This article presents a business history of the Barranquilla Railway and Pier Company (BRPC) and its impact on Colombia’s Caribbean region. It explores the company’s operations, profitability, shareholders, infrastructure development, and competition with other coastal railways for insights into the role of foreign capital in regional growth. The BRPC’s railway and port infrastructure connected the coastal city of Barranquilla with the Colombian interior, allowing the city to supplant Cartagena as the country’s principal international port. Statistical analysis reveals the railway’s remarkable profitability, which attracted transnational investors, who consolidated majority control. The company’s ability to leverage engineering expertise and capital underscored its strategic significance, yet its interests centered on protecting its transport monopoly. The railway’s lack of visibility in London and information asymmetries shaped investor perceptions. Extending the pier demonstrated BRPC’s role in accommodating rising export volumes during Colombia’s “despegue cafetero.” However, the railway faced obsolescence, as the government opened the obstructing Bocas de Ceniza sandbank and pursued railway nationalization. The railway’s redundancy, demographic shifts, and rise of Buenaventura underscore its eventual decline. This paper reveals the complex dynamics between foreign capital, infrastructure, and trade monopolies in shaping uneven development. It highlights the BRPC’s overlooked yet fundamental role in Colombia’s export economy and Barranquilla’s ascendancy.

Does Chinese aid to African countries trigger Chinese foreign direct investment? Bridging the literature on the impact of foreign aid on foreign direct investment (FDI) and that on state ownership, we consider FDI by China's state-owned enterprises (SOEs) compared with that of its privately owned enterprises (POEs) and find FDI by the former is more likely to follow Chinese governmental aid to Africa. Borrowing from institutional theory, we posit that FDI by SOEs follows political imperatives while FDI by POEs pursues market motives. Using data from multiple sources on 3,760 Chinese FDI projects in Africa between 2001 and 2015, we find a correlation between SOE FDI and government aid than that of POEs; that aid has a greater impact on the probability of FDI when the policies of the host country and those of China are in sync, especially in the case of SOEs; and that in low-investment-risk countries the link between aid and investment is weakened, especially in the case of POEs. The results are robust and consistent across different measures and analyses. We contribute to the literature on the relationship between aid and FDI, as well as to that on varieties of capitalism.

I present a theoretical framework that links different configurations of organized violence to global patterns in foreign direct investment (FDI). Insurgents, states, and rogue government agents all use violence for political purposes (i.e., incapacitating rivals), but they vary in how they use violence for economic purposes (i.e., generating income). Applying Olson’s (1993) concepts of “roving” and “stationary” banditry, I hypothesize that violence perpetrated by rebels and rogue agents indeed depresses a host country’s commercial appeal, but that violence perpetrated willfully by the state doesn’t. This claim is tested against data on FDI “entry” by several thousand multinational corporations between 1994 and 2018.

Why do firms demand antidumping protectionism? Contemporary literature highlights a plethora of causal mechanisms within the data-generating process, including retaliatory motives, exchange rate appreciations, business cycles, and deindustrialization. I argue that countries that are economically integrated into global markets should be associated with less demand for antidumping trade remedies. In particular, countries with higher levels of trade and financial flows should receive fewer petitions for antidumping trade remedies from firms overall, ceteris paribus. I test this theoretical argument with a series of de facto globalization indicators collected from thirty-three countries between 1978 and 2022, finding support for these arguments.

When and how does stakeholder credibility matter in shaping public opinion? We explore this question in a real-world setting: in order to fight its citizens’ financial exclusion—a key barrier to development in Indian Country—American Indian Nation “A” negotiated the first entry of the first bank to its reservation. The bank is owned by American Indian Nation “B.” To the Federal Reserve, the bank branch is a potential proof-of-concept for the capacity of tribe-to-tribe investment to improve capital access in underserved Native communities. The bank’s success ultimately depends on whether Nation A’s citizens use its services; in the months before its opening, all three stakeholders independently attempted to influence public opinion toward the bank. We collaborated to conduct a first-of-its-kind survey of Nation A’s tribal members, finding high baseline buy-in especially given the bank’s nationality, but weak and even counterproductive treatment effects of pro-banking cues provided by Nation A and the Federal Reserve. Our results make clear the practical benefits of theory-building around stakeholder credibility, and the crucial role of individual attitudes in the political economy of development.

Inspired by Bourdieu's field theory and utilising the case of Zambia, this article aims to enhance the understanding of the intricate relationship between Chinese private investors and sub-Saharan state institutions. The study proposes an epistemological framework that integrates sociological, anthropological and neo-institutional approaches to development studies. Through extensive fieldwork and over 75 interviews with both Chinese and Zambian stakeholders, we explore various contexts in which group-actors related to foreign capital in Zambia operate. We argue that three separate habiti – inhabited by the Zambian political class, Chinese investors and ‘ordinary’ Zambians – are crucial for comprehending private foreign capital operations in this sub-Saharan state. The ordinary Zambians and Zambian political class fields converge primarily during elections, while interactions between ordinary Zambians and Chinese investors have remained very limited (predominantly employee–employer relations), creating an ideational structure of hostility. In contrast, the Zambian political class and Chinese private investor fields crosscut and are mutually constitutive.

What factors contribute to the differences in foreign direct investment (FDI) levels in environments characterized as high risk? While research shows that armed conflict influences foreign investment decisions, it remains unclear how conflict dynamics, specifically the relative power capabilities of warring parties, affect FDI. This study explores the effects of rebel strength relative to government forces on FDI. We argue that there is a reduction in foreign investments in civil conflict countries as rebels gain a military advantage relative to the government. Stronger insurgents send a signal that the government is losing its strength in the conflict, creating uncertainty regarding conflict outcomes and posing economic and security risks for investors. To avoid facing economic and property losses due to increasing rebel strength, investors are incentivized to decrease their investment in the conflict state. Using data on insurgent troop size relative to government forces and FDI, our findings show that higher military capabilities of rebel forces relative to the government are associated with less FDI inflows in conflict-affected countries.

Special economic zones (SEZs) can be described as “carved out jurisdictions within the overall jurisdiction of a state in order to introduce different laws and regulations that are usually more trade and investment friendly”. South Africa's SEZs are created under the Special Economic Zones Act 16 of 2014. This article analyses the country's legal framework for SEZs, which legal scholars have thus far only examined from a purely economic perspective. It provides a brief historical overview of industrial development zones, examines the 2014 act and suggests some reforms within the SEZ legislative framework. A comparative analysis is provided by drawing some lessons from BRICS member countries that have a successful record in operationalizing SEZs.

To what extent do national strategic interests influence countries’ distribution of health assistance during a global health crisis? We examine China's global COVID-19 vaccine allocation, focusing on the relationship between its vaccine prioritization and its geopolitical expansion through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). We claim China uses its vaccine diplomacy as a comprehensive tool to promote its grand strategy and expand its global leadership and influence. Employing a newly available dataset on Chinese COVID-19 vaccine deliveries for a cross-section of 108 BRI member countries, our study shows that countries with foreign direct investment flows into BRI projects have received more vaccines from China. Our findings confirm that donor strategic concerns affect bilateral foreign assistance. Our results remain robust to several robustness checks, including endogeneity concerns.

Many studies put forward the argument that local policy experimentation, a key feature of China's policy process in the Hu Jintao era, has been paralysed by Xi Jinping's (re)centralization of political power – otherwise known as “top-level design.” This narrative suggests that local policymakers have become increasingly risk-averse owing to the anti-corruption campaign and are therefore unwilling to experiment. This article, however, argues that local governments are still expected to innovate with new policy solutions and now will be punished if they do not. By introducing the analytical framework of “experimentation under pressure” and drawing on an analysis of over 3,000 local government regulations and fieldwork data related to foreign investment attraction policies in two localities, Foshan and Ganzhou, the authors highlight new features developing within current experimental policy cycles. Local cadres now have no choice but to experiment as the political risk of shirking the direct command to experiment may be higher than the inherent risk of experimentation itself.

International Economic Law (IEL) has largely regulated cross-border trade and investment in the post-WWII world. IEL has become an important part of the Liberal International Order that prescribes a set of rule-based relationships for international cooperation based on political liberalism, economic liberalism, and liberal internationalism. However, economic globalization has witnessed a relative decline, especially after the 2008 global financial crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic. This form of ‘de-globalization’ challenges the assumptions upon which modern IEL is premised. This introductory article to the special issue on ‘Domestic Investment Laws and International Economic Law in the Liberal International Order’ explains how domestic law has started playing an increasingly important role in regulating foreign investment. Often overlooked instruments such as Domestic Investment Laws, Investment Screening Mechanisms, and Investment Promotion Agencies are now important tools in promoting or restricting foreign investment flows. Expanding on this premise, the article examines the transition from international to domestic in the Liberal International Order with a focus on Domestic Investment Laws. The move to domestic law does not signal a new era of economic isolation for States. Instead, it presents an effort to achieve similar ends of attracting foreign investors using different means while exercising more control over foreign investment.