Political tradecraft is a set of duties, responsibilities and skills required of diplomats who work in political affairs. It is the main instrument in the diplomatic tradecraft toolbox, which also includes, among other tools, economic tradecraft, commercial diplomacy, consular affairs and public diplomacy. Political officers work both at diplomatic missions abroad and at headquarters, such as their ministry of foreign affairs or the State Department. Although there are some differences in a political officer’s daily duties at home compared with those abroad, they all participate in managing international relations and implementing foreign policy. Those who rise to the most senior positions in their ministry or department also take part in the policymaking process. The primacy of politics is the reason the political department is the most powerful in any ministry of foreign affairs, and its head, known as “political director,” is typically among the highest-ranking officials.

This chapter traces the complex trajectory of land tenure reforms in Benin since the democratic transition and liberalisation of the economy in the early 1990s. It shows that conceptions of the problem of land tenure insecurity and the responses to it have often clashed. Attention paid to sectors (rural vs urban) has varied as well as the timing and the nature of land tenure reforms. The solution of formal land titling propounded by international donor and local supporters has been considered by many as both inaccessible and unsuited to the needs of the majority of the population, hence the search for legal and institutional alternatives. This history of land reforms reveals intricate conflicts involving corporatist struggles, conflicts of interest between different stakeholders, and divergent social choices. It highlights the political economy dimension of land tenure problems and their instrumentalisation by some actors and competing public policy networks, the strengths and limitations of attempts to implement policy reforms, and the influence of donors in reform processes. It also questions the capacity of the intended reforms to modify practices and have enough inclusiveness.

This chapter discusses the implementation of EU policies after they have been adopted. It is structured around three phases in the implementation process: legal implementation, practical implementation and monitoring implementation. Each of these phases takes place both at the EU-level and within member states, leading to a system of multi-level administration. Subsequent sections zoom in on each of the three phases. In relation to legal implementation, both transposition by member states and the adoption of delegated and implementing acts by the Commission are discussed, including the system of comitology. The section on practical implementation looks at areas in which EU institutions are the main implementers and discusses the general EU requirements for implementation by member states. The section on monitoring implementation includes an extensive discussion of (the procedural set-up and practical use of) the infringement procedure and preliminary rulings. The chapter ends with a discussion of the role of EU agencies and European regulatory networks in the implementation of EU policies, stressing the variation within and commonalities between these two types of structure.

After laying out the substantial challenges faced by the young People’s Republic of China in 1949, this chapter focuses on the particular ways in which revolutionary policies were implemented: by an ever shifting mix of bureaucratic and campaign modalities that were supported by a range of public performances. Bureaucracy was characterized by hierarchy, order, precedent, the strengthening of formal state institutions and a mania for classification, thus radically simplifying complex realities through a process of disaggregation; campaigns mobilized moral commitments through a different type of radical simplification – fusion into morally charged narratives and popular mobilization. Both modalities were in evidence in the two signature campaigns of 1951: the Campaign to Suppress Counterrevolutionaries and land reform. While, in the early 1950s, bureaucratic and campaign modalities were co-constitutive, after the mid 1950s, they were more often in stark tension with each other.

The chapter tests a further observable implication of the theory that blunt force regulation does reduce pollution. Regressing pollution levels on blunt force measures, this chapter shows that this type of regulation is effective at overcoming enforcement failures; indeed, it is associated with much greater reductions in pollution than conventional regulation. These findings challenge a common conception that blunt force regulation is mere political theater, in which the government uses highly publicized spectacles to convince the public it is doing something about pollution. Drawing on interviews with national and local regulators, this chapter further illustrates that far from mere performance, blunt force measures are the result of high-level government planning, enlist the efforts of several government agencies, and constitute part of a concerted, multiyear strategy to reduce pollution levels across the country.

Meant for public health professionals, the Chapter explains what is meant by political economy and its relevance to health, why structural reforms in health are frequently influenced and obstructed by political considerations, how political expediency influences priority setting decisions in health that are frequently related to allocation of resources, and what measures can be taken to minimize political obstacles and barriers in favour of evidence-informed decisions. Political economy of health, as a field of study, grew rapidly in the 1970s that sought to explain the disparities in health care access and the socioeconomic differential in health status across society. Health system development, reform and transformation is a social and political intervention. Political economy analysis (PEA) is central to the successful formulation of health policies and plans and for ensuring their effective implementation. PEA can help to identify potential barriers and facilitators for policy and system change. PEA can help to identify potential barriers and facilitators for policy and system change.

Chapter 7 investigates how bureaucratic norms change, analyzing recent institutional reforms in Uttar Pradesh (UP) and Bihar. I first examine Mahila Samakhya in UP, a women’s empowerment program initiated by the central government. Challenging legalistic bureaucratic norms, Mahila Samakhya fostered a subculture of deliberation that inspired frontline worker commitment to institutional activism. Frontline workers countered village caste and patriarchal structures to mobilize Dalit women's associations, a process rife with social conflict. Deliberation with target households supported the integration of disadvantaged girls into school. In Bihar, by contrast, committed state leadership worked to strengthen law and order, encouraging a broad shift toward legalism. Bureaucratic commitment to rules supported the growth of school enrollment and infrastructure provision. However, state initiatives to improve education quality through innovative teaching practices faltered, as they conflicted with administrative rule-following. The findings suggest the difficulties of securing frontline worker commitment to quality reforms on the back of legalistic bureaucracy.

Chapter 1 introduces the central puzzle of implementing primary education in northern India, a least likely setting for programmatic service delivery. Despite having the same formal institutions and national policy framework for primary education, implementation varies remarkably across northern Indian states. After reviewing existing explanations, the chapter outlines the main argument, anchored around variation in informal bureaucratic norms, and foreshadows the theoretical contributions to comparative politics and development. It then presents the research design and methods, based on multilevel comparisons in four Indian states (Uttar Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh, Uttarakhand and Bihar). Using multiple field research methods, I trace the implementation process from state capitals down to the village primary schools, drawing on two and a half years of field research: participant observation inside bureaucracies; village ethnography; and 853 interviews and 103 focus group discussions. I conclude with an overview of the book’s remaining chapters.

Chapter 4 embarks on Part II of the book, the first of four empirical chapters analyzing implementation in northern India. It examines primary education in Uttar Pradesh (UP), a state that exemplifies the dynamic of legalistic bureaucracy theorized in Chapter 2. Rural UP is among the least likely setting. First, I trace the historical origins and persistence of legalistic bureaucracy in UP from the colonial era onward, but focusing on the recent period of lower caste mobilization and multiparty competition. Next, I present evidence from multilevel comparative fieldwork demonstrating how legalistic bureaucracy drives implementation over a range of administrative tasks, including school infrastructure and enrollments and provision of the Midday Meal program. I then bring the analysis down to the village-level. Taking a citizen-centric view of the state, I trace the evolution of village collective action around primary schooling over time, demonstrating how bureaucratic norms interact with citizen oversight.

Chapter 9 concludes the book by outlining its contributions to scholarship in comparative politics, development and public administration. The theoretical framework centered on bureaucratic norms brings institutionalist perspectives on the state and social policy together with insights on street-level bureaucracy and local collective action. The conceptual interweaving of meso-level state institutions with the micro-politics of frontline service delivery gives rise to a new understanding of bureaucracy and its relationship to human development. The chapter also explores the study's policy implications for the reform of bureaucracy, public services and primary education in developing countries.

Chapter 6 studies primary education in the Himalayan state of Uttarakhand. It offers a matched-pair comparison with the previous chapter's study of Himachal Pradesh (HP). Despite similar geography, agrarian economies and sociocultural norms, Uttarakhand's school system performs far worse. I trace the underperformance to the persistence of legalistic bureaucratic norms. Drawing on historical and ethnographic materials, I explore the political process behind Uttarakhand’s political separation from UP in 2000, a critical juncture that offered a window for state elites to reshape bureaucratic norms. Field-based evidence from interviews with state and societal actors showcases how legalism persists inside the state bureaucracy. Next, I analyze how legalism influences the state's management of teachers and monitoring of education services. I find that village collective action gets thwarted due to administrative burdens posed by local agencies, which induces households to exit and seek private substitutes. The findings suggest that legalistic bureaucracy weakens societal coproduction of public services over time, even in settings of high social capital.

Chapter 2 presents the book’s theory connecting differences in bureaucratic norms to variation in the implementation of primary schooling. I first define implementation and operationalize it for the primary education domain. I then present comparative education indicators, showcasing differences in performance across four Indian states. Next, I develop a theory anchored around the ideal types of legalistic and deliberative bureaucracy. I argue that deliberative bureaucracies, which promote flexibility and problem-solving, are more effective since they can adapt policies to local needs and activate participation from marginalized communities. By contrast, legalistic states, which adhere strictly to rules and procedures, implement policies unevenly and tend to benefit privileged groups in society, weakening the engagement of poor communities. I elucidate two mechanisms: collective understanding and behavior of state officials, and societal feedback, which together yield varied mentation patterns and outcomes. I explore the political origins behind the differences in bureaucratic norms. I scope conditions of my theory and contrast it with alternative political explanations for the implementation of public services.

Chapter 5 analyzes how deliberative bureaucracy works to produce superior outcomes for primary education through the analysis of implementation in the state of Himachal Pradesh (HP). Notwithstanding its difficult Himalayan geography, subsistence agricultural economy and weak initial conditions, HP has arisen to become one of India's leading states in primary education. Drawing on historical sources and interviews with state officials, I first examine the historical emergence of deliberation in HP, linked to the politics of state-building in the 1970s and 1980s. I then present findings from qualitative field research conducted at the state-, district- and village-levels, demonstrating how deliberative bureaucracy implements primary education across a range of administrative tasks: state planning to expand infrastructure and integrate disadvantaged children, the promotion of women’s participation in the monitoring of schools and, finally, village-level coproduction of primary education services over time.