The watershed in modern Chinese politics known as the May Fourth Movement (1919) offers insights into how a single protest event can quickly diffuse to other regions, draw in new participants and produce legacies in contentious politics. This article examines the May Fourth protests from the perspective of “eventful sociology” – an approach that examines how protests, repression and other contingent events link together to bring about landmark political episodes. It traces the sequence of protest and repression events in Beijing and draws on an original database of protest and repression events in Shanghai to emphasize the haphazard sequencing of actions and information flows that led the Chinese government to reverse its stance and concede to protestors’ demands. An eventful account illustrates how past protest sequences can produce a long-term impact on subsequent protest events. It also calls for greater awareness of “single sparks” that initiate protest sequences and unexpected political outcomes.

This study focuses on the Hong Kong Lennon Walls and the communications posted there. We assert that the physical placement of COVID-19 related images on the Lennon Walls of Hong Kong and the replication of symbols and iconography from the Umbrella Movement and the Anti-ELAB Movement situated COVID-19 discourse not only physically within but also symbolically within the contentious politics of Hong Kong. We conclude that the messages and images posted on Lennon Walls between January and April 2020 have used COVID-19 to extend public expression of sentiment on the debates around the Hong Kong government and to further mobilize a sense of Hong Kong identity against China. The findings contribute to the understandings of how the cultural politics surrounding the pandemic became a collective action frame in the mobilization of a localized Hong Kong political identity against the Hong Kong and Chinese governments.

Many studies put forward the argument that local policy experimentation, a key feature of China's policy process in the Hu Jintao era, has been paralysed by Xi Jinping's (re)centralization of political power – otherwise known as “top-level design.” This narrative suggests that local policymakers have become increasingly risk-averse owing to the anti-corruption campaign and are therefore unwilling to experiment. This article, however, argues that local governments are still expected to innovate with new policy solutions and now will be punished if they do not. By introducing the analytical framework of “experimentation under pressure” and drawing on an analysis of over 3,000 local government regulations and fieldwork data related to foreign investment attraction policies in two localities, Foshan and Ganzhou, the authors highlight new features developing within current experimental policy cycles. Local cadres now have no choice but to experiment as the political risk of shirking the direct command to experiment may be higher than the inherent risk of experimentation itself.

Since the early 2010s, a low-profile “dig deep and reach wide” campaign led by local Chinese Communist Party (CCP) committees has unprecedently institutionalized and embedded academic opinions into the regimes’ decision-making processes. This research aims to deepen the existing understanding of the intricate relationship between players in the CCP's decision-making process by analysing the Party's deliberation on scholarly opinions through an academic lens. It argues that the local Party committees’ incentives to incorporate academic opinions into their information channels are not only a reaction to the central CCP's increasing need to “reach wide” for high-quality and critical policy proposals but are also a move to seek political endorsement from the central authorities. This process has transformed government–academic relations in China from a patron-client model to one of increasing interdependence in which Chinese academia has become increasingly attuned to the thinking and needs of the CCP.

Recent reforms to China's People's Armed Police have changed the balance of authority between central and local officials, continuing a pattern of reduced local control and granting more authority to Xi Jinping in his role as Central Military Commission chairman. The new system, however, attempts to balance central control with provisions that allow local officials down to the prefecture level to take command in some circumstances. This system intends to allow for rapid mobilization in cases of social unrest or natural disasters, although a review of emergency response plans and other Chinese sources indicates uneven implementation. The risk is that centralization could slow emergency response, although the effects will depend on the nature of civil–military coordination at different levels. The paper describes new legal authorities, assesses implementation and challenges, and reaches conclusions about the implications for Chinese political control and emergency response.

Scholars consider deficient local accountability mechanisms a key shortcoming of China's response to environmental issues. Through empirical analysis of the new procurator-led public interest litigation (PIL) system, this study examines whether – and to what extent – this shortcoming can be remedied by empowering the juridical institutions. It concludes that thanks to the procuratorates’ political insider status, relative autonomy from local politics and extensive resources, procurators have generally found ways to maintain a delicate balance between holding executive agencies environmentally accountable and managing local governments’ resistance to the PIL system. However, reliance on top-down political support may ultimately hinder the expansion and stability of the procuratorial PIL system.

This article presents a qualitative empirical study of elite collusion and its influence on village elections and rural land development in China. Drawing on ethnographic data collected from two Chinese villages, it investigates how village cadres collude with other rural elites, using bribery, gift-giving and lavish banquets, to establish reciprocal ties with township officials and other public officials. Meanwhile, the officials make use of formal organizations to corruptly obtain profits and form alliances with village elites. The article examines how rural elites, especially village cadres, use this collusion to profit from the misuse of villagers’ collectively owned assets, the manipulation of village elections and the suppression of anti-corruption protests. It also offers new descriptive evidence of how recent reforms designed to strengthen the Party's overall leadership in rural governance may have actually facilitated elite capture and grassroots corruption.

As part of a broader direction of welfare and governance reforms, China has launched a policy to contract welfare services out to social organizations. Scholars have explored the implementation of the policy in a few socioeconomically advanced cities such as Guangzhou, Shenzhen and Shanghai. In this article, we examine how local governments lacking nongovernmental services suppliers or resources for contracting respond to the policy. We developed a framework of multiple logics to analyse services contracting in a county-level city in eastern China. We found that local officials follow three logics in implementing the policy: to meet the central state's targets, to balance policy outcomes and risks, and to stimulate a more participatory society. This generates a mix of policy behaviour, including entrepreneurialism, welfarism, innovation, risk-sharing and collaboration. We thus argue the interplay of the logics determines the local policy process of services contracting in China.

Using a detailed case study of house eviction in peri-urban China as well as original data from an online survey experiment, this article explores the opportunistic bargaining phenomenon in China in which citizens leverage the policy priorities of authorities with tactics that are not approved by the state to bargain for goals beyond those promised by the state. We find that opportunistic bargaining is widely accepted by Chinese citizens and that such an inclination is encouraged by successful precedents and clear signals of an opening through which to leverage government policy priorities; however, it is dampened by unclear signals and failed precedents. We also find that opportunistic bargainers tend to hold more negative perceptions of the current regime and are less likely to abide by state rules or social norms. The characteristics of opportunistic bargaining appear to be the opposite of the dominant “rightful resistance” framework.

What are the various ways in which local governments in China accommodate migrants through housing policies, and what are the forces that drive these variations? Through systematic coding of policy documents from 97 prefecture-level cities, this study captures the patterns of migrant housing policies using cluster analysis. We found that 18.6 per cent of the cities adopted a residual approach. Most cities adopted a rental-based approach (public and private rental, and collective rental) that could only meet migrants’ short-term housing needs. Only a few cities (12.4 per cent) adopted a citizenship-oriented approach, which best fits the central government's overarching goal of facilitating migrant workers’ long-term settlement in the host cities. Regression analyses examining the determinants of local migrant housing policies showed that the policy variations were not only shaped by economic and political concerns but also the salience of urban issues (problem-solving functions) and previous welfare generosity (path-dependency tendencies).

This article examines the fertility desires, intentions and outcomes of 406 alumni of a middle school in Dalian city, Liaoning province, when they were surveyed in 2014–2015 (during their late 20s and early 30s). It also looks at how and why the fertility desires, plans and outcomes of a 47-member representative subsample and their spouses changed from year to year as they moved through their 20s and 30s between 2008 and 2021. Although most respondents started out wanting two children, longitudinal interviews with the representative subsample and their spouses showed that most gradually resigned themselves to having no more than one child. This was because they felt unable to provide two children with the high standard of living and childcare that their own experiences as singletons had led them to consider essential for proper childrearing.

This paper explores household income per capita for the rural Yi and Manchu ethnic minority groups and the Han majority using data from the China Household Income Project 2002, 2013 and 2018. The disparity between total per capita income for the Yi and Han populations narrowed, while the average per capita income for the Manchu population remained relatively similar to that of the Han population. Decomposing total income to its sources shows that the rapid increase in agricultural income among the Yi was a main reason why the disparity in income, compared to the two other ethnic groups, narrowed. Nevertheless, reliance on agricultural income among the Yi was reduced as wage employment and migration increased. The Manchu group and the Han group also experienced rapid increases in wages and self-employment income. The aggregated value of transfers from the public sector was similar for all three ethnic groups.

Using census data spanning several decades, this paper offers a new and intuitive approach to understanding earnings mobility. We use “mobility ratios” and “immobility ratios” as indicators of the speed of upward mobility at the top end (i.e. moving into the ranks of the well-off) and the bottom end of the income distribution (i.e. moving out of poverty) as each cohort ages. We demonstrate that in Hong Kong, relative income upward mobility did slow down considerably for those born 1976–1980 and after. The 1976–1980 cohort is a watershed, prior to which upward mobility was generally robust and after which upward mobility was significantly subdued. The later cohorts generally start off with a much lower percentage that is well-off and a much higher percentage that is poor. Given such a low base, the apparent existence of upward mobility is not much solace for the majority as many are stuck in poverty. The prospect of slower economic growth in the coming decade suggests that it is unlikely that their lifetime fortunes will be better than those of older cohorts.

After nearly two decades of rising wages for those in the unskilled sectors of China's economy, in the mid-2010s employment and wages in China began to experience new polarizing trends. Using data from the National Bureau of Statistics of China, this paper examines trends in multiple sectors and subeconomies of China, revealing the substantial rise of employment in informal, low-skilled services as well as the steady decline of wage growth in the informal subeconomy. At the same time, we find that although employment growth in the formal subeconomy is relatively moderate, wage growth in high-skilled services is steadily rising. These two trends pose a challenge for China, presenting a new and uncertain period of economic change.