This article considers, summarises, and analyses the merits of various arguments regarding options for regulating (or not regulating) ‘gig work’, concluding with observations about currently proposed legislation. There is a strong argument for regulating gig work. Many workers are vulnerable, and many of the arguments against any form or regulation – in terms of innovation, productivity, employment, or the inevitability of this trend – lack merit. Current definitions of employment, indeed current labour law, are not adequate and many, but not all, gig workers are like employees in terms of the control exercised over them. However, treating gig workers as employees would encounter several problems. The outcomes would be uncertain. Not all would be covered. Many gig workers would be opposed (despite wanting protection). The gig firms could render such legislation ineffective, or alternatively succeed in mobilising opposition, almost ensuring such legislation would be revoked at the next change of government. Regulating gig work as a form of contracting is a viable alternative. It has the potential to attract support from gig workers themselves, undermining opposition by the gig firms, and attract support from some parts of capital. The New South Wales experience shows us that regulation of gig work as contracting is feasible and politically sustainable. Despite limitations, the ‘Closing the Loopholes’ Bill provides a sustainable model for regulating and protecting many ‘gig economy’ workers. It is time to envisage labour law as something that extends not just to employees but to many contractors as well.

Australian labour market and industrial relations policies are poised for fundamental change. A combination of political and macroeconomic factors has created a historic opportunity to turn away from the individualised, market-driven labour market policy that has prevailed since the 1980s, in favour of a more interventionist and egalitarian approach. Factors contributing to this moment include the breakdown of bipartisan consensus around key neoliberal precepts; growing public anger over inequality, insecure work and stagnant wages; and a weakening of macroeconomic conditions. Australia’s labour market is now marked by underutilisation of labour in various forms, a deterioration in job quality (especially the growth of insecure and precarious work) and unprecedented weakness in wages. The deterioration in job quality and distributional outcomes is the long-term legacy of the post-1980s shift away from Australia’s earlier tradition of equality-seeking institutional structures and regulatory practices. The current malaise in labour markets should be confronted with a comprehensive strategy to both increase the quantity of work available to Australian workers and improve its quality. The major components of such a strategy are identified, and their prospects considered, in light of the economic and political forces reshaping Australia’s labour market.

The employment relationship in a growing number of industries with large concentrations of low wage workers has become ‘fissured’, where the lead firms that collectively determine the product market conditions in which wages and conditions are set have become separated from the actual employment of the workers who provide goods or services. Instead, the direct employers of low wage workers operate in far more competitive markets that create conditions for non-compliance. We examine this evolution in employment and its implications for public policy in the US, discuss the factors driving fissured employment and sketch its main features and outcomes. We then look at the traditional methods used for labour standards enforcement in the US and discuss why they are poorly suited to address fissured workplaces. Finally, we survey how public policies might better address the realities of the modern workplace, including efforts in this regard by the Obama administration.

This essay examines a significant event in Australia’s economic and labour relations history in which an industrial relations court acted against government policy but in line with the advice of professional economists to impose a general wage reduction. This determination, unique during the period of central wage fixation, was made as the country fell into deep depression in 1930–1931. Arguments that a reduction in purchasing power would exacerbate the depression did not prevail over expert economic advice that wage reduction would lessen the structural consequences of reduced rural export income. The Court determined that the loss of real national income had to be accommodated without a wider package of measures such as exchange rate depreciation or expansionary monetary and fiscal policies. The impressive endeavours of the Court to understand and respond to a difficult economic reality represented a significant elevation of the status of wages policy in macroeconomic management – one that was to last for 60 years.

The impact of minimum wage legislation has been widely discussed and is a major concern among labour economists. This article investigates, from economic, legal, international political, trade, and social perspectives, the possibility of decoupling foreign workers’ wages from the minimum wage in Taiwan. The results show that foreign workers’ wages cannot possibly be decoupled from the minimum wage, and foreign workers should not be treated as a separate group of workers in Taiwan’s minimum wage policy.

This paper builds an estimation model to test whether improved labour standards necessarily lead firms to send work offshore to countries with lower wages and fewer employment protections; or improved labour standards influence the labour market, where with time, firms attract more skilled workers, which help deter outward foreign direct investment (FDI). When more firms comply with improved labour standards, the industrial relations climate also improves as non-compliance usually causes labour unrest. Using a model built on pooled cross-sectional time-series data from 2008–17, we studied the role of changes in labour unrest and the percentage of skilled workers in the labour force in predicting outward FDI in Taiwan. Per our estimation model, we found the percentage of skilled workers steadily increased as Taiwan maintained improved labour standards. The increase in skilled workers also increased labour costs making it challenging for firms to stay onshore. However, skilled workers helped firms improve productivity, which justified increased labour costs. As a result, firms in Taiwan that complied with labour standards found it less challenging to pay higher wages and stayed onshore.

Informed by autonomist perspectives on precarious work and labour subjectivity, this article discusses the dynamics between autonomy and job precarity. Based on purposive sampling, the qualitative findings, drawn from interviews with precarious workers aged 18–29 years in Hong Kong, reveal tensions among four types of aspirations. First, the desire for achieving freedom and individual ambition in work made the respondents critical of the notion of employment-related stability. Second, a determination to break with mainstream career paths empowered young people to take alternative pathways to new modes of work and life. Third, precarious employment was seen as a stepping stone for realising plans for travel or study. Finally, tolerance of precarity was perceived as a transitional stage in their striving for future stability. However, the findings also show the structured dilemmas experienced by young workers regarding the complex relationship between autonomy and precarity in a neoliberal labour market. Some young workers pursued work–life autonomy, constrained by precarious employment relations, acknowledging and bearing the costs, while some strategically used precarity in individual negotiations with employers to realise their goals. This article analyses young workers’ subjectivity through the lenses of autonomy and age and pushes the boundary of precarity studies beyond an implicit dichotomy between determinism and voluntarism.

Skills that are difficult to automate are expected to increase in demand and reward according to skill-biased technological change advocates, who have identified high rewards for cognitive and social skills. However, such broad skill categories involve numerous essential competencies that can be differentially rewarded or go simply unrewarded. Using US data, this article analyses the demand for and payment of linguistic competency, a cross-cutting kind of skill that is basic for both cognitive and social work in the new economy and is one of the human capacities that is most difficult to automate. While human capital theory predicts an increase in wages as the demand for linguistic skills rises, from cultural/institutional perspectives, it can be theorised that communicative abilities and foreign-language knowledge are socially undervalued because of their association with feminised activities, ethnicity, and low-status service jobs. We analyse the demand and reward for linguistic skills through a two-step analysis of occupational and individual data derived from two sources: the Occupational Information Network and the Current Population Survey. Results show that while ‘hard’ verbal-reasoning skills are associated with high average salaries, as is predicted by neoclassical theory, the potentially undervalued linguistic skills – interactive and multilingual skills – are unrewarded and even penalised. This evidence requires further political attention, given its implications for large number of workers, especially in feminised, low-status service jobs.

This article considers the national industrial relations policy aspects of the economic recovery agenda in Australia, in the context of the theory of monopsonistic competition, employment and productivity. This framework acknowledges the employer ability to exercise discretion in the setting of wages. The proposed reforms were unlikely to lead to any increase in economic growth through higher labour productivity or employment. Proposed agendas in enterprise bargaining, greenfields agreements and award simplification (as well as union regulation), would principally have reduced labour costs and incomes. In many circumstances, allowing employers to offer lower wages may lead to fewer filled jobs, higher labour turnover and absenteeism and lower employment. The incentive on employers to improve labour productivity may fall. Proposals to more energetically punish wage theft may have had the opposite effects, but these were abandoned by the government despite support from the other parties. In the end, the only part of the reform agenda to pass Parliament concerned changes to the definition and treatment of casual employees, but casual employment grew strongly before the Bill took effect, the crisis the Bill was meant to solve eased before the Bill was passed, and even if successful the changes would have done little to boost labour productivity.

Adam Smith is widely regarded as the father of political economics, and as one who provided the philosophical underpinnings of much of neoclassical economics. Since the mid-1970s there has been renewed interest in, and reinterpretation of, Smith’s work. This paper looks at two aspects of this reinterpretation, the first of which is Smith’s writing on wages. Smith was an advocate of high wages, a view that strongly contrasted with the received wisdom of the day. He considered that a wage which provided for a reasonable standard of living was essential for the development of an economy. The second aspect encompasses Smith’s notion of the subsistence wage which traces its historic lineage to the Greek philosophers. The paper concludes that Smith, the champion of ‘liberty’ and non-government interference in markets, would probably have supported the notion of minimum wages, such as are now mandated in the United Kingdom, the United States and Australia. Nevertheless, the mandating of minimum wages is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the achievement of living wage outcomes.

In this article, we study the minimum wage setting reform in Russia that aimed to decentralise the fixing of the minimum wage and to increase the involvement of social partners into this process. The old system of minimum wage setting was based on a single nationwide minimum wage which was differentiated across regions and occupations via a cumbersome framework of coefficients. The new system is a mixture of the government-set minimum wage at the federal level and collective agreements at the regional level. We show that the system of minimum wage setting has become more flexible. The reform succeeded in raising the real value of the minimum wage and increasing earnings of low-paid workers without causing significant negative effects in terms of employment. The reform did not lead to greater regional variation of minimum wages. Nevertheless, it introduced some new imbalances: an unintended consequence of the reform was the emergence of separate regional wage sub-minima for private and public sector workers in many regions. The major challenge in coming years is to strengthen the institutions of collective bargaining, introduce evidence-based evaluation and boost the capacities of government and non-government monitoring agencies.

Under what circumstances can minimum wages increase without adverse effects on employment levels? In 31 Chinese provinces between 2004 and 2015, the employment effect of a minimum wage depended on the minimum wage level, foreign direct investment, per capita gross domestic product and labour productivity. A minimum wage increase reduced hiring as foreign direct investment inflow rose, regardless of the amount of investment. Any positive employment effect of a minimum wage increase was mitigated by per capita gross domestic product growth, except when per capita gross domestic product was above the average. Above-average labour productivity enhancement significantly mitigated the adverse employment effect of the minimum wage. Employers responded to a rising minimum wage by increasing hiring when the geometric growth rates of the minimum wage and foreign direct investment for a particular province within a period of time were above the overall average across provinces. However, they scrutinised both annual and overall economic growth within a time period when making hiring decisions in the face of minimum wage adjustments. An inverted U-shape relationship between minimum wages and employment suggest a maximum threshold value for the minimum wage. Thus, government policy measures should foster short-term and long-term economic growth, to facilitate employment creation when minimum wages increase.

The COVID-19 pandemic has created economic crises and considerable loss of employment throughout the world. In the Australian context, social distancing restrictions and business closures contributed to a dramatic increase in unemployment, with 780,000 people losing work within weeks of the first COVID-19 outbreaks. Job losses were concentrated in casualised industries such as retail, recreation, arts and culture, hospitality, and accommodation. We examine policy discourses framing independent work, entrepreneurial workers and flexible work relations as essential for ‘economic recovery’, where this means business flexibility, productivity and future economic prosperity. We draw on these framings to show how the equation of flexible work relations and productivity underpins the Australian Government’s response to unemployment caused by the pandemic, as reflected in policy announcements and proposed changes to industrial relations law. In these proposals, constructions of ‘job creation’ and ‘economic recovery’ rationalise industrial relations changes that further empower business, through conflating public and business interest. At the same time, ensuing labour market deregulation and the changing profile of business renders the very idea of ‘jobs’ tendentious.

This paper evaluates the impact of an increase in the federal or state minimum wage on the egg industry, where labor is a key input. This analysis uses an for Iowa, a key egg-producing state. When spread across the industry, the total negative effects of the increased minimum wage do not appear to be economically significant. This is due largely to the Iowa egg industry’s current equilibrium wage of $13.50 an hour. Thus, a $15.00 minimum wage adds only $1.50; however, to stay competitive, egg industry employers likely would increase their wage above $15.00. Despite these seemingly small effects, egg producers may struggle in the short run to respond to immediate labor expenses should Iowa or the United States not phase in its minimum wage over the course of several years.

Following the covid-induced lockdowns, many commented on the role the German model of Kurzarbeit could play in reducing unemployment. Other countries emulated the model. Looking at the experiences of Germany, the UK, Sweden and the USA, the article analyses the strengths and weaknesses of short-time working (STW) schemes. It asks whether STW has been well designed to have optimal short and longer run impact. It is quite effective as a short-term palliative, but in longer downturns, its weaknesses come to the fore. It is by no means clear that the UK needs a permanent replacement for the furlough.

We estimate the changing value of workplace pensions in the UK and incorporate their value into an estimate of the public sector pay differential. Falling pension membership in the private sector and growing value of public service pensions led to a significant increase in the estimated public sector pay differential from 1997 to 2009, even though headline pay grew faster in the private sector. From 2009 to 2012, although pay grew faster in the public sector, reforms to public service defined benefit pensions, particularly indexation to the CPI rather than RPI, significantly reduced the public pay differential.

State and local pension plans are increasingly moving from the traditional defined benefit (DB) model to non-DB models that generally allow for participant-directed investment. This shift has important implications for the management of the more than US$3 trillion in assets held to finance public employee retirement benefits. To investigate these implications, we introduce new data from a nationwide survey of public DB and non-DB plans and a unique data set on thousands of individual investors in the state of Florida's defined contribution (DC) plan. Using these sources, we explore how participant involvement in the public sector affects the distribution of asset class allocations, management fees, investment outcomes, and portfolio rebalancing at both the individual and aggregate levels. We found that there is little difference between the DB and non-DB plans in terms of asset mix, returns, and fees, except that DB plan have greater access and allocations to alternative investments. We also found that while the average individual DC plan participant allocated their asset similarly to the DB plan, black females and older white males, on average, invested on opposite tails of the risk spectrum.

This paper addresses the issue of underemployment in the UK labour market – the demand for hours of work is less than workers’ willingness to supply extra hours. Workers would like to work more hours, but there is insufficient product demand to justify additional hours. This phenomenon has been evident in the UK labour market for some time, but has grown significantly during the Great Recession. In this paper, we develop a new index of underemployment which is intended to combine indicators of excess capacity on the extensive (jobs) and intensive (hours) margins of the labour market. This index continued to increase during 2012, though unemployment was stable. The paper also investigates the microeconomic determinants of underemployment, finding that it is particularly prevalent among the young and unqualified.

Studies using data from the early 1990s suggested that while the progressive Social Security benefit formula succeeded in redistributing benefits from individuals with high earnings to individuals with low earnings, it was much less successful in redistributing benefits from households with high earnings to households with low earnings. Wives often earned much less than their husbands. As a result, much of the redistribution at the individual level was effectively from high earning husbands to their own lower earning wives. In addition, spouse and survivor benefits accrue disproportionately to women from high income households. Both factors mitigate redistribution at the household level. It has been argued that with the increase in the labor force participation and earnings of women, Social Security now should do a better job of redistributing benefits at the household level. To be sure, when we compare outcomes for a cohort with a household member age 51 to 56 in 1992 with those from a cohort born twelve years later, redistribution at the household level has increased over time. Nevertheless, as of 2004 there still is substantially less redistribution of benefits from high to low earning households than from high to low earning individuals.

This article explains the role of evidence in determining the recommendations made by the Low Pay Commission (LPC) for the National Minimum Wage (NMW). First, it sets out the process of recommending the minimum wage including the role of evidence. Second, it summarises the evidence available on the impact of the minimum wage before discussing how that evidence has informed the recommendations for the adult rate of the minimum wage in the LPC's reports. It concludes by assessing the extent to which the NMW might be regarded as a success and considers whether the recent financial crisis will alter the evidence-based approach so far adopted by the LPC.