Do recent increases in women’s representation around the world have implications for international relations? We argue that greater representation of women in legislatures increases the likelihood of human rights treaty ratification for two reasons. First, given their shared gendered experiences of exclusion and discrimination, women legislators will advocate on behalf of marginalized groups on an international scale as transnational surrogate representatives. Second, women legislators may be more inclined to prioritize the ratification of human rights treaties because these treaties align with their domestic policy preferences, which aim to support marginalized groups. We contend that, in countries where ratification depends upon legislative approval, legislatures are more likely to ratify human rights treaties as women’s presence increases. Using an original dataset of 201 multilateral treaties, we find that countries become more likely to ratify human rights treaties as levels of women’s legislative representation increase.

The potential for mutual influence or “spillover” between economic and security cooperation is a long-standing area of interest for policymakers and scholars alike. This paper examines how network dynamics affect spillover. We focus on two prominent types of formal bilateral cooperation—defense cooperation agreements (DCAs) and bilateral investment treaties (BITs)—both of which have proliferated dramatically in the post-Cold War international system. We argue that existing theoretical and empirical approaches to economic-security spillover focus too strictly on influences at the bilateral level. As with other forms of international cooperation, BITs and DCAs comprise larger international networks. Governments develop portfolios of BITs or DCAs with distinct structural goals in mind, and they implement specific strategies in pursuing those goals. With BITs, governments follow a network-hierarchy strategy that allows them to influence treaty design and protect their firms. In DCAs, governments instead favor a network-community strategy focused on pooling collective security goods among groups of like-minded collaborators. When these network strategies complement one another, they promote cooperative economic-security spillover. When they conflict, however, they inhibit spillover, such that cooperation in economic or security issues discourages cooperation in the opposing issue area.

This article challenges the orthodox view of international law, according to which states have no legal duty to cooperate. It argues for this legal duty in the context of COVID-19, based on the ethical principles of solidarity, stewardship, and subsidiarity. More specifically, the article argues that states have a legal duty to cooperate during a pandemic (as solidarity requires); and while this duty entails an extraterritorial responsibility to care for and assist other nations (as stewardship requires), the legal duty to cooperate still allows states to attend first to the basic needs of those under their own jurisdiction—namely, fellow nationals and residents (as subsidiarity requires). The article provides a definition and philosophical justifications for this legal duty that are lacking in the literature by examining its application to a current COVID-19 controversy: namely, states’ responsibility to assist other countries in greater need by, inter alia, exporting at a discount or donating scarce COVID-19 treatments (including vaccines). In providing a principled tripartite account of pandemic governance, this conceptual and normative article offers a new lens for debating the potential international treaty for pandemic prevention, preparedness, and response that has now been drafted and is under negotiation at the World Health Assembly, by responding to the recent backlash against multilateralism by substantiating global co-responsibilities in times of pandemics and beyond.

International society has recently witnessed the emergence of two interrelated trends: on the one hand, the significant rise in transnational crimes, which constitute a serious challenge to States’ traditional security capabilities, and the noticeable increase in the number of international instruments put in place to bring that challenge to acceptable levels, on the other hand. The great emphasis the international community has put on the principle “aut dedere aut judicare” to strengthen the universal legal regime against serious crimes and to deny safe haven to their perpetrators is challenged not only by political, legislative and practical considerations pertaining to the lack of ratification and incorporation of international conventions and the wide disparity between States as to their implementation capacity, but also by the inherent differences between States’ differing legal systems. This is an area that, despite its relevance to international cooperation and human rights, has long been ignored by criminal justice comparative studies. Based on actual cases such as the Ramda and El Guerbouzi cases, this article examines and assesses the impact of the differences between civil law and common law systems on the effectiveness of international cooperation and human rights. It argues that, unless these differences are acknowledged and properly dealt with, perpetrators of serious crime will continue to constitute a serious threat to our peace and security.

Almost all technology is dual use to some degree: it has both civilian and military applications. This feature creates a dilemma for cooperation. States can design arms control institutions to curtail costly competition over some military technology. But they also do not want to limit valuable civilian uses. How does the dual use nature of technology shape the prospects for cooperation? We argue that the duality of technology presents a challenge not by its very existence but rather through the ways it alters information constraints on the design of arms control institutions. We characterize variation in technology along two dual use dimensions: (1) the ease of distinguishing military from civilian uses; and (2) the degree of integration within military enterprises and the civilian economy. Distinguishability drives the level of monitoring needed to detect violations. When a weapon is indistinguishable from its civilian counterpart, states must improve detection though intelligence collection or intrusive inspections. Integration sharpens the costs of disclosing information to another state. For highly integrated technology, demonstrating compliance could expose information about other capabilities, increasing the security risks from espionage. Together, these dimensions generate expectations about the specific information problems states face as they try to devise agreements over various technologies. We introduce a new qualitative data set to assess both variables and their impact on cooperation across all modern armament technologies. The findings lend strong support for the theory. Efforts to control emerging technologies should consider how variation in the dual use attributes shapes this tension between detection and disclosure.

Long examined by the academic literature as a challenging technical-legal fiction with a strong geopolitical impact, border carbon adjustment is on its way to becoming a European reality. This Article provides an overview of the European legislative process with a comparison of the initial Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (‘CBAM’) project presented by the Commission in July 2021 with the positions formalised by the European Parliament and the Council in 2022. With a detour through the doctrine of international law and building upon the work of Professor Thomas Cottier on the concept of Common Concern of Humankind (‘CCH’) in international law, the Article examines the European CBAM, and more broadly, the recent multiplication of unilateral environmental initiatives with extraterritorial impacts, as a contextual transition from a logic of coexistence to a logic of cooperation in the field of environmental policies. It concludes on the necessity to design the European CBAM accordingly, by redistributing its direct revenues and developing open and inclusive cooperation frameworks, to accelerate this transition in the field of industrial decarbonisation.