Security measures aimed at the repression of corsairing continued apace in the wake of 1816. ‘Barbary piracy’ remained a subject of negotiation and cooperation during the late 1810s and early 1820s. It was dealt with at ambassadorial conferences in London, during meetings of the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle (Aachen), in combined talks with the Ottoman Porte, and through an Anglo-French expedition to the coasts of North Africa. Increasingly ambitious efforts to enact maritime security and an increasingly vocal opposition to such efforts marked the eight years following the Anglo–Dutch bombardment of 1816. The authorities of the regencies managed to thwart several European security practices, ranging from concerted communications to defensive alliances. To understand the starts, stops and reversals of the fight against Mediterranean piracy, local activity needs to be analysed. This chapter foregrounds the role of actors who were deemed piratical threats. The contestations of these threatening actors influenced the shape and success of European security practices.

The creation of a new order of security in the Mediterranean revolved around shared conceptions of threat and a common apparatus of cooperative repressive practices. This conclusion explains how the repression of ‘Barbary piracy’, which European contemporaries perceived as one of the most urgent and persistent threats to security, was used to bring significant changes to the traditional diplomatic and maritime practices of the Mediterranean region. In fact, the fight against this imputed piratical threat fostered new ideas of the Mediterranean as a regional whole that could be rendered secure through policing efforts and imperial interventions. As a result, the political appearance of the Mediterranean Sea and its shorelines changed profoundly between 1815 and the closing years of the 1850s, when the Mediterranean seemed perfectly secure from piratical threats.

The Anglo-Dutch bombardment of Algiers on 27 August 1816 indicated how, after the Congress of Vienna, a new order based on collective security was taking shape, not just on the continent, but also in the Mediterranean Sea. This chapter suggests that 1816 was a moment of departure from past traditions and signified the creation of a new Mediterranean order. Defining features of that order – such as modes of cooperation, the linkage to the Congress System, the use of security as a legitimizing discourse and the important roles of smaller and non-European powers – all came into play during the Anglo–Dutch bombardment. Additionally, this Anglo–Dutch cooperation shows how various states took the lead in the fight against piracy, dependent upon the situation. There was not a single naval hegemon who executed the repressive effort. At this early stage, smaller powers initially drove the repression of ‘Barbary piracy’, later to be followed by Great Britain, Russia and France. The effort became a truly pan-European reorganisation of security in the Mediterranean.

In order to appreciate the imperial impact of the new security culture, the French invasion of Algiers in 1830 ought to be seen within the framework of the post-1815 Congress System and the Concert of Europe. Though the invasion of Algiers was essentially a unilateral action undertaken under the national flag, it nevertheless took shape through extended multinational deliberation and involved a fair share of diplomatic concertation among the different European Great Powers. French imperial aspirations became intertwined with the repression of Mediterranean piracy, which was understood as a shared, European project. In attacking Algiers, members of the French government sought to reassert the country’s position as a nation on par with the other Great Powers of the European continent. The conflict with Algiers allowed French officials to assert status through the much more ‘disinterested’, ‘European’ goal of ending piracy and bringing security to the Mediterranean Sea.

The Congress of Vienna in 1814–1815 delineated territorial settlements, coronated several newly independent monarchs and resulted in an official declaration on the abolition of the slave trade, but it did not treat the issue of piracy. This paradox is the key concern of this chapter. Vienna’s Final Acts were the end product of these talks, and though they did not mention ‘Barbary piracy’, their conclusion would nevertheless have a great impact on the international treatment of this newly perceived threat to security. The years 1814–1815 were an important turning point because they initiated a period of transition. The congress created an international context in which North African corsairing could be reconceived as a threat to security. This new perception of threat hinged upon misconceptions of the supposed fanaticism and irrationality that allegedly characterised North African privateering. It also disregarded the long history of diplomatic and commercial contact between both sides of the Mediterranean Sea.

This chapter takes stock of the many consequences and conflicting legacies of the French invasion of Algiers. It analyses the effects of this climactic event in the fight against Mediterranean piracy. The invasion’s immediate consequences allow us to reflect upon the security goals French actors and their allies had attached to the expedition – and uncovers the long-term impact of those goals. Subsequently, the chapter turns to the two decades following 1830. These were the years in which French expansion commenced and soon posed international problems in Algeria’s environs. Lastly, I discuss how earlier European security efforts against piracy featured at the Congress of Paris that ended the Crimean War (1853–1856), particularly in the Paris Declaration Respecting Maritime Law of 1856, which abolished privateering as a legitimate wartime practice. That text finalised the steady delegitimation of North African corsairing and the violent engagement with the Barbary Regencies. It served as a memorial, a recorded legacy of all the preceding negotiation, repression and destruction. It both marks a new era of international law and denotes, in the light of piracy repression, an ending to the old traditions of Mediterranean corsairing.

This book focuses on the way in which ideas and discourses of security have shaped the conduct of international relations in the past. Its main concerns include how historical actors conceived of security as an idea, used it in their writings and discussions, pondered its implementation and turned conceptions into practice. Security efforts shaped international relations at a crucial moment in history, during the first half of the nineteenth century, when international systems and global divisions of power dramatically changed. International involvement with Mediterranean piracy reflected all of these changes. Yet, in order to better grasp the impact of security considerations, one must look at the means by which contemporaries made sense of, were swayed by and, also, turned against the concept. Security must be historicised.

This essay ties together some key elements of a maritime existence – indulgence, mercy, pretence, prerogative, plunder, homicide – and contrasts them with the growing importance among commercial societies of contract, justice, rights, the legal alienation of goods, and the punishment of those who take what is not theirs. And then it measures Defoe’s adherence on the one side to what amounts to a state of war, and on the other to a state of civil society. It comes as a surprise to find that Defoe, author of The Compleat English Tradesman, entertains opinions about sovereignty that are far from being commercially orthodox. The moment when the pirate Bob Singleton becomes aware that he can exercise the prerogative either of absolute power, and kill his captives, or of mercy, letting them live and even healing their wounds, marks the end of his feelings of guilt and uselessness, and the access of an ecstatic kind of self-discovery, a sort of sublime caprice.

International peace and security on the oceans are currently faced with a variety of threats. For instance, piracy and armed robbery against ships are serious problems endangering the welfare of seafarers and the security of sea communication. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) through marine transport is a matter of pressing concern. Furthermore, military uses of the oceans raise international tension between interests of the coastal State and interests of the naval State. Thus, this chapter will address the legal issues of maintenance of international peace and security at sea. Principal focus will be on the following issues: (1) the rules applicable to the suppression of piracy and its limitations, (2) the prevention and suppression of maritime terrorism and other unlawful offences at sea, (3) military exercises in the EEZ of a foreign State permissible in the law of the sea, and (4) the significance of nuclear-weapon-free zones.

Known as enemies of all nations, pirates emerged out of a contest for New World resources and land amidst an increasingly lawless early modern Atlantic World. While Spanish treasure fleets faced attacks from brazen British privateers, such as Henry Morgan, piracy became commonplace by the start of the eighteenth century. Although some engaged in slaving and certainly embraced violence, many pirates established outlaw communities based on democratic ideals that would come to characterize the Enlightenment. By the Age of Revolution, instability and intermittent warfare allowed sea bandits such as the Laffite brothers to flourish once again during the War of American Independence and the Napoleonic Wars, especially in coastal enclaves like Louisiana and Texas and on smaller Caribbean islands such as Guadeloupe. The wars of independence in Spanish America likewise saw an upsurge in smuggling and privateering. As new nations began to curtail the licensing of these privateers, their numbers and significance waned by the 1830s.

Chapter 7 investigates Veracruz’s function as a military bulwark of the Spanish Caribbean, focusing on the role of the free-black militia in the defense of the port. In the second half of the seventeenth century, territorial losses in Jamaica and Hispaniola and frequent attacks on its ships and ports forced Spain to reconsider its strategic priorities. Setting aside earlier fears of arming men of African descent, Spanish ports turned to free-black militias to fulfill the duties of defense. In Veracruz, free-black militia service was formalized in 1669, when militiamen received relief from an unpopular tribute tax. Remarkably, in their petition for tribute relief, Veracruz’s free-black militia cited precedents in Havana, Cartagena, Santo Domingo, and Campeche, manifesting an explicit articulation of a Mexican-Caribbean regional identity. Over the next thirty years, tribute relief for militia service was extended to free-black men in other Gulf Coast cities, but did not reach militias in the interior until the middle of the eighteenth century. The uneven use of tribute relief thus reinforced regional variations in colonial status systems.

The Conclusion turns to the end of the seventeenth century, when Mexico and the Caribbean underwent a political realignment. In the Caribbean, ascendant European empires began to construct the monocultures that have come to dominate the study of Caribbean history. Meanwhile, in the mainland, renewed interest in New Spain’s northern frontier initiated a new series of cultural encounters and violent contests that signal the origin of borderlands history. While it is tempting to see in these two developments the disintegration of the Mexican-Caribbean world, I argue that the end of the seventeenth century was not an unmaking but a remaking. As Spanish power in the Caribbean declined, bonds between remaining Spanish island and mainland settlements strengthened. At the same time, Veracruz and the Caribbean both played an important role in the construction of Mexico’s northern border and the Caribbean’s new economic and political relationships. In this, the study points forward to the development of new material relationships that informed the social and cultural possibilities of people in Mexico’s Gulf Coast and the Caribbean Islands into the eighteenth century.

Research has proliferated on several topics that have invited new methodological approaches: the rural setting, gendered relations between men and women, communal status of minorities (Christians and Jews), and religious diversity among Muslims, in particular among those who identified as Sufi mystics. New sources and revisionist interpretations of them continue to transform the field of Mamluk Studies. Yet in many instances, findings on these subjects are confined to discoveries of information on discrete conditions or isolated events that do not lend themselves to comprehensive analysis. They often depend on a single source or fragmentary data set, and require imaginative speculation to formulate hypotheses that apply to questions about their broader contexts in society. The chapter will outline the state of research on these subjects and their potential to open new lines of inquiry by highlighting examples that have influenced revisionist interpretations.

The Sultanate was a global state that interacted with regimes in North, West and East Africa, Mediterranean Europe, Asia Minor, the Arabian Peninsula and Southwest Asia. Its ideology of diplomacy focused on maintenance of the balance of power extant during the formative stage of its founding: control over the Syrian Littoral and Red Sea nautical routes to South and East Asia. Senior officers appointed from Cairo ruled Syrian provincial capitals as viceroys, tying them directly to the imperial center. On the Red Sea coast of Arabia (Hijaz), the Hasanid Sharifs of Mecca exercised local political authority, but from Baybars’ reign were compelled to comply with the Sultanate’s commercial and fiduciary policies over the spice trade. Tensions in Southeastern Asia Minor heightened when objectives of territorial stasis advocated by the Mamluks clashed with aims of territorial conquest asserted by the Ottomans. Regional principalities pursued their own goals of autonomy with varying degrees of success. The international system of commerce, centered on Venetian and Mamluk exploitation of trade routes to Asia through the Red Sea, was decisively altered by the Portuguese entry to the Indian Ocean. When the Ottomans defeated the Cairo Sultanate, its centrality in the global environment was already diminished.

Foreign trade always mattered in imperial China. Especially during the middle period and early modern times, China experienced enormous growth and expansion of foreign trade. According to Confucian concepts, merchants belonged to the lowest echelon of society; agriculture, not trade, was considered the basis of a stable state and society. Most Chinese governments indeed sought to maintain more or less strict control over foreign commerce and those who were responsible for it. But one has to emphasize the co-operative rather than antagonistic relationship with markets and with the merchant class during most of China’s imperial history. In addition, we can observe certain characteristics and qualitative changes throughout the centuries.

This chapter broadens Foucault’s ideas of the author-function to include such textual progenitors as stationers, printers, and booksellers. It argues that authorship is a mode of self-fashioning and highlights the ways that the sociology of truth demands that others recognize one’s authorial and expert claims over a knowledge domain like natural history. It explains why Adrian Johns’s concept of stationer “credit” is of limited use and why his conflation of plagiarism and piracy confuses two separate issues of impropriety that undergo radical changes in the sixteenth century. It suggests making a “bibliographic turn” to remedy Johns’s interpretation of Steven Shapin’s “social history” and better account for bibliographic scholarship.