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Problem solving is a goal-directed activity. As such, it depends critically on abstract, mental representations of a problem, including the identification of the goal that needs to be reached and the operations that allow the problem solver to navigate within the problem space. Because of this, mental representations of the physical, cognitive, and social environments take center stage when problem solving is discussed. The role of mental representations explains why the origins of research on problem solving are so closely related to the origins of the modern approach to perception initiated 100 years ago by the gestalt psychologists. The gestalt psychologists were particularly interested in insight problem solving, where the term “insight” provides an intuitive definition of such problems. We all know that Archimedes had an insight when he shouted out “Eureka” when he discovered the principle of buoyancy. Chapter 1 sets the stage for the remainder of the book, by promising to provide a new formalism that may be able to explain not only insight, but also many other research problems, including problems in mathematics and physics, as well as in scientific discovery. This ambitious plan should keep the students eager to see how it plays out, and by the end of Chapter 11 it should be clear why launching, 70 years ago, a new field called cognitive psychology, was called a scientific revolution.
Deficits in goal-directed behavior (i.e. behavior conducted to achieve a specific goal or outcome) are core to schizophrenia, difficult to treat, and associated with poor functional outcomes. Factors such as negative symptoms, effort-cost decision-making, cognition, and functional skills have all been associated with goal-directed behavior in schizophrenia as indexed by clinical interviews or laboratory-based tasks. However, little work has examined whether these factors relate to the real-world pursuit of goal-directed activities in this population.
Methods
This study aimed to fill this gap by using Ecological Momentary Assessment (four survey prompts per day for 1 week) to test hypotheses about symptom, effort allocation, cognitive, and functional measures associated with planned and completed goal-directed behavior in the daily lives of 63 individuals with schizophrenia.
Results
Individuals with schizophrenia completed more goal-directed activities than they planned [t(62) = −4.01, p < 0.001]. Motivation and pleasure (i.e. experiential) negative symptoms, controlling for depressive symptoms, negatively related to planned goal-directed behavior [odds ratio (OR) 0.92, p = 0.005]. Increased effort expenditure for high probability rewards (planned: OR 1.01, p = 0.034, completed: OR 1.01, p = 0.034) along with performance on a daily functional skills task (planned: OR 1.04, p = 0.002, completed: OR 1.03, p = 0.047) negatively related to both planned and completed goal-directed activity.
Conclusions
Our results present correlates of real-world goal-directed behavior that largely align with impaired ability to make future estimations in schizophrenia. This insight could help identify targeted treatments for the elusive motivated behavior deficits in this population.
Apathy, the reduction of motivation and goal-directed behaviour, is a ubiquitous behavioural syndrome in many neurological disorders. However, apathy measures are limited in non-English speaking countries. The present study aimed to develop a culturally appropriate version of the Vietnamese Frontal Systems Behavioural Scale-Apathy subscale (V-FrSBe-A) and Dimensional Apathy Scale (V-DAS), examine their internal reliability and construct validity (i.e., factor structure, convergent and divergent validity) in a Vietnamese healthy sample and establish preliminary normative cut-offs for clinical and research applications.
Method:
In total, 112 healthy subjects and 64 informants completed the self-report and informant report V-FrSBe-A and V-DAS, developed using a translation, back-translation and cultural adaptation procedure. McDonald’s omega was applied to examine internal reliability. The internal structure of the V-DAS was evaluated using exploratory structural equation model. For both apathy scales, convergent validity was determined by correlations between scales and between informant and self-report versions. Regarding divergent validity, participants completed the Vietnamese Depression Anxiety Stress Scale-21 and V-FrSBe-Disinhibition for depression and disinhibition assessment.
Results:
Both the V-FrSBe-A and V-DAS were reliable (ωt ≥ .74). Dimensional manifestations of apathy in executive, emotional and initiation domains were confirmed on the V-DAS. Both scales were also valid, convergent with each other and divergent from depression and disinhibition symptoms. Cut-off scores for both scales were higher than their English versions.
Conclusion:
The adapted V-FrSBe-A and V-DAS have good reliability and validity for the potential application in clinical groups to advance current knowledge about apathy transculturally and direct more effective clinical care for Vietnamese individuals with neurological disorders.
This chapter examines how memory function enables agency and how memory dysfunction disables agency. Because some memory systems mediating goal-directed behavior may be intact while others are dysfunctional, neurological and psychiatric disorders that impair some of these systems can impair agency to varying degrees. The chapter also analyzes the role of memory in personal identity. Updating the content of episodic memories is necessary to adapt to the environment. But adaptability may come at the expense of identity over an extended period. The chapter discusses precedent autonomy in dementia. It discusses whether the ethical and legal force of an advance directive about medical care in a demented state holds from the time when a person is competent to a time when she is no longer competent and no longer the same person.
We quite naturally attribute mental representations in order to explain actions. The chapter argues that some animal behavior is properly so explained, and thus that some animals truly have beliefs and desires. There are two strands of evidence which separately support this conclusion. First, behavior that is appropriately explained in terms of mental states such as beliefs and desires is behavior directed at a goal relative to which the agent is able to learn; and since human behavior meets this criterion, the chapter discusses on evolutionary grounds, that some animal behavior meets this criterion as well. Second, it shows that a number of different scientific observations of animal behavior strongly support the hypothesis that animals engage in goal-directed behavior, behavior that is organized around a goal with respect to which they are able to learn and, hence, behavior that is justifiably explained in terms of their having beliefs and desires.
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