This paper examines the impact of cross-ownership on the strategic incentive of environmental corporate social responsibility (ECSR) within a green managerial delegation contract in a triopoly market engaged in price competition. It demonstrates that bilateral cross-ownership between insiders provides weak incentives to undertake ECSR, which has a non-monotone relationship with cross-ownership shares, while it provides strong incentives for outsiders, which increases the ECSR level as cross-ownership increases. It also compares unilateral cross-ownership and finds that a firm that owns shares in its rival has a greater incentive to undertake ECSR than its partially-owned rival, while an outsider has more incentive than firms in bilateral scenarios. These findings reveal that a firm's incentive to increase a market price through ECSR critically depends on its cross-ownership share, while it decreases environmental damage and increases social welfare when the environmental damage is serious.

The degree to which legislation on labour relations and other societal institutions creates value and mitigates harm is explored in this article through a framework designed to guide both the authoring and the analysis of objects of such legislation. Creating value and mitigating harm are typically explicit in the objects of public policy and implicit in adjudication, administration and adherence under public policies. Although conceptually distinct, creating value and mitigating harm can be both complementary and detrimental to each other. This article reviews various combinations of legislative objects over more than a century of Australian labour and employment relations policy. The objects examined include the prevention of industrial disputes, the introduction of a social minimum wage, the expansion of enterprise bargaining, expansion or curtailment of tribunal powers by government and other developments. Questions of ‘for whom?’ value is created or harm is mitigated are key. As an inductive study, the article concludes with hypotheses to guide future research, including implications that reach beyond Australia and employment legislation.

This extended Review Article assesses the changing role of the corporation in history, using the 2018 book by Oxford scholar Colin Mayer entitled ‘Prosperity’ as a basis for the analysis. This is a traditional review article centred around the Mayer book, but as we end we take our argument, albeit tentatively, to other related issues, beyond the Mayer argument. The corporation may be viewed in a positive sense as a creator of wealth and ‘prosperity’ for society in general, or as in a negative sense as generating ‘prosperity’ only for the few, shareholders and executives at the expense of the many, including workers, customers and future generations. Colin Mayer’s book visits both sides of this ‘prosperity’ equation and the title of the book derives from this recognition. Our argument is that even within the limits of contemporary neo-liberal global capitalism, corporations could be a force for more sustainable and balanced economic growth, as well as for social and environmental good. This requires a clarification of its ‘purpose’ as well as changes in the composition of its decision-making structures and revised mandates of its boards and sub-committees such as its remuneration committees that often have been given the power alone to determine executive pay. But we argue (albeit only suggestively) in the final section that the nature and variety of capitalism itself may have to be addressed alongside firm level changes for the long-term good and sustainability of a more equal society. Mayer shows that since its birth in Roman times, as an agency for promoting public works and the public good, the corporation has taken on many different roles, with varying purpose. Only in the last 50 years has the Milton Friedman doctrine, that companies should have only one role, of maximizing shareholder wealth, become the dominant explanation for the purpose of the corporation. We are not confident that corporations will voluntarily move in these progressive directions, especially given the continuing stranglehold of neo-liberal globalization. A push for broader social and economic change from below through struggle may be essential.

The reform of corporate governance is again on the agenda in the wake of Enron and excessive risk-taking by financial institutions. However, the search for new and better forms of governance often seems to lack guiding principles. A theory of corporate governance ought to emerge from a theory of the firm. Yet, the literature shows how this project is both difficult and far from complete. In this paper we review how existing theory provides a variety of arguments favouring either a shareholder or a stakeholder orientation. These arguments may depend on whether the prime objective for governance is improved current performance or a more long-term focus for firms. A brief review of recent US governance reforms is given as a backdrop to discussing more far-reaching proposals that have emerged in the recent literature; a greater role for institutional investors on the one hand or a return to managerial capitalism on the other.