Bigotry distractions are strategic invocations of racism, transphobia, or negative stigma toward other marginalized groups to shape political discourse. Although the vast majority of Americans agree on large policy issues ranging from reducing air pollution to prosecuting corporate crime, bigotry distractions divert attention from areas of agreement toward divisive identity issues. This article explores how the nefarious targeting of identity groups through bigotry distractions may be the tallest barrier to health reform, and social change more broadly. The discussion extends the literature on dog whistles, strategic racism, and scapegoating.

Georgia State University College of Law Professor Emerita Charity Scott quoted these words from Albert Einstein in June of 2022 as she concluded a tribute to Professor Joseph (Jay) M. Healey, one of the founding lights of health law and health law teaching. She chose the quote because she thought the words and sentiment would resonate with Jay. I repeat it because Dr. Einstein’s words capture the essence and heart of Charity’s approach to teaching, pedagogy, and life. Charity modeled, urged, nudged, and taught the community of health law professors to embrace imagination and creativity. Charity’s vision has helped us be more creative and reflective teachers.2

This symposium Article describes how prison abolitionist arguments also support the hypothesis that a defining goal of health law should be the abolition of hospitals. Like prison abolitionism, the hospital abolition hypothesis can provide a constructive way to shift the focus of legal analysis from substantive dimensions (in health law — cost, quality, access, and equity) to the dimension of power.

As Steve Kaminshine said in his comments at the symposium honoring Charity Scott, I was recruited to come to Georgia State University as a “Law and Bioethics” scholar who had spent more than sixteen years shuttling between an office in a hospital and another in a law school. But when I first visited Georgia State Law, I did not know that more than ten years earlier Charity Scott had spent the better part of an academic year living and breathing clinical ethics at Grady Memorial Hospital.1 Because of her usual habit of immersion in all learning experiences, in that year Charity gained more insight into how hospitals work and how physicians behave when they are knee deep in their professional milieu of life and death decision-making than many full-time bioethics academics do in a career. For the rest of her career Charity kept one foot well planted in the medical context, as an advisor in problems of research ethics, as a teacher in her own medical-legal partnership structured around real-life clinical problems, and as an ethical analyst who could never be accused of mouthing a mantra of phrases, the “vacuous incantation of abstract principles”2 that might pass for bioethics discourse in some circles.

In 2006, the University of Maryland Carey School of Law had the privilege of co-hosting the annual Health Law Professors Conference with the American Society of Law, Medicine & Ethics (ASLME). Coincidentally, as director of the Law & Health Care Program at Maryland, I had the opportunity to announce the winner of the Jay Healey Health Law Teachers’ Award at the conference. The award is given to “professors who have devoted a significant portion of their career to health law teaching and whose selection would honor Jay [Healey’s] legacy through their passion for teaching health law, their mentoring of students and/or other faculty and by their being an inspiration to colleagues and students.”1 Healey, a Professor in the Humanities Department at the University of Connecticut School of Medicine, was the youngest recipient of the Society’s Health Law Teachers’ Award, which he received in 1990. He was passionate about teaching and had the idea to devote a session each year at the annual conference to teaching health law. It was always a plenary session at which he challenged us to be better teachers. Jay died in 1993, at the age of 46, not long after the Health Law Teachers conference that year, which he attended and which also happened to be held in Baltimore at the University of Maryland School of Law. Thereafter, the award was given in his name.

Few people in my memory have a name that more appropriately defines the life they have lived. “Charitable purpose” as defined in O.C.G.A. § 43-17-2 includes any charitable or benevolent purpose including health, education, or social welfare. Anyone who knew Charity Scott knows that she lived a life devoted to providing and improving the health of her community, the education of law students about health law and its use to improve the health of her community, and social welfare by addressing the socio-economic determinants of health. If she had not been assigned that name at birth, those of us who knew her could have easily assigned Charity as a nickname.

This special edition of JLME celebrates the life of Charity Scott, Professor Emerita and Founding Director of the Center for Law, Health & Society at Georgia State University College of Law.

Neither the individualistic regulatory health paradigm nor the vulnerable populations approach of public health can provide the legal structure necessary to address the most pressing problems in health care today. These approaches fail to address conflicts between individuals and populations as well as challenges to qualifying for care and are in inherent conflict with each other, sometimes within the same statute. As health concerns become more global, it is necessary to move past a vulnerable populations approach to a broader population approach that respects individual choice but does not sacrifice community health for liberty interests.

This article explores how the political ideal of data interacts with the legal entitlement of autonomy in the care of pregnant people guided by feminist theory and critical approaches to data. Using Scandinavian legislation and administrative practice, it analyses how the presence or absence of data, namely scientific evidence, interacts with pregnant people’s legal autonomy in healthcare. Data –particularly scientific evidence - is shown as something that is not neutral but open to interpretation and misappropriation. First, administrative complaints illustrate that not only a lack of scientific studies on pregnant people but also patriarchal attitudes have implications for care. Second, Scandinavian legislation authorizes the involuntary detention of pregnant drug users despite an absence of evidence supporting such drastic actions. Third, complaints bodies are found to frame injury to pregnant bodies as a natural consequence of birth, despite clear evidence as to the duties of healthcare professionals in preventing harm. A relational approach that sees the pregnant body and fetus as integrated though quintessentially unequal is needed. Evidence is not the only answer; an approach that recognizes the dignity of pregnant people must be central. This requires eliminating coercion, recognizing the pregnant patient as the decision maker in healthcare choices and prizing the birthing patient’s voice as a valuable data source.

This paper challenges historically preconceived notions surrounding a minor’s ability to make medical decisions, arguing that federal health law should be reformed to allow minors with capacity as young as age 12 to consent to their own Centers for Diseases Control and Prevention (CDC)-approved COVID-19 vaccinations. This proposal aligns with and expands upon current exceptions to limitations on adolescent decision-making. This analysis reviews the historic and current anti-vaccination sentiment, examines legal precedence and rationale, outlines supporting ethical arguments regarding adolescent decision-making, and offers rebuttals to anticipated ethical counterarguments.

Disputes over frozen embryos represent a particularly problematic case, legally and ethically, due to the ambiguity of their moral and legal status and the potential rights-claims which can be made with regard to them. Recent work has contextualised frozen embryos as liminal and suggested a contextual approach to their legal classification. By appeal to personal property law, with a lens provided by Roman law doctrines, and reproductive bioethics, we argue that frozen embryos may be subjects of property rights, providing a more stable framework for dispute resolution. To illustrate how a property approach would work, we reconsider the facts of the influential Evans case and argue that if a proprietary rather than promissory estoppel claim had been pursued, the reverse outcome may have been reached, to the benefit of women who are disproportionately harmed in these scenarios.

In light of a history of categorical exclusion, it is critical that pregnant people are included in research to help improve the knowledge base and interventions needed to address public health. Yet the volatile legal landscape around reproductive rights in the United States threatens to undue recent progress made toward the greater inclusion of pregnant people in research. We offer ethical and practical guidance for researchers, sponsors, and institutional review boards to take specific steps to minimize legal risks and ensure the ethical conduct of research with pregnant people in an evolving legal environment.

This column will be the first in a series exploring innovative ways to teach concepts and ideas in health law across a wide variety of classrooms, schools, and curriculums.

Death by neurological criteria (DNC) has remained controversial since its introduction over 50 years ago. Objections to the diagnosis of DNC have been coming before the courts in various jurisdictions, including at least seven recent challenges before the UK courts. In responding to these challenges, the UK courts have expressed no doubts as to the status of DNC and have affirmed that following a diagnosis of DNC, the matter of best interests is no longer relevant. Yet, the courts have also, tacitly, acknowledged that DNC is not quite the same as cardio-pulmonary death.

This paper begins by setting out the origins of DNC as a medico-legal construction, and its ongoing controversies. It then analyses the treatment of DNC, including authorisation of DNC testing, by the UK courts. It shows that the courts have been operating a form of ad hoc reasonable accommodation of different views of DNC but have done so without normative engagement. The paper argues that the courts should recognise that DNC disputes are not simply concerned with whether, as a matter of fact, DNC has been correctly diagnosed, but also raise profound questions about rights and interests, both of families and of the DNC dead.

The prison-industrial complex has historically operated as a mechanism for social control generally and as a tool to restrict women’s reproductive capacities specifically. Reproductive justice is a domain within the practice of health law. However, health law as currently practiced is ill-equipped to understand how the carceral state functions as a structural determinant of health or how legacies of oppression have facilitated the abridgment of incarcerated women’s reproductive capacities.

Several countries maintain universal health coverage, which implies responsibility to organize delivery formats of healthcare services and products for citizens. In Brazil, the health system has a principle of universal access for more than 30 years, but many deficiencies remain and the country observes a day practice for those seeking judicial decisions to determine provision of healthcare.

This Article explores the connections between disability and health justice in service of further tethering the two theories and practices. The author contends that disability should shift from marker of health inequity alone to critical demographic in the analytical and practical application of health justice. This theoretical move creates a more robust understanding of the harms of health injustice, its complexities, and, remedially, reveals underexplored legal and policy pathways to promote health justice.