The debate about whether state or non-state players have primacy has been a major preoccupation for International Relations researchers. This chapter argues the key is not so much to determine which players are dominant, but how they interact to produce the prevailing order. The 1985 book Bringing the State Back In declared the return of the state for international politics and political economy (Evans et al. 1985). This chapter argues instead for bringing state–society relations ‘back in’ to the centre of what makes international relations.

This chapter gives an overview of the long history, nature and significance of terrorism for international relations. It first addresses the topic’s recent prominence. Terrorism is by no means the most brutal type of violence, especially compared to wars in which states have killed millions of people. But it garners outsized attention through its symbolic nature. Only by educating ourselves can we rob terrorism of the source of its power. Second, it addresses key academic debates, which usually go back to the definition. The chapter argues that there are core areas of international agreement about what a terrorist act is, and that it can and should be distinguished from other types of violence. It also explains the lively debate over digital technology and the future of terrorism. Third, it lays out intellectual frameworks that help us to understand and analyse terrorism, including types of terrorism, historical patterns and the strategies used by terrorist groups. The chapter concludes with reflections about what is at stake in countering this type of illegitimate act.

The Conclusions reflect on the law outlined in Chapters 1−10. They recall that IHL is essentially an attempt to balance two fundamentally contradictory drivers – the need to wage war effectively, and the need to protect people and property from the excessive effects of warfare. It concludes that IHL largely succeeds in this endeavour, and that without IHL life for those caught up in armed conflict would be immeasurably worse. It notes, however, that while the fundamental principles of IHL are enduring, States can and should do more to develop new or more comprehensive laws where there is a need, such as the under-developed law of non-international armed conflict and the lack of regulation of certain weapons.

The chapter sets off by examining the theoretical bases upon which a non-state actor (NSA) may be deemed to possess human rights obligations and critiques the various approaches put forward by states and the scholarly community. It then goes on to examine a variety of NSAs along with their own distinct position as regards their human rights role. Some NSAs, such as international financial institutions (IFIs), take a legalistic approach to the matter and are generally wary of accepting even the more fundamental obligations, whereas other actors are keen to achieve a broader human rights agenda and are thus willing to accept some human rights commitments. Besides intergovernmental organisations we also focus on multinational corporations (MNCs) and the way in which their operations have a significant impact on the rights of populations worldwide. It shall be demonstrated that, while their human rights ‘obligations’, if any, have largely arisen as a result of voluntary undertakings, they are now entering a hybrid phase of limited regulation, or at least of an attempt at regulation. Finally, we shed some light on national liberation movements and rebel groups and their distinct responsibilities under international humanitarian law (IHL).

International human rights law is part of public international law and shares a number of its features, including sources, obligations (primary rules) and state responsibility (secondary rules). While international human rights law has formed within the broader setting of international law, it has developed distinctive features. Traditional international law was an order based on the sovereign interests of states as its sole subjects. In contrast, international human rights law is characterised by its emphasis on common interests that reflect the fundamental values of the international legal order. This value-based approach is evident in the concept of jus cogens, or peremptory norm, and the notion of erga omnes, obligations owed to the international community as a whole. Undoubtedly, international human rights law can form an important component of a new international order or international constitutionalism. However, unilateralism, selectivity and fragmentation, in addition to challenges of effective implementation, are restraining factors that may slow down, if not undermine, ‘constitutional’ developments at the international level. This chapter examines these dynamics and discusses the key building blocks of international (human rights) law: its sources; its rights and obligations and the scope of their application; and its implementation as well as state responsibility and enforcement.

Chapter 3 identifies the numerous strategies the contemporary liberal states have pursued to navigate the cross-pressures engendered by the migration trilemma during the post-Cold War period, and especially since September 11th. Contesting scholarly claims that the liberal states cannot avert unwanted immigration, its main argument is that they have considerably reconciled the tensions inherent in the trilemma by enlisting and coopting non-central state actors at the intersection of human mobility and security. Specifically, they have forged bilateral and multilateral policy agreements and devolved many of their responsibilities for implementing immigration and human mobility policy to international, subnational and private sector actors. In pursuing this multifaceted course, the immigration policies of states have converged, and their burdens in managing their immigration-related responsibilities have been partially alleviated. But in doing so, the liberal norms inspiring their once steadfast commitments to maintaining relatively open borders and safeguarding citizen and immigrant rights have been compromised.

The author explores how the Court of Justice of the European Union (hereafter CJEU) has dealt with issues of consent as a trigger of commitment in the context of treaty-making by focusing on its practice pertaining to informal arrangements concluded between the European Union and third parties. The main arguments advanced in the chapter are: (a) that the Court has largely followed mainstream international legal thinking by identifying consent as the ‘objective’ common intention of its authors to be legally bound; and (b) that the Court has acknowledged the constitutive function of consent when it comes to treaty-making with non-State actors. The chapter also illustrates an important blind spot in the current debate on consent. The examination of the CJEU’s case law shows that political factors may have a bearing on the ascertainment of the consent to be legally bound. This, in turn, entails that attempts at theorizing how international law can remain sociologically clever and keep pace with current developments on the ground should be cognizant of the danger of over-relying on judicial practice.

Chapter 8 seeks to untangle various issues in addressing when and how a state might be able to resort to the use of force in self-defence against non-state actors. It firstly raises some important general considerations in relation to self-defence against non-state actors, before moving on to examine the situation of self-defence measures which target both the non-state actors and the host state, as was the case with the United States’s response to the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. A distinction needs to be made between self-defence taken against both the non-state actor perpetrators of the attack or those posing a threat and the state within which they are located, and those actions that are more limited in only specifically targeting the non-state actors. The chapter finally addresses the particular phenomenon of so-called targeted killing, which engages not only the jus ad bellum, but also the legal framework of international human rights law and, potentially, international humanitarian law.

Chapter 3 proposes an original conceptual framework built on gender and security studies and supported by existing international legal standards and norms to reframe the interpretation of the refugee definition and better reflect the nature of violence in armed conflicts. In doing so, it reasserts the Refugee Convention as the cornerstone of international protection. This chapter claims that the ongoing dynamics of violence in situations of armed conflict provide a more valuable lens to interpret the Refugee Convention definition where persons flee armed conflicts as it focuses on the nature of violence, including its continuum, features, application, direction, motivation and impact. A micro-level analysis of this type also enables the identification of gender dynamics that are essential in understanding violence in armed conflicts. The framework outlines the knowledge that should be incorporated into the process of interpreting the refugee definition to ensure effective protection of refugees fleeing armed conflicts. The chapter is broken down into the characteristics of contemporary armed conflicts and how these features relate to the refugee definition, including the temporality of armed conflicts, the rise of non-state actors, weak states, and the objectives, gendered strategies and tactics of fighting parties.

This chapter explores the process of developing analytical frameworks to guide empirical research on agreement-making. An analytical framework is a set of ideas that structure analysis by specifying core concepts and relationships to be explored. In some cases, a researcher may be able to use an existing framework found in the literature. More frequently, a researcher will need to adapt an existing framework or develop a new framework to address their specific research questions. In this chapter, the authors share their own experiences of developing and adapting frameworks to analyze nonstate actors’ influence and agency in agreement-making. They argue that deciding on a framework requires deep thinking about key concepts and relationships in the context of existing literature and data access. Frameworks evolve through an iterative process over the course of the research. Working with frameworks is a creative part of the research process that can help researchers navigate the messy and overwhelming world of agreement-making. The chapter thereby situates the role of frameworks in the wider research process and provides insights into different ways to go about working with analytical frameworks.

It is not possible under Article 34 ECHR to lodge individual applications at the Court to complain about an interference with one’s Convention rights caused by non-State actors. Nevertheless, the Court has found various ways to extend the protection offered by the Convention rights to horizontal relations.

This chapter focuses on the scope of protection of the Convention in vertical and horizontal relations. First, the direct Convention responsibilities of the States in horizontal relations are explained. The point at which an organisation or institution can be regarded as a ‘public authority’ to be held directly accountable for respecting the Convention is discussed and it is explained that public authorities are always obliged to act in accordance with the Convention, even if they behave as private parties. Subsequently, it is set out how the Convention may have indirect horizontal effect. Attention is thereby paid in particular to the positive obligations of the State to provide effective regulation and enforcement in such horizontal relationships, as well as to the obligations for national courts to take the Convention rights into account when deciding on private law matters.