This article explores the complex dynamics of financial innovation in early modern times, challenging linear models of temporal and spatial divisions that tend to shape our understanding of the evolution of financial systems. It supports the idea that innovation should be viewed as a non-linear and contextual process, involving diverse stakeholders and characterised by interactions and unexpected occurrences. The study focuses on the dissemination and trajectories of financial innovations, specifically the bill of exchange and its variation, the ricorsa, as well as the transferability and negotiability of commercial paper. It does so by investigating the interactions and exchanges between merchants and bankers from diverse backgrounds during the sixteenth-century Lyon fairs, using the archival records of one of the first Italian banks in Lyon (Salviati). The study reveals the mutual influence and acculturation among these agents and challenges the compartmentalisation of financial expertise. Through an analysis of transactions recorded in the Salviati bank's ledgers, the article highlights previously unknown uses of commercial paper by Southern merchant communities and discusses the factors that may have hindered the full-scale development of endorsement and discount in the Lyon trading networks, despite their potential benefits. The results provide insights into the intricate nature of financial innovation and the influence of structural and cultural factors on its development.

Financial markets derive their political and societal legitimacy from their ability to produce fair and accurate prices. However, reviewing the literature on how stock exchanges price securities, we find an inherent tension between market organization and price disclosure, which is borne out by this special issue's historical case studies.

For most of its history Amsterdam securities trading was entirely unregulated and spread over various venues frequented by different social groups, handicapping price transparency. A public price current emerged only in 1796 and then with wide bid-ask spreads to protect margins. To combat the confusion a curious pricing method, the mid-price system, emerged during the nineteenth century. Tied to a market microstructure centring on hoekmannen (market makers), this system transited effortlessly from a public market into a monopoly by 1913, self-governing, still without any government regulation, and offering wide rent-seeking opportunities.

How was Romania able to borrow cheaply on the international capital markets before World War I? We explore this within the context of its three southeast European neighbours, Bulgaria, Greece and Serbia, using a novel dataset of monthly bond prices from the Berlin and London stock exchanges. A comparison of country characteristics and panel data analysis suggests that Romania was able to borrow under more favourable conditions due to its abundant natural resources and desirable exports.

We analyse the money-financed fiscal stimulus implemented in Venice during the famine and plague of 1629–31, which was equivalent to a ‘net-worth helicopter money’ strategy – a monetary expansion generating losses to the issuer. We argue that the strategy aimed at reconciling the need to subsidize inhabitants suffering from containment policies with the desire to prevent an increase in long-term government debt, but it generated much monetary instability and had to be quickly reversed. This episode highlights the redistributive implications of the design of macroeconomic policies and the role of political economy factors in determining such designs.

In the stream of flurry of publications grappling different paradigms to tackle underlying mechanisms of moral decision-making, EVENT RELATED POTENtial (ERP) studies is beginning to explore psychophysiological components in the moral domain, focused on observing various moral behaviors in the experimental situations. This research was aimed at providing a new method of study investigating neural correlates of subjective moral decision-making in which we hypothesize that the social congruent or in-congruent context, could emerge a salience brain response in intuitive or cognitive control related responses toward moral dilemmas. Electrophysiological data were recorded from the scalp a 32-channel recording system complying with the international 10–20 system. The average N2 (175–300 ms) and LPP (300–600 ms) amplitude and latency were measured after the onset of putative counterpart response. Repeated measure ANOVA revealed that there was a difference between congruent versus in-congruent social response to high conflict scenarios in LPP amplitude in right lateral and frontal electrodes F(4, 174) = 5.812, P < 0.001 (Fig. 1). The findings also, suggest that N2 latency in less conflict moral scenarios may appear earlier compared with high conflict moral scenarios during in congruent social response in frontal electrodes especially left area F(3, 174) = 3.013, P < 0.05 (Fig. 2, figures are not available for this abstract). In conclusion, these results were either extend previous neurophysiological findings on classic moral scenarios and consistent with the notion that right hemisphere would be much more representative of cognitive control process during high conflict moral decision-making, while left frontal electrodes engaged in early intuitive process.

Before the Panic of 1907 the large New York City banks were able to maintain the call loan market's liquidity during panics, but the rise in outside lending by trust companies and interior banks in the decade leading up the panic weakened the influence of the large banks. Creating a reliable source of liquidity and reserves external to the financial market like a central bank became obvious after the panic. In the call loan market, like the REPO market in 2008, lack of information on the identity of lenders and volume of the market hindered attempts to stop panic-related depositor withdrawals. Our new estimates of who was participating in the call loan market reveal that it did not contract after 1907; while the trust companies became less important, the New York national banks and outside lenders more than made up the difference.

In Britain around 1900, established financial institutions for long-term savings such as life assurers, and pension funds which were just in their formative phase, did not make material allocations to publicly quoted equity markets or ordinary shares; long-established life assurers, for example, had less than 3 per cent allocated to the asset class (Baker and Collins 2003). Over the following 100 years, this picture radically changed, with equities emerging as the central asset class for many institutional investors and the term ‘the cult of (the) equity’ was coined (Scott 2002; Avrahampour 2015). As the century progressed, institutional investors superseded private individuals and became the dominant holders of British publicly quoted companies (Cheffins 2010). Despite the attractions of the asset class and their generally high returns, within a relatively short period by the end of the century, institutional equity exposure had peaked and was in decline both at life assurers and within pension funds. Here we highlight, and link together, the key actuarial (Turnbull 2017) and investing (Morecroft 2017) ideas that were influential in these developments. We also identify the main individuals who were instrumental in the application of equity investing to institutional portfolios. The article has an emphasis towards years from 1920 to 1960 when most of the changes to investment practice and actuarial theory occurred.

This article attempts to establish a quantitative revision of issuing banks created in Andalusia in the middle of nineteenth century founded as a result of liberal banking laws in 1856, comparing with those of similar dimension in other Spanish provinces. Possible causes of their soon extinction are discussed, like the financial worldwide crisis in the 1860s, the monopoly issue granted to the Bank of Spain in 1874 and the specific circumstances of regional banking. The article tries also to evaluate the performance of Bank of Spain branches, since 1875 until 1914, in those Andalusian places where issue banks were independent before and in relation to the fluctuations of the regional economy in that period.

This paper focusses on the financial relations between the banking sector and the Treasury in Modern Spain. Tax systems have been insufficient, generating a chronic budget deficit. This drove to irresponsible public debt management, being the State a serial defaulter until 1987. This prevented the budget deficits could be financed by sovereign debt issued on the stock exchanges, and forced the state to resort to banks (public and private). The new series of public debt banks portfolios evolution is explained by their pursuit of returns and by changes in banking regulation and financial repression, which favoured the banking status quo. The paper analyses the causes of banking regulation, derived from the public borrowing policy and also from the banking lobbying strategy. It examines the consequences of the deadly banking-state embrace which brought about the interconnection between fiscal and banking crises.

This article studies the relationship between the Irish and London stock markets over the period 1869 to 1929, using monthly data on capital gains. A bivariate GARCH model shows that there were significant volatility spillovers from the London to the Irish market, but not vice versa. This suggests that shocks originating in London were transmitted to Ireland, but that the reverse did not occur. Furthermore, the time-varying correlation indicates that the co-movement between London and Ireland declined during the Irish independence struggle and the establishment of the Irish Free State. The correlation appears to stabilise in the late 1920s.

The essay examines Spain’s colonial legacy in the long-run development of Spanish America. It surveys the fiscal and constitutional outcomes of independence and assesses the relative burden imposed by colonialism. Constitutional asymmetries between revenue collecting and spending agents constrained de facto governments’ power to tax. Inherent disparities embedded in the colonial fiscal system worsened with vaguely defined representation for subjects and territories and vexed their aggregation into a modern representative polity. Governments with limited fiscal capacity failed to deliver public goods and to distribute the costs and benefits of independence equitably. Growing indirect taxes, debt and money creation allowed them to transfer the fiscal burden to other constituents or future generations. Taxpayers became aware of the asymmetry between private contributions and public goods and hence favoured a low but regressive taxation. Comparisons with trajectories in the metropolis and the United States are offered to qualify this legacy.

Numerous archival documents show how the suspension of payments by Philip II, in September 1575, on the contracts with Genoese bankers (asientos) induced a freeze of the domestic credit market in Castile through the bankers’ intermediation for asientos and the credit interconnections. Commercial fairs stopped, banks failed and trade suffered while the king granted legal protection to the Genoese bankers. The evidence strikingly confirms that by his strategy, Philip II was able to remove the de facto ceiling on the domestic debt (juros) imposed by the fixed revenue commitment of the Castilian cities in the Cortes. The agreement with the bankers was signed in December 1577 immediately after the cities had agreed to the doubling of their commitment.

In July 1983 an agreement was reached between the British government and the London Stock Exchange that was to transform the London securities market in October 1986. The result was a revolution that extended all the way from the design of the market to those permitted access to the governance of those who traded. Given the speed of change, it was termed ‘Big Bang’ by contemporaries. As the scale of the transformation became known, politicians were quick to claim credit for what had been achieved. Subsequently, Big Bang has been regarded as one of the crowning achievements of the Conservative government led by Mrs Thatcher, providing the foundation for the City of London's re-emergence as the leading international financial centre. However, only now is evidence emerging of the intentions of those involved at the time rather than as expressed in the light of hindsight, which casts doubt on what they were seeking to achieve, whether viewed from the perspective of either the politicians or those in charge of the Stock Exchange. Instead, the longer-term pressure for change in the London securities market, the chain reaction caused by abolition of fixed-commission charges, and the proactive role of the Bank of England appear to be of greater significance. What an examination of the process leading up to Big Bang in 1986 reveals is the complexity of political decision involving the financial sector and the danger of unforeseen consequences. One small change can create a tipping point if the result is to remove an essential element within a complex system.

By examining the acts of the Public Notary of Haifa (1890–1915), this article shows that it was the traditional informal market of credit, run by local notables, which financially supported the development of the small-landholding-based agricultural sector of the Haifa district in late Ottoman Palestine. In seeking to ascertain what led to the success of the informal rural credit market as compared with the formal credit market, the article finds that the local notables, who acted as financial intermediaries for small landholders, enjoyed an information advantage over the banks stemming from the establishment of interlinked credit market transactions connected to the stipulation of bay' wafā, salam and muzara‘ah contracts. In a context of land privatisation and growing commercialisation of agriculture, these contracts became the instruments used by notables to invest in peasants' landholdings and to manage a sales network for agricultural products on a local and international scale, hence representing an efficient financial institution to support the ‘agricultural export-led growth’ of late Ottoman Palestine.

This article examines Britain's temporary import surcharge introduced in October 1964, a largely overlooked but significant dimension of the 1964 sterling crisis. Import surcharges (temporary supplementary tariff) were illegal under GATT rules and aroused fury among trading partners. Britain's surcharge is placed in context by consideration of the use of import surcharges by other countries under Bretton Woods as currency crisis management and balance of payments measures, notably Canada's import surcharge of 1962–3 that inspired Britain's. Developed by the Conservative administration from 1963, a 15 per cent surcharge was introduced by the newly elected Wilson government as a radical alternative to deflation or devaluation to help correct the record balance of payments deficit and meet the gathering sterling crisis. As a currency crisis management measure the surcharge worked in Canada but in Britain it made matters worse and was soon supplanted by conventional measures. Deemed a failure and discredited, the surcharge was eventually lifted in November 1966 ‘unwept, unhonoured and unsung’ (Financial Times). Nevertheless, while in place the surcharge provided significant temporary assistance to the improvement of Britain's balance of payments.