While there is literature on ‘populist securitisation’ and on the ‘securitisation of Islam’, the possibility that some populists may desecuritise Islam is not sufficiently explored. Left-wing populist parties have demonstrated solidarity towards Muslim minorities in Europe through a discourse based on inclusionary rhetoric and deconstruction of the securitising narratives promoted by mainstream and populist right-wing parties. However, their attitude towards Islam can be ambiguous. This paper argues that left-wing populists tend to desecuritise Islam. However, desecuritisation happens in ways that do not always accommodate Muslims’ religious freedoms. This happens because the driver of the left-wing populist desecuritisation of Islam lies in the left-wing thick ideology surrounding populism and not in the populist thin core. I illustrate this argument through the case study of Jean-Luc Mélenchon, leader of the left-wing populist party La France Insoumise. Through a discourse analysis of texts from 2009 to 2022, I show that Mélenchon has predominantly desecuritised Islam. While his desecuritisation is populist, it has not been truly emancipatory for Muslims. Although a more committed fight against Islamophobia has emerged since 2019, Mélenchon’s ideological attachment to laïcité hinders a full rearticulation of French political community based on genuine recognition of Muslims’ religious freedoms.

Does American identity predict preferences for anti-democratic policies that aim to marginalize Muslim Americans? Absent significant priming of inclusive elements of American identity, we argue that individuals with stronger attachments to American identity will be less likely than their counterparts to reject a range of anti-Muslim policies that are antithetical to principles of religious liberty and equality. Across three surveys and multiple measures, American identity powerfully predicts preferences for curbing the civil liberties of Muslim citizens. Particularly striking is the finding that the effect of American identity spans the partisan divide; it consistently explains the endorsement of exclusionary policies among self-identified Democrats, who typically hold more progressive policy positions toward minority groups than Republicans. Overall, our study highlights the contradictory and exclusionary nature of American identity, which has important implications for minority groups constructed as outside the boundaries of Americanness.

Much sociological attention has focused on Black identity within the United States. Less attention, however, has been given to understanding how immigrant and native-born streams of U.S. Black Muslims articulate American identity. In this study I ask: how do second-generation Black American Muslims and indigenous Black American Muslims compare in the ways they narrate connections among race, American identity, and Islam? Using data from thirty-one in-depth interviews with Black Muslims living in Houston, TX, I find that racial double-consciousness complicates American identity for respondents. While indigenous Black American respondents critique racist U.S. histories and structural inequities, I argue that in certain spaces Muslim identity reinforces American identity. For second-generation respondents, however, American identity is reinforced through embracing immigrant status. This study extends Du Boisian double-consciousness by making a case for “layered double-consciousness.” I argue that layered double-consciousness better explains how Black Muslims perceive their racial, religious, and national identities across macro levels within the context of the United States and meso levels within the Muslim American community.

This is a study on the inclusion of Muslims in liberal democracies in the presence of value conflict. We focus on handshaking controversies that appear to pit gender equality against religious freedom. The possible outcomes seem mutually exclusive: either conservative Muslim minorities must conform to the norms of the majority culture, or non-Muslim majorities must acquiesce to the legitimacy of conservative Muslim ideas. Using a trio of experiments to replicate our results, we demonstrate the efficacy of introducing alternative gestures of respect. Presented with a substitute gesture of respect – placing the ‘hand on heart’ – non-Muslim demands for Muslim conformity drop dramatically. The results of the handshaking experiments call out a general lesson. Thanks to the ingenuity and versatility of cultural customs to signal respect, value conflicts can be open to resolution in everyday encounters without minorities or majorities having to forsake their convictions.

This paper analyzes relationships between Islamic religious behaviors and civic engagement in Europe and North America. Using data from an original survey of Muslims in Canada, France, Germany, the UK, and the United States, it finds that Muslim religious behaviors relate to civic behaviors in varied ways. The conventional distinction between public and private religious behaviors does not graft perfectly on to Islamic religious behaviors, but the way Islamic religious behaviors straddle the public-private divide help explain their relationships with civic behaviors. Mosque attendance, an example of public religious behavior, is positively associated with secular organizational membership and mainstream political behaviors, and negatively associated with protest activity. Private, or quasi-private, religious behaviors are more commonly associated with protest activities. There are some national-level differences in patterns of civic engagement after controlling for other determinants, but not many, suggesting similar mechanisms mobilize and facilitate Muslim civic incorporation across national contexts. The results suggest that Islamic religious behaviors create diverse opportunities for Muslims to engage as civic citizens.

Water conservation is of particular importance for arid regions, including many Muslim-majority countries. With the added pressures of human population growth and expansion and global climate change, water conservation efforts are imperative to extending the life of current water supplies as well as to sourcing water treatment methods that are religiously congruent. We review Qur’anic verses that address water usage and conservation. We searched the English translations of the King Fahd Complex for the Printing of the Holy Qur’an and the King Saud University Electronic Moshaf Project for Qur’anic scripture related to water and water conservation. A total of 25 verses were found that related to creation, water usage for agriculture and food provision/production and as a common resource for humanity. Qur’anic scripture encourages gratitude for water and wise stewardship of this resource. Specific prohibitions against the reuse of water (e.g., treated water) were not found, and recent Islamic literature supports the use of cleansed greywater. Treated greywater may thus be an additional source for agricultural needs, thus reducing the stress placed on already limited water supplies. Water conservation falls within Qur’anic scripture.

Although diverging influences have always characterized the relation between religion and democracy, in Italy, tensions arising from these divergences are especially exacerbated by the country’s current religious diversity and plurality, and they are magnified when combined with chronic emergencies such as immigration and international terrorism. These critical factors complicate the application of freedom of religion and the supreme principle of secularism (principio supremo di laicità), which are essential parts of the Italian legal system. This article analyzes these aspects of the law by considering the relation between Islamic communities and the state. In particular, the article focuses on both endogenous influences (Italy’s traditional system of state-church relationship) and exogenous influences (immigration and international terrorism). These factors muddle the interpretation of constitutional rights, including the right of Muslims and Islamic groups to be equal and equally free before the law.

Two dominant explanations for ethnic bias in distributional outcomes are electoral incentives and out-group prejudice. This article proposes a novel and complementary explanation for the phenomenon: variation in legibility across ethnic groups. The author argues that states will allocate fewer resources to groups from which they cannot gather accurate information or collect taxes. The argument is supported by original data on state aid from the 1891/1892 famine in the Russian Empire. Qualitative and quantitative analyses show that districts with a larger Muslim population experienced higher famine mortality and received less generous public assistance. The Muslims, historically ruled via religious intermediaries, were less legible to state officials and generated lower fiscal revenues. State officials could not count on the repayment of food loans or collect tax arrears from Muslim communes, so they were more likely to withhold aid. State relief did not vary with the presence of other minorities that were more legible and generated more revenue.