Every civil wrong has a number of requirements that must be satisfied before the plaintiff may obtain compensation for resulting harm. One requirement common to all wrongs is that the harm must be attributable to the defendant’s wrongful conduct. It may broadly be said that the defendant’s wrongful conduct must constitute a cause of the harm. This always involves an inquiry into whether there is a historical link in fact between the wrong and the harm, and usually also a value judgement on whether liability for the harm ought to be imposed upon the defendant.

With regard to wrongs actionable only on proof of damage (for example, negligence), the attribution of responsibility for harm is part of establishing liability rather than a matter of remedy. With regard to wrongs actionable per se, the attribution of responsibility for harm is a matter of remedy since nominal damages can be awarded in the absence of loss. In any event, it is customary to discuss attribution of responsibility in books on remedies, and this book follows that custom.

The victim of a tort can generally claim compensatory damages for any loss suffered as a result of the tort. The assessment of such damages and the attribution of responsibility for such loss are generally governed by the rules discussed in Chs 2 to 4 for civil wrongs in general. Specific rules for tort are discussed in this chapter: the assessment of damages and the attribution of responsibility. The assessment of compensatory damages for personal injury, which are usually claimed in tort, is discussed.

The responsibilitiesand liability of the persons and organisations involved in the development of AI systems are not clearly identified. The assignment of liability will need government to mo e from a risk-based to a responsibility-based system. One possible approach would be to establish a pan-EU compensation fund for damages caused by digital technologies and AI, financed by the industry and insurance companies.

Psychologists are often called in personal injury and workplace discrimination cases to help determine the extent of psychological damages (e.g., psychological trauma). We apply a rigorous five-stage temporal model to guide forensic evaluators in providing a robust, evidence-based psychological perspective on the nature and extent of the injury, how that injury arose, and the effects of that injury in the future. Functionality of the plaintiff is assessed in daily activities, in the workplace, in intimate relationships, in social and recreational activities, and in relation to their family. Systematic analysis of the functioning of the plaintiff in these areas from the period before the legally relevant event until litigation concludes allows decisions to be made about the nature and source of any impairments. This method includes consideration of alternative hypotheses, integral to decisions about causation. Psychologists’ decisions thus affect outcomes for injured parties. Future research and practice implications are discussed.

ERISA’s underdeveloped civil enforcement mechanism, section 502(a), has generated extensive litigation. Judicially crafted strictures on the relief available to participants have arisen with respect to standing, scope of judicial review, causes of action, and remedies. While the Supreme Court has held those with a colorable claim to benefits have standing, precisely what that means has proven elusive. Judicial review of denied claims is strictly constrained. Court access requires that participants have exhausted internal review processes, and if the plan grants the administrator discretion to determine eligibility for benefits or construe the plan’s terms (which is virtually always), judicial review is restricted to a cursory scan for abuse of discretion. Deferential review survives even if the administrator is conflicted: lower courts are instructed to consider the conflict merely as one factor in and overall assessment of whether discretion was abused. Finally, the Court has held that ERISA does not permit the full panoply of damages one would expect in the aftermath of contractual or fiduciary breach. Consequential damages are unavailable for denied claims, and equitable relief for fiduciary breach is limited to what was typically available in equity in the days of the divided bench.

When determining compensation as a form of reparation for the breach of a bilateral investment treaty, investment tribunals generally rely on the judgment of the Permanent Court of International Justice in the Factory at Chorzów case, and Article 36 of the International Law Commission’s Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, as reflective of customary international law. Progressively, however, investment tribunals have developed a doctrine of ‘equitable considerations’ as a legal proposition capable of affecting the quantification of damages in ways not envisaged in the Factory at Chorzów case. This development is not uncomplicated. While equity may serve as a useful tool in the hands of arbitrators to provide a balanced legal reasoning and arrive at a more acceptable legal outcome, an unprincipled application of equity may have serious repercussions on the integrity of the arbitral award and undermine the legitimacy of the tribunal. Thus, this chapter seeks to provide an analytical framework for the operation of equitable considerations in the context of compensation in investor-State arbitration.

The Chorzow Factory case serves as a means for tribunals and academics to make different kinds of assertions regarding the application of customary international law (CIL) and the principle of full reparation. Internationally, both tribunals and academics argue that this case is CIL, and that it serves as evidence for the principle of full reparation at the moment of assessing the damage in a case. Against this background, this chapter demonstrates that the aforementioned affirmations are not exact and that have been taken out of context by some parts of academia and tribunals themselves. Firstly, the Chorzow ruling does not cite the legal sources that, without doubt, would allow them to affirm the formerly made statements. Secondly, the ruling did not categorically say that CIL had been used as a source, as has been said by many investment arbitral awards. Thirdly, the context in which the decision was awarded is overlooked. In light of the former, it will be shown that most of the decisions of the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) were made by way of general statements, without citing the direct sources that established such rules.

This chapter deals with defences to the trespass actions discussed in Chapters 6 and 7. As a general rule, the defendant bears the burden of proving the facts necessary to constitute a defence. Where the defence is established, the defendant will be relieved of liability.

It should be noted that some statutory defences, which are similar to common law defences, are provided by the civil liability legislation and/or Criminal Code in most of the Australian states and territories. Therefore, when considering such defences, the relevant legislation in a particular jurisdiction must be consulted. This chapter will discuss some of the most important defences available for trespass to the person, trespass to land and trespass to personal property.

The defences fall within three roughly divided categories:

1. (1) Self-help based defences

2. (2) Justification-based defences

3. (3) Fault-based defences

   We also consider a number of factors that are not defences to trespass at the end of this chapter.

In a tort action, if the plaintiff’s claims are successful and no relevant defences are available to the defendant, the plaintiff will be entitled to an order or award by the court for an appropriate remedy. Such judicial remedies include:

• damages

• injunctions

• declarations.

In addition, self-help remedies are available and include:

• eviction of trespassers and re-entry of land

• self-defence

• abatement

• apology.

  The focus of this chapter will be on judicial remedies, especially damages.

We briefly mentioned in Chapter 2 that the main source of contractual obligations under Qatari contract law arises from: (i) the contract itself; (ii) the intention of the parties at the time of forming the contract; and lastly; (iii) the relevant laws regulating contractual affairs. Here, we need to highlight the fact that obligations in general under the civil law are comprised of three tiers: (i) civil obligations; (ii) natural obligations; and (iii) moral duties. Understanding these is vital to one’s appreciation of contractual performance. Civil obligations include statutory and contractual undertakings, such as the sale of goods and services. Civil obligations also include civil-wrongdoings, which are governed by the law of delict under the CC. Civil-wrongdoings are concerned with personal injury, negligence, defamation, mental distress, etc. All civil obligations are enforceable.

While company law makes great efforts to maintain the separation of different legal entities, other areas of law increasingly emphasise the common responsibility of corporate groups. One of the fields shaping this emerging principle is competition law, where focusing on the whole group rather than its individual members is increasingly becoming the norm. But this approach is still far from being uniformly accepted. While EU competition law is pushing ahead, US antitrust law is said to take a rather critical stance. Against this background, this chapter examines the functions performed by a unitary perspective on corporate groups. The main goal is to show that at least three important functions must be distinguished in EU competition law, each of which has its own implications. Only when these are properly understood can it be determined where the group perspective is appropriate and where it is not. This is shown by the example of current discussions, for example, on the liability of sister companies and on possible applications in the area of liability for damages. Finally, the analysis in this chapter also aims to contribute to a better understanding of the different approaches in EU and US competition law.

Chapter 8 deals with the potential remedies available to protesters when their constitutional rights are violated. It focuses on damages remedies intended to make protesters whole for such injuries. The law of public protest severely restricts such remedies. Under principles of “qualified immunity,” the law generally immunizes all but the most incompetent officers from civil liability. Empirical evidence shows that in protesters’ First Amendment and Fourth Amendment cases, defendants’ qualified immunity claims are granted 60 percent of the time. Protesters also face nearly insurmountable obstacles in terms of holding municipalities liable for constitutional violations. The Supreme Court has recently limited protesters’ ability to bring First Amendment “retaliation” claims. Finally, the Court has all but sounded the death knell for First Amendment damages claims against federal officials. The chapter joins the chorus calling for qualified immunity reform. It also encourages states and localities to restrict officers’ ability to invoke qualified and other immunities, and to create causes of action against officials for violations of state constitutional law.

This chapter considers the rules governing claims for compensatory damages in tort. Compensation in tort is generally governed by the same rules as apply to all civil wrongs, although some specific rules apply to torts claims in particular.