Compensation was paid to river interests adversely affected, including some waterfront labourers, the State became owner of the Legal Quays until the 1830s, the Corporation built a canal across the Isle of Dogs, and a new London Bridge eventually replaced the Old. All this depended to some degree on State support; in the case of compensation payments, a Treasury loan was repaid by a tax on shipping. River port prosperity was largely unaffected by the introduction of docks, although their warehousing privileges deprived waterfront wharves of potential business. Coastal and low-duty European imports continued, boosted by the introduction of steamship services. Vessels carrying coal, grain, timber and provisions competed with passenger steamers and river traffic for water space, leading to conflict between users and with the Corporation as Harbour Authority.

Chapter 8 focuses on the imperial state level to examine the legal and political logic informing the final adjudication of the case in 1799, a decision that constituted a shift in the decisions the Council of the Indies and colonial tribunals had been taking in the 1780s. The chapter examines the political reasons related to mining utility and security that informed the shift and the juridical basis imperial jurists used to ground the case’s outcome. Ultimately, the Bourbon Crown ruled in favor of the cobreros but attached caveats related to Indian law to their collective freedom. The chapter ventures into the immediate aftermath of the Freedom Edict of 1800 to examine the challenges that emerged in the colony regarding the actualization of the decreed emancipation. It also interrogates the possibility of compensation or reparations to the cobreros for their wrongful enslavement.

Although the 13 United States courts of appeals are the final word on 99 percent of all federal cases, there is no detailed account of how these courts operate. How do judges decide which decisions are binding precedents and which are not? Who decides whether appeals are argued orally? What administrative structures do these courts have? The answers to these and hundreds of other questions are largely unknown, not only to lawyers and legal academics but also to many within the judiciary itself. Written and Unwritten is the first book to provide an inside look at how these courts operate. An unprecedented contribution to the field of judicial administration, the book collects the differing local rules and internal procedures of each court of appeals. In-depth interviews of the chief judges of all 13 circuits and surveys of all clerks of court reveal previously undisclosed practices and customs.

This chapter discusses the general principles relating to the assessment of compensation for loss resulting from a civil wrong. Since courts and legislatures often lay down legal rules for a particular area of law, the assessment of compensation differs between areas. This is why Part 2 contains separate chapters for contract, tort, the Australian Consumer Law and equity. However, there are several commonalities between the areas, in particular, contract and tort. This chapter discusses the rules that are common to at least contract and tort. Most of them also apply in equity and under the Australian Consumer Law. Deviations from those rules in equity or under the Australian Consumer Law are discussed in the relevant chapters. This chapter also provides a brief introduction to those matters that differ between contract and tort. Comprehensive treatment is given to the date of assessment; even though there are significant differences between the causes of actions, there has been considerable convergence.

The Australian Consumer Law (‘ACL’) is the national consumer law and applies across Australia. It came into force on 1 January 2011. At the same time, the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) changed its name to the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth). Schedule 2 of that Act now contains the ACL. The ACL replaced a number of consumer protection provisions in federal, state and territory laws. It was enacted with the cooperation of the federal, state and territory governments. This cooperation was necessary since the Commonwealth lacks the power to comprehensively legislate on consumer law.

The ACL applies as a federal law, or as a law of the relevant state or territory, or both. It is not necessary here to go into all the details of the demarcation since the same body of law generally applies. Broadly, the ACL applies as a law of the Commonwealth to the conduct of corporations and certain natural persons, and applies as a law of a state or territory to the conduct of corporate and natural persons with a connection to the relevant jurisdiction. The application of the ACL as a federal law and the application of the ACL as a state or territory law are not mutually exclusive (where there is no conflict).

This chapter discusses the account of profits, disgorgement, and other forms of gain-based relief. It will consider the difference between compensation, restitution and disgorgement. It will then consider the account of profits, and the operation of bars to relief and other limiting factors.

The primary rationales of the account of profits have been identified as deterrence and prophylaxis (that is, preventing a defendant from gaining from wrongdoing). Deterrence looks not to the dispute in question, but to the future conduct of the specific defendant (specific deterrence) and the future conduct of other potential defendants (general deterrence). By stripping the defendant of her gain (or part of her gain), the defendant (and other potential defendants) will be deterred from engaging in similar conduct in the future. It is argued that the remedies discussed in this chapter have a deterrent flavour.

The law of civil remedies has frequently been described as a ‘capstone’ private law subject. In other words, it is the culmination of a student’s knowledge of private law, and it is intended to assist all the disparate strands from previously studied private law subjects to come together.

It is for this reason that we will take a generally ‘functional’ approach to the organisation of this book, grouping remedies from across different areas according to the broad functions they perform so that parallels and contrasts can be made.

A contract may be breached by one party (the defendant) through defective performance, delayed performance, or a total failure to perform. If the contract breached is enforceable at common law, the innocent party (the plaintiff) can generally claim common law damages for any loss suffered as a result of the breach. The assessment of such damages and the attribution of responsibility for such loss are generally governed by the rules discussed in Chs 2 to 4 for civil wrongs in general. Specific rules for breach of contract are discussed in this chapter: the assessment of damages and the attribution of responsibility.

The victim of a tort can generally claim compensatory damages for any loss suffered as a result of the tort. The assessment of such damages and the attribution of responsibility for such loss are generally governed by the rules discussed in Chs 2 to 4 for civil wrongs in general. Specific rules for tort are discussed in this chapter: the assessment of damages and the attribution of responsibility. The assessment of compensatory damages for personal injury, which are usually claimed in tort, is discussed.

In this chapter, we consider exemplary damages and aggravated damages, remedies with a strong vindicatory flavour, as recognised by the High Court of Australia in Lewis v Australian Capital Territory.

Exemplary damages vindicate the plaintiff’s interests, but also explicitly punish the defendant for the wrong in question. Punishment is not commonly recognised as a central aim of private law. Some commentators have argued that it should not be part of private law. However, exemplary damages are said to validate the plaintiff’s feelings of hurt and anger arising from the contumelious nature of the defendant’s wrong. Such damages also perform a vindicatory function. The fact that the law punishes a defendant for the manner of his interference with the plaintiff’s interests signals the importance of those interests.

This chapter reviews strategies for maximising the level of function of people with cognitive impairment. The chapter focuses on a number of strategies, often developed for working with acquired brain injury, such as the use of internal memory aids (e.g. mnemonics, chunking) and external memory aids (e.g. diaries, mobile phones, white boards). Cognitive training exercises and cognitive stimulation are reviewed, along with the evidence base for their effectiveness.

The chapter presents a vision of Berlin after socialisation of housing, as proposed by DWE. It details the organisational structure of a new institution (Anstalt öffentlicher Rechts) that would manage this housing democratically. It explains the legal rules for calculating the compensation to the expropriated landlords. It also compares the non-profit-oriented architecture with the ‘architecture of financialisation’: the housing built by the corporate landlords.

Pursuing German and Japanese war criminals and gaining compensation for survivors were high on the agenda of the victorious Allies after 1945. Enthusiasm, however, waned considerably and unforgivably in the context of the Cold War and partial restoration of pre-war elite networks. Long-term continuities in business–government networks in the coordinated economies of Germany and Japan meant that some of those who had been charged with war crimes – and/or those whose wealth derived at least in part from activities associated with the war – figured prominently in major post-war scandals. Over time, however, those directly tainted with pre-1945 crimes and practices begin to retire and die off. Moreover, the export orientation of both countries, combined with other aspects of the globalisation of business, finance, and markets, also changed the composition and dynamics of elite networks. This happened more rapidly and thoroughly in Germany than in Japan, owing to Germany’s greater dependence on exports; its central role in the European Union; and its greater openness to foreign imports and investment. German corporate governance therefore experienced more far-reaching reform than its Japanese counterpart. For many of the same reasons, Germany has made greater strides towards coming to terms with its pre-1945 past than Japan.

This chapter focuses on the so-called politics behind nil compensation against the background of some recent judicial developments, which arguably show a conservative trend in awarding compensation that deviates substantially from market value. The chapter questions why the narrative in favour of nil compensation is so dominant if it is argued that it is already legally possible to expropriate for very little compensation. Considering the Msiza judgments in the Land Claims Court and the Supreme Court of Appeal, the chapter asks: Do we need to rethink the space that nil compensation occupies in our legal framework? The fact that expropriation is essentially compensation-based, coupled with the difficulty that courts have to determine compensation that is not (always) related to market value, suggests that it may be necessary for us to engage more directly with the idea of nil compensation in a much more open, honest and principled manner. There is enough evidence to show that this option is not only politically driven but in fact legally necessary.

This chapter investigates the notion of ‘justice’ that informs ‘just and equitable’ compensation in section 25 of the Constitution and questions whether this notion changed during the attempt to amend section 25. It starts off by investigating the possible meaning of ‘justice’ during the transition and interrogates the usefulness of that notion of justice in interpreting section 25. It makes the argument that the conversations bringing about the Constitution Eighteenth Amendment Bill, even though not leading to an amendment, were important to challenge the notion of ‘justice’. The adoption of this Constitution lays a secure foundation for the people of South Africa to transcend the divisions and strife of the past, which generated gross violations of human rights, the transgression of humanitarian principles in violent conflicts and a legacy of hatred, fear, guilt and revenge. These can now be addressed on the basis that there is a need for understanding but not for vengeance, a need for reparation but not for retaliation, a need for ubuntu but not for victimisation (Epilogue of the interim Constitution, 1993).

The UK Parliament has already pre-emptively legislated for a compensation solution for autonomous vehicle accidents through the Automated and Electric Vehicles Act 2018. The Act is a response to the fact that the ordinary approach to motor vehicle accidents cannot apply in an AV context since there is no human driver. Tort law has previously been subjected to major shifts in response to motor vehicles, and we are again on the cusp of another motor-vehicle-inspired revolution in tort law. However, in legislating for AV accidents in the UK, there was inadequate consideration of alternative approaches.