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This paper examines a causal relationship between foreign direct investment (FDI) and firms' pollution intensity by exploiting the policy of China's FDI access relaxation in 2002. The result shows that FDI leads to a significant reduction in firms' pollution intensity. The mechanism tests find that FDI reduces pollution intensity by increasing firms' productivity, pollution management abilities, and the output of lightly polluting firms. The effect primarily acts on firms in lightly polluting industries and firms in the eastern region. The findings support the pollution halo hypothesis and provide implications for developing countries like China by evaluating the effectiveness of policies to attract FDI.
This article explains a curious redirection of economic policies that uses the policy framework of Kalecki and Keynes only to undermine it. It does not negate their theory of demand management, but reformulates it to serve the powerful interests of finance in the era of financial globalisation. As a result, accountability to finance rather than to the citizens becomes more important for democratic governments, and credit rating dominates democratic performance.
In the context of the working-class backlash against free trade represented by Brexit, the recent surge of right-wing political parties in Europe and the 2016 US presidential election, it is timely to take stock of the threats to jobs and wages posed by recent negotiations over the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership. The European Commission selectively relied on econometric analyses, predicting a positive impact of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership. Its proposed legal text on ‘Trade and sustainable development’ fell short of the European Parliament’s negotiating guidelines, which themselves failed to ensure protection of labour standards. The activities of corporate lobbies threatened the effective protection of workers’ rights. Major risks to workers’ rights are posed by discrepancies between US and European Union labour and social law and labour standards. The most recent legal text lacks compliance monitoring provisions and sanction mechanisms against member states failing to ratify core labour conventions. The investment court system does not resolve the problems of the discredited investor-state dispute settlement mechanism for which it is the proposed replacement. The year 2016 has provided a foretaste of the dislocation likely from trade and investment regulation that sees social and environmental standards and labour rights simply as barriers to corporate profits.
Although the positive socio-economic effects of remittances for recipient countries in the short term are unmistakable, inflows of remittances may at the same time exert adverse effects on the trade competitiveness of an economy, by appreciating the real exchange rate. This phenomenon is characterised as an instance of the ‘Dutch disease’ – the negative impact of windfall revenue inflows on the competitiveness of other tradable sectors and hence on overall economic growth. While the real effect of workers’ remittances on real exchange rates in a recipient economy is still a controversial issue, several studies have analysed evidence for the existence of the ‘Dutch disease’ phenomenon in various sets of countries. The main objective of this study is to examine whether remittance flows have had any adverse effect on the international trade competitiveness of a selected group of developing countries during the period from 1995 to 2014. Using a one-step system Generalised Method of Moments specification within a simultaneous equation approach, it shows that remittance flows depreciate the real exchange rate at their levels and that the lagged value of remittances create the Dutch disease for this country group. In addition, we confirm that while trade openness and world real interest rates contribute to a depreciation in real exchange rates, gross domestic product per capita and net Official Development Aid inflows tend to appreciate real exchange rates. A policy implication is that trade liberalisation policies that lower tariff rates on capital imports and new export-oriented incentive programmes should be accompanied by measures designed to prevent appreciation in the real exchange rate: steps in this direction such as recent macroeconomic and prudential capital flow management initiatives are briefly referenced.
This paper re-examines the pollution haven hypothesis (PHH) by taking environmental regulation in ambient regions as a critical determinant concurrent with own regulation. Exploiting the Two Control Zones policy in China as a quasi-natural experiment, we find that both the curbing effect of the local environmental regulation and the spillover effect of ambient regions affect high-polluting foreign direct investment (FDI) location. Moreover, reallocated FDI results in redistributing instead of reducing pollutant emissions. Our evidence enriched by spatial spillover primarily supports the PHH in the context of China. It suggests a national-wide coordinated environmental policy with a unified goal performs better than separately implementing stringent regulations in highly polluted areas.
Explaining cross-country differences in current accounts is difficult. While pay-as-you-go pensions reduce the need to save for retirement, contributions to capital-funded pensions are saved for future consumption. An overlapping-generations analysis shows that capital-funded pensions increase net foreign assets holdings. With a multi-pillar system whose capital-funded part accounts for 18% of pensions, the Austrian current account balance would be 1 percentage point of gross domestic product (GDP) higher than with pure pay-as-you-go pensions in 20 years. By comparison, the Austrian current account surplus averages 1.8% of GDP. Empirically, I find that the current account of high-income countries increases with the coverage and replacement rates of capital-funded pensions.
Environmental protection is an issue that all developing countries must cope with when inviting foreign direct investment (FDI). However, the high correlation between FDI and pollution does not necessarily indicate that foreign firms are to blame. In this study, we apply firm-level panel data from Vietnam and unique information on waste discharge to demonstrate that foreign firms are actually more proactive in acquiring ISO14001 certification. ISO14001 is a voluntary environmental standard, the adoption of which improves a firm's performance in terms of waste control, and increases its welfare and productivity level. This study provides robust evidence that firms' efforts toward corporate social responsibility eventually benefit them as well.
The historical evolution of the EU–US unemployment-rate gap is often explained in the literature in terms of asymmetric changes in labor-market institutions. There may well also be asymmetries in population aging, which may generate international capital flows and have substantial impacts on relative unemployment rates. In this paper, we ask whether the combination of institutions, aging, and capital flows explains the rise in the unemployment gap between 1960 and 2010. To this end, we set up a two-region OLG model with search unemployment in which we introduce the historical and projected changes in labor-market institutions and demographics. We show that asymmetric institutional changes alone can reproduce a large part of the historical rise in the unemployment gap. However, this result no longer holds once we add asymmetric aging in closed economies. We find this initial result again, and in an even stronger form, when we allow for international capital mobility.
Increased environmental regulations and a milk quota that restricts growth have increased the interest in immigration to the United States by Dutch dairy farmers. A risk-based economic analysis of 23 representative U.S. dairy farms versus a representative Dutch farm shows that risk-averse Dutch dairy farmers would prefer to liquidate their dairy farms and invest in a large dairy in Idaho or north Texas. The risk ranking suggested that continuing to farm in the Netherlands rather than immigrating to the United States is preferred over only two of the 23 U.S. representative farms analyzed.
With the aim of examining the causal structure between foreign directinvestment (FDI) and economic growth, this study derives inductive causalinference using the directed acyclic graph approach, which makes no a prioricausal assumptions. There are three major findings of this study. First,economic growth causes FDI inflows for developing countries, whereas FDIinduces economic growth for developed countries. Second, trade is animportant intermediary to facilitate the interaction between FDI and otherfactors. Third, the stock market is found to be an intermediary thatamplifies the influence on FDI from many causal variables of FDI fordeveloped countries.
This article examines the potential conflict of interest of underwriters in London's foreign sovereign debt markets prior to the Baring crisis of 1890. We describe the main sources of information for investors concerning Argentina, whose government debt default contributed to Baring's collapse, and compare them with those of the underwriters, particularly Baring's. We then present some empirical evidence using data on bond prices and underwriting fees that demonstrate that Baring did not exploit its information lead to the detriment of investors. Finally, we present historical evidence that shows that Baring foresaw default before markets did and consequently planned a bailout loan that could not be issued due to political instability in Buenos Aires.
Spain’s financial position during the late 19th and early 20th centuries has usually been presented as one of persistent deficit on current account, which resulted from her integration into international commodity and factor markets and this, in turn, slowed down the growth of the economy. In this essay a preliminary reconstruction of the balance of payments on current account allows us to reject this view. In fact, a net capital inflow made possible to meet the demand for investment-boosting economic performance. Current account reversals in a context of macroeconomic domestic imperfections help to explain the economic slowdown at the turn of the century.
As the tenth anniversary of EMU is approaching, a debate is underway as to whether the single currency has promoted or hindered convergence among the countries of the Euro Area. On the one hand, there is wide agreement that asymmetric shocks have subsided after the creation of the single currency, but if one moves to examine the catching-up process between the more and less affluent countries of the Euro Area, the evidence is waning. Another worrying development in the Euro Area is the emergence of unprecedented current account deficits in the southern Euro Area countries, while the northern ones enjoy substantial surpluses. To counter these new imbalances, new well-framed policy priorities are required in the Euro Area that put more emphasis on convergence and competitiveness than before.
On admet généralement que la mobilité internationale serait devenue très
forte à la suite de la libéralisation et de l'intégration financière des
vingt dernières années. De façon surprenante, la plupart des travaux
empiriques « à la Feldstein-Horioka » ne valident cette hypothèse. Une
reconsidération de ces estimations conduit toutefois à des résultats neufs.
Les tests, même classiques, confortent l'idée d'un accroissement à long
terme de la mobilitéet la tendance s'est accentuée depuis le début des
années quatre-vingt. Tous les pays industrialisés, grands ou petits, sont
concernés par cette augmentation; la globalisation financière marque
néanmoins une frontière entre ces pays et les pays émergents pour lesquels
l'investissement demeure dépendant de l'épargne intérieure. Dans l'ensemble,
la décorrélation entre investissement et épargne se manifeste par une plus
grande autonomie des flux de capitaux. La relation linéaire entre
investissement et épargne pivote autour d'un point fixe représenté par le
taux d'épargne mondial. Le positionnement des pays par rapport à ce point
fixe permet d'établir une typologie robuste qui remet en cause l'idée reçue
selon laquelle tous les pays seraient égaux devant la globalisation
financière.
On utilise le modèle d’accumulation optimale de Ramsey pour analyser la dynamique des inégalités au sein d’un pays s’ouvrant aux échanges avec un pays plus pauvre. Avec une fonction de production Cobb-Douglas, le modèle prédit, en même temps qu’une augmentation des inégalités de revenu, une diminution des inégalités de patrimoine. Ce résultat reproduit la dynamique croisée des distributions de revenu et de patrimoine observée en France sur la période récente.
Dans un monde à deux pays où la mobilité du capital est parfaite, on analyse l'interdépendance des pays lorsque les agents n'ont pas la même élasticité de substitution intertemporelle dans les deux pays. Cette hypothèse implique que plus l'élasticité de substitution intertemporelle est importante, plus le taux de croissance de la consommation est grand. Deux résultats apparaissent: le premier est que la dynamique de l'économie mondiale n'est pas indépendante de la répartition des richesses. Le second concerne les échanges commerciaux et financiers entre les pays. L'écart entre les taux de croissance de la consommation de chaque pays dû à des préférences différentes des agents est un déterminant essentiel des dynamiques de la balance courante et de la balance commerciale des pays.
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