division of competences does not find support in international dispute-settlement practice. The book reveals that the European Union and its Member States are independently responsible for their joint obligations. The central argument is that while states are free to transfer their powers to an organisation, their international obligations are non-transferable.
This Article represents the first comprehensive study of the EU query process, a form of flexible extra-judicial cooperation between the European Ombudsman and the national ombud offices on the interpretation and application of EU law across member states. The way this cooperation is constructed brings imminently to mind the preliminary reference procedure: A national office submits a query within the scope of EU law to the European Ombudsman who, after consultation with the Commission—in the vast majority of cases—provides a reply. Upon closer examination, however, this Article illustrates key differences between the two procedures, while pointing out the added value of the EU query procedure compared to the preliminary reference. More specifically, while the interpretation that is provided is not authoritative or legally binding (among other differences), thanks to the flexibility of this instrument, interpretative guidance is provided at an early stage in case a problem in the interpretation and application of EU law arises, and thus litigation may be avoided. Furthermore, the EU query procedure serves as a reliable source of information for both the European and the national sides. However, this Article also identifies a number of challenges in relation to the transparency of the scheme, its effective functioning, as well as its interplay with other instruments, such as the infringement procedure.
A lack of political legitimacy undermines the ability of the European Union (EU) to resolve major crises and threatens the stability of the system as a whole. By integrating digital data into political processes, the EU seeks to base decision-making increasingly on sound empirical evidence. In particular, artificial intelligence (AI) systems have the potential to increase political legitimacy by identifying pressing societal issues, forecasting potential policy outcomes, and evaluating policy effectiveness. This paper investigates how citizens’ perceptions of EU input, throughput, and output legitimacy are influenced by three distinct decision-making arrangements: (a) independent human decision-making by EU politicians; (b) independent algorithmic decision-making (ADM) by AI-based systems; and (c) hybrid decision-making (HyDM) by EU politicians and AI-based systems together. The results of a preregistered online experiment (n = 572) suggest that existing EU decision-making arrangements are still perceived as the most participatory and accessible for citizens (input legitimacy). However, regarding the decision-making process itself (throughput legitimacy) and its policy outcomes (output legitimacy), no difference was observed between the status quo and HyDM. Respondents tend to perceive ADM systems as the sole decision-maker to be illegitimate. The paper discusses the implications of these findings for (a) EU legitimacy and (b) data-driven policy-making and outlines (c) avenues for future research.
This chapter presents an overview of the history of humanitarian efforts as seen according to a new periodisation scheme, which identifies three main phases of engagement. These are the laissez-faire 'ad hoc humanitarianism' of the nineteenth century, the 'organised humanitarianism' associated with Taylorism and mass society (c. 1900–70), and the 'expressive humanitarianism' characterising the period since 1968. We combine this with background information on the context of the three case studies: relief efforts during the Great Irish Famine of the 1840s; the famine that ravaged Soviet Russia and the Ukraine in 1921–3; and the devastating famine in Ethiopia of the mid-1980s.
This article draws on empirical research conducted with European Commission officials in three Directorates-General and its other services on their perception of how the legislative and policy-making process facilitates the interaction of science and environmental law. This article deploys Sheila Jasanoff's theoretical framework of co-production as an important lens to examine how the European Commission creates this interaction of science and law in environmental policy making and identifies how the Commission incorporates different voices and stakeholders in this policy area. The Commission can be seen as a vehicle of co-production of science and law in EU environmental policy by building strong expert identities, putting in place institutional processes and instruments, and creating discourse between scientists and lawyers leading to outputs of co-production. It is argued that in actively facilitating co-production, the Commission underpins the legislative and policy-making process with its institutional values.