The relationship between Marcus’ views of natural philosophy and his ethical commitments has long been a vexed issue. This chapter aims first to clarify what Marcus’ own views on physics were, relying only on the contents of the Meditations, and only then to ask how these views relate to those of earlier Stoics and to consider whether Marcus’ position was a good one for him to hold. It becomes clear that Marcus regards nature, which is for him identical with god, as directly setting some important norms for human beings, most importantly because of the thorough integration of humans into the providential and teleological order of the cosmos. Marcus’ understanding of the natural world includes his conception of human nature as naturally social, which entails other important norms for human behaviour. Humans are, for Marcus, integrated ‘vertically’ with the cosmic order and ‘horizontally’ with other human beings; these integrations structure a great deal of Marcus’ ethical theory. But natural philosophy is far from being the only source of norms for Marcus; reflection on his relationships with other people and on the workings of his own mind also have impact and, as I suggest, may even lead him to views which conflict with the materialist determinism of most earlier Stoics.

This chapter uses Diogenes Laertius’ doxographical overview of Stoic natural philosophy as a starting point to examine the role of physics in Marcus Aurelius’ Meditations. Contrary to a common misconception, all the central aspects of Stoic physics, except for some more technical issues, are well represented. The chapter discusses Marcus Aurelius’ treatment of the telos-formula of ‘living according to nature’; the two fundamental Stoic principles of reality, god and matter; the scale of nature; and the relation between Providence, fate, necessity, change, human action, and freedom. Marcus Aurelius’ distinctive touch comes through in certain areas of emphasis, such as the centrality of sociability, human and divine, or the many implications of the view that the processes of change that also entail human mortality actually constitute the order of the universe.

One of life’s most fundamental revelations is change. Presenting the fascinating view that pattern is the manifestation of change, this unique book explores the science, mathematics, and philosophy of change and the ways in which they have come to inform our understanding of the world. Through discussions on chance and determinism, symmetry and invariance, information and entropy, quantum theory and paradox, the authors trace the history of science and bridge the gaps between mathematical, physical, and philosophical perspectives. Change as a foundational concept is deeply rooted in ancient Chinese thought, and this perspective is integrated into the narrative throughout, providing philosophical counterpoints to customary Western thought. Ultimately, this is a book about ideas. Intended for a wide audience, not so much as a book of answers, but rather an introduction to new ways of viewing the world.

The first chapter deals with Proclus’ little studied treatise Elements of Physics where he sums up in an axiomatic manner Aristotle’s theory of motion from Physics VI, VIII and De caelo I. I demonstrate that Proclus’ project is embedded in an exegetical tradition and show how he omits certain parts of Aristotle’s works that might conflict with his Neoplatonist views. Additionally, I provide evidence for the view that Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics proved to be influential for the axiomatic structure of Proclus’ treatise.

In this introduction, I outline Proclus’ relationship with Aristotle and provide an overview of the state of the art. I discuss Proclus’ views on the so-called harmony of Plato and Aristotle and contrast it with the views of other, contemporary Neoplatonists, showing that Proclus stands out as more critical of Aristotle. I show that the concept of motion provides a perfect avenue for understanding how Proclus sees the tension between Plato and Aristotle. Lastly, I explain how Proclus differentiates distinct levels of motion which also structure my discussion in the monograph.

In the seventeenth century British natural philosophers explored the cognitive value of mechanical trades. From the beginning, these explorations of down-to-earth manual processes were expressed in oblique and ironic texts. In utopian fictions by Thomas More, Francis Bacon and Gabriel Plattes, mechanical trades were presented as at once near-at-hand and alien to the world of books and codified knowledge. Bacon’s mid-century followers tried to negotiate these difficulties in plans to compile a comprehensive ‘History of Trades’. In the period’s most widely circulated didactic text, Izaac Walton’s Compleat Angler, the tacit and haptic dimension of a humble pass-time was explored through genial satire and eccentric textual design. Later, one highly literate artisan, the printer and instrument maker Joseph Moxon, gave thought to the difference between the artisanal expertise he employed as a manual technician and the theoretical knowledge he dealt with as a writer and fellow of the Royal Society.

Hegel’s “natural philosophy” is an extension of his overall systematic project having to do with a post-Kantian philosophy that did not rely on Kant’s conception of “pure intuitions.” Instead, Hegel proposed a Logic that as an internally self-enclosed system of pure thoughts required to make sense of making sense. Famously, he concluded his Logic with some not entirely clear ideas about the need to move from it to a Naturphilosophie, a move which he somewhat puzzlingly said was not itself a further logical “transition.” Hegel also defends a non-empiricist study of nature, that is, an explanation not merely in terms of empirically determined regularities, for all such regularities, although existent, are not fully “actual” in that they are not what is doing the real work of explanation. What explains the regularities themselves are the various pure objects of the Naturphilosophie which are involved in working out what “external to pure thought” would mean: the mechanical, the physical, the chemical, and the biological fields of nature, each of which manifests a power (Potenz) that explains why the empirically found regularities in nature actually hold. This chapter suggests that the reason for the transition from Logic to Nature is that pure thought on its own is powerless, and that this has implications for how we think of Hegel’s system as a whole.

The Quaestiones de secretis mulierum of MS Erfurt-Gotha, Universitäts- und Forschungsbibliothek, Dep. Erf., CA 4º 299, ascribed to John Buridan and recently edited for the first time, are an incomplete set of questions on Pseudo-Albert the Great’s De secretis mulierum. The text contains an extensive treatment of the topic of human generation, with a particular focus on male and female roles in reproduction. This essay retraces Buridan’s view on the generative aspects of female physiology as it emerges in his commentary on Pseudo-Albert’s text. By analyzing this unexplored feature of Buridan’s thought, the essay aims to contribute to the growing research on the biological aspects of Buridan’s natural philosophy.

Part III of Gulliver’s Travels stands out from the other voyages: instead of landing Gulliver in a single country, it consists of four, distinct journeys to extraordinary lands. Each of these is peopled by quasi-magical beings and each voyage dramatizes the abuses of the 'modern' learning and political and scientific culture of Swift’s time. In Laputa, the Floating Island, Gulliver encounters fanatical mathematicians whose bodies are as twisted as their mistaken calculations. In Balnibarbi, the literally overshadowed country beneath, barren crops and cockeyed buildings testify to the misapplied science of its Academy of Projectors. In Glubbdubdriub, the Island of Sorcerers, Gulliver meets the ghosts of the heroes and great thinkers of the ancient world who battled tyranny; he also encounters the ghosts both of corrupt modern commentators who distort classic texts and of the syphilitic ancestors of modern aristocrats. The final voyage to Luggnagg features a race of immortals who illustrate the vanity of human wishes as they grow increasingly quarrelsome, discontented and senile forever. As a whole, Part III constitutes a savage satire on the entire Whiggish project of Swift’s contemporary Britain.

If one reads about science, writes about science, or teaches science, one should know about the whats, hows, whens, and whys of science. What is science? How is it done? When is science needed? Science seeks to understand and systematize the natural world. It does so experimentally, using test tubes, computers, and animals (including humans), among other things. Curiosity and necessity drive science. Since ancient times, people have wanted to understand and then manipulate their world. For example, science has provided the means to painlessly and noninvasively look into the human body through the development of X-rays, magnetic resonance imaging, computed tomography, and scintigraphy (radioisotopes). Electronics and materials science have enabled creation of cell phones. Chemistry has given us therapeutic drugs, Teflon, and Velcro. Physics and engineering have taken us to the Moon, Mars, and beyond. This broad scope of science makes it difficult, but not impossible, to define. This chapter provides a holistic view of science.

This chapter considers the early modern ‘prehistory’ of the Romantic sublime. It considers the sublime as a type of experience of the natural world that far preceded its formal articulation, taking as examples the volcanic encounters of the Scottish traveller William Lithgow (c. 1582–c. 1645) and the Jesuit Athanasius Kircher (1602–1680). The natural philosopher Thomas Burnet (c. 1635–1715) has often been identified as an originator of the Romantic sublime; this chapter casts him instead as a lynchpin. He was not the first to ‘see’ the great in nature; instead, his theory challenged the theological foundations of many early modern sublime experiences, paving the way for a theory of the sublime that could move beyond the divine. Above all the chapter argues for the value of the vocabulary of sublime experience to describe encounters with the natural world before the Romantic sublime.

When Sor Juana Inés de la Cruz (1648?-1695) famously described the natural secrets of cooking, she invoked some of the foundational terms of colonial science and society, from Aristotelian paradigms to Columbian acts of claiming. Scholars have long noted the importance of scientific knowledge to Sor Juana and underscore her engagement with Indigenous cultures, languages, and traditions. But few scholars have examined the intersection of Indigenous knowledge and scientific writing in Sor Juana’s ouvre. This chapter, grounded in a reading of classical natural philosophy, as it was expressed in Sor Juana’s Respuesta (1695), represents an effort to bring these research areas into dialogue. By juxtaposing Mayan-language documents from colonial Yucatán with Sor Juana’s masterful defense of knowledge in central New Spain, this chapter analyzes how Indigenous ways of knowing may have shaped one of the most important treatises on knowledge in colonial Mexico, thus suggesting. ways in which colonial letters both mark and help to promote critical transitions in the meaning of knowledge, epistemological categories, and the nature of knowledge production itself.

The treatise On Generation and Corruption (GC) consists of a general account of generation and corruption (offered in the first book) plus an elemental theory (advanced in the second book). This introduction explores the relation between these two pieces. The upshot of this exploration is that the unity of the treatise is stronger than it is often thought. Far from being a suboptimal amalgam of various pieces, the treatise is the best and most efficient way to fulfill the promise made at the outset, where an account of the nature and causes of generation and corruption is announced, including how they differ from other natural processes such as alteration and growth.

This chapter asserts the influence of Francis Bacon’s natural philosophy on the early modern English essay, noting in particular how the Baconian commitment to scientific experiment and empirical investigation informed the work of early essayists such as Robert Boyle, Samuel Hartlib, and William Cornwallis. The author argues that the humanist form of the essay was also harnessed to the practical and utilitarian ends of managed state capitalism, including agriculture and political economy.

The ant in Robert Hooke’s compendium and celebration of microscopy in Micrographia: or Some Physiological Descriptions of Minute Bodies Made by Magnifying Glasses (1665) uniquely resists scientific scrutiny: moving about when alive, too-easily crushed when dead, the ant proves to be insistently difficult to study under a microscope. Through an extended allusion to Richard Ligon’s A True and Exact History of the Island of Barbadoes (1657), Hooke links the unruly ant to the colonial economy of enslaved Africans in Barbados, a place that Ligon understands through sugarcane, enslaved Africans, and saltwater slavery. The story of Hooke’s ant in Micrographia uncovers what Lisa Lowe calls the “intimacy” of modern, Western liberalism and the global conditions upon which it depends. In this case, Hooke’s ant reveals the intimacy of early scientific practice and the institution of transatlantic chattel slavery, exposing in the process that a small thing can reveal vast scales of geography and their networks of exploitation.