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This essay assesses the morality of Ukraine's use of drones to attack targets inside Russia. Following its invasion by Russian forces, Ukraine has had a just cause to wage a war of self-defense. However, its efforts to achieve that cause remain subject to moral limits. Even a state that has been unjustly attacked may not, for example, respond by deliberately targeting the attacking state's civilian population. To do so would violate the jus in bello principle of discrimination. The essay first describes how drone technology has frequently enabled long-range strikes against Russian military assets as well as other targets inside cities. It then explains why it would be morally wrong for Ukraine to attack its enemy's population centers. First, Russian civilians are not liable to attack, and this nonliability is undiminished by the injustice of Russia's invasion or by any in bello wrongs committed by the Russian military. Second, attacking Russian cities with drones would arguably achieve little or no self-defensive benefit for Ukraine, and it could even be counterproductive.
The global increase in observed forest dieback, characterized by the death of tree foliage, heralds widespread decline in forest ecosystems. This degradation causes significant changes to ecosystem services and functions, including habitat provision and carbon sequestration, which can be difficult to detect using traditional monitoring techniques, highlighting the need for large-scale and high-frequency monitoring. Contemporary developments in the instruments and methods to gather and process data at large scales mean this monitoring is now possible. In particular, the advancement of low-cost drone technology and deep learning on consumer-level hardware provide new opportunities. Here, we use an approach based on deep learning and vegetation indices to assess crown dieback from RGB aerial data without the need for expensive instrumentation such as LiDAR. We use an iterative approach to match crown footprints predicted by deep learning with field-based inventory data from a Mediterranean ecosystem exhibiting drought-induced dieback, and compare expert field-based crown dieback estimation with vegetation index-based estimates. We obtain high overall segmentation accuracy (mAP: 0.519) without the need for additional technical development of the underlying Mask R-CNN model, underscoring the potential of these approaches for non-expert use and proving their applicability to real-world conservation. We also find that color-coordinate based estimates of dieback correlate well with expert field-based estimation. Substituting ground truth for Mask R-CNN model predictions showed negligible impact on dieback estimates, indicating robustness. Our findings demonstrate the potential of automated data collection and processing, including the application of deep learning, to improve the coverage, speed, and cost of forest dieback monitoring.
The central argument set out in this Element is that the combination of a perceived radical change in the threat environment post 9/11, and the new capabilities afforded by the long silent reach of the drone, have put pressure on the previously accepted legal frameworks justifying the use of force. This has resulted in disagreements - both articulated and unarticulated - in how the Western allies should respond to both the legal and operational innovations in the use of force that drones have catalysed. The Element focuses on the responses of the UK, France, and Germany to these developments in the context of the changing US approach to the use of force. Locating itself at the interface of international law and politics, this is the first attempt to look at the interplay between technological innovations, legal justifications, and inter-alliance politics in the context of the use of armed drones.
Aerial visuals play a central – and increasing – role in military operations, informing military decision-makers in real time. While adding relevant and time-sensitive information, these visuals construct an imperfect representation of people and spaces, placing additional burdens on decision-makers and creating a persuasive – yet misleading – virtual representation of the actual conditions on the ground. Based on interdisciplinary analysis of critical security studies, behavioural economics and international law literature, as well as rich data from US and Israeli military investigations into four military operations spanning from 2009 to 2021, this article identifies three types of challenges stemming from the mounting reliance on aerial visuals to inform military operations: technical challenges, relating to the technical capabilities and features of aerial vision technologies; cognitive challenges, relating to decision-making biases affecting human decision-makers; and human-technological challenges, relating to the human–machine interaction itself. The article suggests ways to mitigate these challenges, improve the application of the law of armed conflict, and protect people, animals and the environment during armed conflicts.
Drone warfare is one of the most important trends in twenty-first-century conflict. This chapter surveys the history of drones – nonpiloted aircraft – and describes their basic features and how they differ from piloted aircraft and missiles. It assesses the advantages and disadvantages of using drones. The advantages include circumvention of some operational crew limitations; longer flight times; plausible deniability; and avoidance of friendly casualties. Whether drone strikes are effective, especially against terrorist and militant groups, is also considered. The chapter next works through the interwoven question of whether (certain types of) drone strikes are legal and/or ethical. It then turns to the political dimensions of how they are authorized, especially their implications for the separation of powers.The chapter then turns to the spread of drones to state and nonstate actors, and the frontiers in the future development of drone technology. The chapter applies many of these concepts to a quantitative study of whether drone strikes reduce terrorism, and a case study of US drone strikes on targets on Pakistani territory in the 2000s and 2010s.
The stabilization of drone programs and their implementation as part of the normal functioning of the state deserve much more attention than it has received, since the power it conveys goes far beyond prompt lethal strikes in foreign territories. The institutionalization of a drone program not only means that the extensive warfare that drones bring about is stable, but also, and perhaps even more importantly, because a drone program consists of the constant surveillance of populations "living under drones." Behavioral changes (in addition to the evident psychological ramifications) of populations living under drones have been proven, at both the individual and community level. This chapter makes clear that a transborder drone program cannot be viewed as occasional interventions in self-defense. Instead, through an institutionalized drone program, a state performs rituals of governance and sovereignty over the populations it monitors. The chapter conceptualizes the extension of state power over the populations of third states and explores what it means for the international legal order that the law is essential to such an extension.
Describing drone programs as a network of interacting and interdependent factors including the contemporary technological capacities of drones, law and military strategy is one of the main aspects of this study. All chapters identify where and how these factors converge or diverge and examine the result of this interaction. This description shows that combat drone technology facilitates anticipatory warfare – the scope of which is indefinite in time and space – and that the law is rearranged around anticipation. Further examining the socio-techno-legal phenomena produced by drone programs, the book explores the long-term effects produced by drone programs over populations living under drones as well as the international legal order. This book can be thought of as an act of compiling the textual, bureaucratic, and material traces of these programs in order to lay bare the infrastructure that is extending warfare in time and space and exacerbating state power.
Drone programs in the counterterrorism context rest on the use of force in self-defense not against an (imminent) act, but against individuals in the light of their personal or behavioral characteristics. Because drone programs are motivated by the objective of permanently addressing future threats before they materialize, technology and legal rhetoric are used as instruments to authorize action against individuals who are not presently perpetrating terrorist acts, nor even clearly preparing, such acts. Some states active in the transnational war on terror have proposed a legal framework for the continuous anticipation of armed attacks against individuals who show signs of hostile intent. These changes in military strategy and legal discourse are not merely the result of how states decide to use force in the counterterrorism context, but also of what technology allows them to do. As such, drones facilitate and arguably intensify the phenomena of the individualization and dematerialization of the use of force. Although the interpretation of self-defense proposed by some states active in the war on terror is still highly contested on some points, the chapter shows that even if some limitations remain, concessions to the extensive interpretation of some limitations appear to have a direct cascade effect on the remaining checks because these limitations are interconnected.
Before developing the argument of the book, this chapter gives an overview of the contexts where combat drones have been deployed as a basis for the study. The description of the contexts in which drone operations have been conducted extraterritorially against non-state actors by the US, the UK, and France follow a chronological sequence, and draw some general common and diverging features of the different legal rationales crafted by these states.
Through an analysis of the use of drones, Rebecca Mignot-Mahdavi explores the ways in which, in the context of counterterrorism, war, technology and the law interact and reshape one another. She demonstrates that drone programs are techno-legal machineries that facilitate and accelerate the emergence of a new kind of warfare. This new model of warfare is individualized and de-materialized in the sense that it focuses on threat anticipation and thus consists in identifying dangerous figures (individualized warfare) rather than responding to acts of hostilities (material warfare). Revolving around threat anticipation, drone wars endure over an extensive timeframe and geographical area, to the extent that the use of drones may even be seen, as appears to be the case for the United States, as part of the normal functioning of the state, with profound consequences for the international legal order.
Vultures are among the most threatened bird guilds on the planet and have a unique functional role within ecosystems. They are therefore subject to increasing research interest, calling for standardised study approaches and monitoring methods. The use of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UASs) is rapidly gaining popularity in ecological research due to technological advances, affordability, and accessibility. This study reviews the existing peer-reviewed publications and grey literature on the responses of European vultures and other comparable species to UASs, and summarises the types of UAS use, their potential disturbance effects on vultures, and the resulting inter- and intra-specific interactions. Our goal was to assess the potential effects of UASs and to provide practical recommendations to optimise their safe use in vulture conservation and research. We acknowledge the potential of UASs to increase research efficiency and reduce research effort, time, and financial cost. Owing to the absence of sufficient data on long-term disturbance effects, we advocate the precautionary principle and offer a set of species-tailored practical recommendations to limit the potential negative effects of UASs and maximise their value in conservation management. We urge that the physiological and long-term impacts on vulture reproduction are considered and call for standardised monitoring protocols and controls on UAS use. Our conclusions and recommendations are particularly aimed at researchers working on vulture conservation and restoration projects worldwide.
This chapter explores literary and cinematic works that capture the emergence of technogenic life-forms in war zones through the artificial vision of the drone: that terror-inducing aerial surveillance apparatus and killing machine that is planetary in its reach and catastrophic in its impact. By technogenic life-forms, I mean machinic abstractions of the organic human form that are available for manipulation, expulsion, and annihilation. These life-forms are the product of a scalar transformation of ordinary human vision through the composite digital infrastructure of the drone. The aesthetic repertoire of the chapter ranges from novels such as Richard Clark’s The Sting of the Drone (2014) and Namwali Serpell’s The Old Drift (2019), films such as Madiha Tahir’s Wounds of Waziristan (2013) and Atef Abu Saif’s war diary The Drone Eats with Me (2016).
Coasts are undeniably regions of critical importance for a range of environmental, sociocultural, and economic reasons. Yet they are also areas of intense anthropogenic impact and are particularly susceptible to climate change-related concerns. As such, it is imperative that we have the means to monitor and manage them in a sustainable manner. Drone technology has emerged as providing a unique value proposition in coastal environments to support data-driven monitoring and management decisions. With their highly detailed data capture capability, drones are particularly well suited to map the spatial heterogeneity, structural complexity, and temporally dynamic nature of coasts. Further, they are readily accessible to coastal populations and can promote grassroots action by the very people whose lives and livelihoods the coasts support. Herein, we cover several of the leading innovations in using aerial drones to map coastal ecosystems. We then consider how general trends and technology projections including artificial intelligence, as well as cloud and edge computing offer opportunities for the future of drone mapping and monitoring in a coastal context. While the challenge of change is inevitable, embracing the opportunities it provides will allow us to better understand and live sustainably with and within our coastal ecosystems.
Endless armed conflicts against terrorist groups put civilian populations at risk. Since France has been involved in the Sahel from 2013 onwards, transnational non-international armed conflicts (NIACs) of extended geographical and temporal scope against groups designated as terrorists are not a US exception anymore. NIACs against terrorist groups, conducted not only by the United States but also by France, persist and have been reconfigured around threat anticipation. How can anticipatory warfare be best constrained? This article argues that it can be best done through more constraining rules regulating target selection in NIACs and, in particular, by redefining the notion of continuous combat function (CCF). Many elements explored in this article indicate that the United States and France select targets that they pre-designate as terrorists, before these targets are engaged in hostilities. Instead of responding to the observed participation of these individuals in hostilities, strikes are based on contextual and behavioural elements ahead or outside of such moments. This paper argues that when war consists of threat anticipation, it becomes very extensive and particularly risky for civilians. Furthermore, recent State practice in the counterterrorism context reveals the pitfalls of the notions of direct participation in hostilities and CCF as defined in the 2009 International Committee of the Red Cross Interpretive Guidance. Outside this context, the interpretations proposed in the Interpretive Guidance might seem sufficient to constrain target selection processes and to protect civilian populations. However, when applied to armed conflicts that are driven by threat anticipation, the pitfalls of these interpretations emerge. I formulate a critique of these interpretations as being partly responsible for anticipatory warfare and propose an alternative theory for the CCF test.
Chapter 7 presents the third of the three case studies: Killing the Individual Human Being via Drones. Here I look at targeted killings and the growing use of drones in this practice. The chapter offers a detailed discussion of the predominantly legal and ethical debate. In doing so, the chapter demonstrates the relevance of an analysis guided by insights from IR theory. But it also discusses legal questions concerning International Human Rights Law and International Humanitarian Law. The case study engages in detail with the general discourse on drone strikes and targeted killings and provides an in-depth analysis of specific strike types and drone strikes. The analysis demonstrates how the individual human being appears as an innocent civilian who should not be killed (if possible) or as a guilty terrorist who should be killed.
This book observes a growing humanisation of global politics relating to the appearance of individual human beings in discourses of global politics. It identifies a mismatch concerning International Relations theory and International Law and the study of the humanisation of global politics. To overcome this mismatch, Sassan Gholiagha proposes a novel theoretical framework based on feminist and constructivist International Relations theory and non-statist theories of International Law scholarship. The book applies this interdisciplinary framework together with an interpretative analytical framework to three cases: the discourse on prosecution, studying international criminal law and the work of the International Criminal Court; the discourse on protection, focusing on the Responsibility to Protect; and the use of drones in targeted killing operations. Drawing on these case studies and the frameworks, the book identifies how individual human beings as participants in global politics position themselves and are positioned by others in these various discourses.
The autonomy inherent in AI systems brings legal challenges. The reason is that it is no longer possible to predict whether and how explanations and actions emanating from AI systems originate and whether they are attributable to the AI system or its operator. The core research is whether the operator of AI systems is contractually liable for the damage caused by its malfunctioning. Is contract law sufficiently prepared for the use of AI systems for contract performance? The answer is provided through a review of the common law, CISG and the German Civil Code (BGB).
Drones represent a rapidly developing industry. Devices initially designed for military purposes have evolved into a new area with a plethora of commercial applications. One of the biggest hindrances in the commercial developments of drones is legal uncertainty concerning the legal regimes applicable to the multitude of issues that arises with this new technology. This is especially prevalent in situations concerning autonomous drones (ie drones operating without a pilot). This article provides an overview of some of these uncertainties. A scenario based on the fictitious but plausible event of an autonomous drone falling from the sky and injuring people on the ground is analysed from the perspectives of both German and English private law. This working scenario is used to illustrate the problem of legal uncertainty facing developers, and the article provides valuable knowledge by mapping real uncertainties that impede the development of autonomous drone technology alongside providing multidisciplinary insights from law as well as software electronic and computer engineering.
Sub-Saharan Africa has seen an extraordinary technological take-up. As recently as a decade ago, fewer than 5 per cent of sub-Saharan Africans had access to the Internet but by December 2020, approximately 85 per cent of Kenyans and 73 per cent of Nigerians had internet access. Growing connectivity is empowering a generation with opportunities that would have been unthinkable a little as 10 years ago. Young sub-Saharan Africans are using tech-based solutions across agriculture, education, finance, healthcare and infrastructure, to develop African economies at lower cost and faster speed. The use of smartphones, which enable greater use of mobile technology, is also growing. Nigeria’s mobile economy is set to grow by 19 per cent between 2019 and 2025 – the highest rate in Sub-Saharan Africa, which is the fastest-growing mobile technology region in the world. Mobile technologies and services generated 9 per cent of GDP in sub-Saharan Africa in 2019 – a contribution that amounted to more than US$155 billion of economic value and supported almost 3.8 million jobs. This reflects the fact that in some areas – such as the mobile financial sector – sub-Saharan Africa has become a global leader.
Sub-Saharan Africa has seen an extraordinary technological take-up. As recently as a decade ago, fewer than 5 per cent of sub-Saharan Africans had access to the Internet but by December 2020, approximately 85 per cent of Kenyans and 73 per cent of Nigerians had internet access. Growing connectivity is empowering a generation with opportunities that would have been unthinkable a little as 10 years ago. Young sub-Saharan Africans are using tech-based solutions across agriculture, education, finance, healthcare and infrastructure, to develop African economies at lower cost and faster speed. The use of smartphones, which enable greater use of mobile technology, is also growing. Nigeria’s mobile economy is set to grow by 19 per cent between 2019 and 2025 – the highest rate in Sub-Saharan Africa, which is the fastest-growing mobile technology region in the world. Mobile technologies and services generated 9 per cent of GDP in sub-Saharan Africa in 2019 – a contribution that amounted to more than US$155 billion of economic value and supported almost 3.8 million jobs. This reflects the fact that in some areas – such as the mobile financial sector – sub-Saharan Africa has become a global leader.