AI will disrupt the existing tort settlement. Tort law should be tech-impartial – that is, it should not encourage or discourage the adoption of new technologies where they generate the same level of risk, and victim rights should not be eroded by the use of new technologies in place of existing systems of work. Existing tort law is poorly suited to address some AI challenges, and a liability gap will emerge as systems replace employees since AI does not have legal personality and cannot commit a tort. A form of AI statutory vicarious liability should apply in commercial settings to address the liability gap and as the tech-impartial solution.

In this chapter we discuss two doctrines that are interrelated in that they impose liability either because of the relationship between the defendant and the tortfeasor (D2–D1) (vicarious liability), or the relationship between the defendant and the plaintiff (D2–P) (non-delegable duty of care).

We will start by examining vicarious liability, which is a form of strict liability. We will learn that the employer–employee relationship is the most common instance of vicarious liability. At common law, the employee who commits the tort is always liable, and so vicarious liability of the employer is in addition to the direct liability of the employee (tortfeasor). We will distinguish the employer–employee relationship from the relationship of principal–independent contractor, as the employer is not vicariously liable for the acts of independent contractors. Then, we will establish when the employee acts in the course of employment. We will also note the employer’s right of indemnity from an employee.

This chapter examines vicarious liability, that is, liability in tort for the tortious acts of others, and the insights that may be gained from a comparative law perspective. John Bell’s work on vicarious liability was cited by the UK Supreme Court in Cox v. Ministry of Justice [2016] UKSC 10, in support of its view that vicarious liability could be justified where the defendants had, in the exercise of their mission or enterprise, placed the tortfeasor in a position where the commission of the tort was an inherent risk of the activities assigned to them. This chapter examines comparatively the role ’risk’ plays in contemporary vicarious liability discourse. While civil law systems such as France have long embraced notions of risk, the common law courts have been slower to respond. Since 2000, however, UK and Canadian case law has indicated a willingness to move in this direction. In contrast, the Australian courts continue to resist the lure of risk- based analysis as an explanation and justification for the imposition of vicarious liability. Is relying on risk as a justification a ’risky business’ or inevitable if one wishes to expand this doctrine to meet the needs of meritorious litigants?

Chapter 2 explained the main areas of the law, including the differences between civil and criminal law. This chapter will focus on one of the main parts of the civil law that is relevant for nurses: the law of negligence. The law of negligence allows a person to bring legal proceedings against another person to correct a wrong or harm that the other person has done to them. Usually the person who has been harmed (the plaintiff) will seek payment of money (called ‘damages’) in compensation for their injury from the person whose act or omission caused the harm (the defendant).

This chapter will outline the key parts of the law of negligence, with a particular focus on the special rules that have developed in relation to health-care professionals, including nurses. By understanding how the law applies to things nurses do that can cause people harm, it should be possible for nurses to better avoid acting negligently.

This chapter examines a central moral problem arising in connection with the law on State responsibility: the problem of justifying the liability of ordinary State subjects for the material fulfilment of the remedial duties arising from their State’s wrongs. After isolating the problem and explaining its relationship to the question of whether States are moral agents, it critically examines a range of different justifications for subject liability, with a focus on theoretical justifications that have received less extensive attention in the literature. It considers: (1) causal contribution, (2) benefitting, (3) duties of aid, (4) part-constitution, (5) authorisation, (6) fictive authorisation, (7) moral vicarious liability, (8) duties to support valuable institutions and (9) lesser evil. The overall conclusion is that, even when State subjects are not morally responsible for the wrong which triggered a remedial duty, there are not infrequently moral liability justifications for State subjects bearing the costs of remedial duties. However, in practice, the imposition of subject liability is likely to be fully justified only on lesser evil grounds.

Since the second AI revolution started around 2009, society has witnessed new and steadily more impressive applications of AI. The growth of practical applications has in turn led to a growing body of literature devoted to the liability issues of AI. The present text is an attempt to assess the current state of the law and to advance the discussion.

The rapid development of robotics and intelligent systems raises the issue of how to adapt the legal framework to accidents arising from devices based on artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning. In the light of the numerous legal studies published in recent years, it is clear that ‘tort law and AI’ has become one of the hot topics of legal scholarship both in national and comparative contexts.

Tort law has a number of systems and structures by which the system will be used to address the challenges posed by AI technologies. It will not be necessary to significantly alter our understanding of tort law’s foundations to be ready for AI, and this may significantly and potentially affect AI innovation and utilization.

Duty of care in an educational context is concerned with the safety and wellbeing of students. It is a term we hear all the time in schools. It is imperative to have a clear understanding and working knowledge of when and where the duty is owed and where it is not. Duty of care is part of the tort of negligence where typically a student becomes injured on school grounds or at a school event and his or her family wants to seek a remedy. This is usually in the form of financial compensation for the loss suffered and for any ongoing treatment costs. The circumstances in which a plaintiff is likely to proceed and win a case in the tort of negligence is now well established in law. This chapter discusses the duty of care and how it operates in schools. The discussion covers the defences used by schools to reduce or avoid their responsibility in such matters. The second half of the chapter outlines several of the significant judicial cases in school law, highlighting what they have decided about the liability and legal position of schools and school authorities.

Lisa M. v. Henry Mayo Newhall Memorial Hospital exemplifies the reluctance of many courts to impose vicarious liability in cases of employee sexual abuse, treating cases of sexual abuse differently from other cases. The California Supreme Court in Lisa M. ruled against a pregnant patient who had been sexually molested by a hospital technician under the guise of performing an ultrasound examination. The court determined that the assault was “outside the scope of employment,” not fairly attributable to the employer, and the result only of “propinquity and lust.” The rewritten feminist opinion recharacterizes the assault as an outgrowth of employment, emphasizing that the employee exercised job-created control and power over plaintiff’s body. Because sexual assaults are not uncommon in the healthcare setting, the feminist opinion regards the assault as foreseeable and would allow a jury to determine whether vicarious liability is warranted because the assault was committed within the scope of employment. The accompanying commentary situates the case at the intersection of sexual violence and women’s health and examines how job-created power can make a patient vulnerable to harm by medical professionals.

The Introduction to Feminist Judgments: Rewritten Tort Opinions situates the sixteen rewritten feminist opinions and accompanying commentaries contained in the volume into the broader legal and scholarly landscape. Although the idea of a feminist tort law is still difficult for many to imagine, the Introduction details the rich history of feminist and critical torts scholarship. Many of its recurring themes echo those found in critical scholarship more generally, including taking a gender-aware approach, preferring contextual analyses that tap into women’s lived experiences, and being skeptical of abstract dichotomies that mask implicit hierarchies. The volume contains “classic” cases that appear in virtually every torts casebook as well as lesser-known cases that deserve more attention. A large number of the cases in the volume deal with gender-related injuries caused by sexual violence, abuse, harassment, and invasions of privacy. The portrait that emerges is that of a tort system that undercompensates for sexual and reproductive injury. When courts confront such gender-related injuries, they tend not to apply ordinary doctrinal rules or not to apply ordinary rules with the same force as in other settings. The Introduction lists promising strategies to correct for such bias and make tort law more inclusive and egalitarian.

This chapter considers the liability of public authorities in negligence. It applies many of the principles discussed in Chapters 2 and 3 when assessing the duty of care (if any) owed by a public authority, where that authority’s acts or omissions cause C loss or damage. Inevitably, as a result of the analysis adopted by the courts in this area of negligence, proof of breach is closely intertwined with the duty of care analysis.

This Chapter will focus on one of the main parts of the civil law that is relevant for nurses: the law of negligence. The law of negligence is a part of the civil law that allows a person to bring legal proceedings against another person to correct a wrong or harm that the other person has done to them. Usually the person who has been harmed (the plaintiff) will seek payment of damages in compensation for their injury from the person whose act or omission caused the harm (the defendant). This Chapter will outline the key parts of the law of negligence. The particular focus of the Chapter will be on the special rules that have developed in the law of negligence in relation to health care professionals, including nurses. By understanding how the law will apply to things nurses do that cause people harm, it should be possible for nurses to better avoid acting negligently.