This paper presents a genealogy of the passport in international law. For the most part, the origins of our contemporary mobility order are narrated from the vantage point of the grand principles of sovereignty, hospitality, and liberty. The nuts and bolts through which people access mobility – passports and visas – are generally understood to be the natural, inevitable, and fair by-products of these principles. This paper contributes to existing debates on the coloniality of international migration law by examining the universalization of the passport under the League of Nations. I argue that the universalization of the passport meant abandoning the old idea that the rights of free movement belonged to everyone and, instead, instituted a system that ranks human mobility based on national origins. Theoretically, it is proposed that attention to these “lowly” practices of mobility governance allows us to track the afterlives of race in the international order.

A new legal order has arisen in the United Kingdom (‘UK’) following that country's withdrawal from the European Union (‘EU’). Nowhere are these changes more evident than in the complex rules that have emerged in the fields of freedom of movement and the right to work. In evaluating the new legal landscape, this Article has two overarching aims. The first is to assess the level of protection granted to the right to work and associated free movement rights within EU and UK law, including the terms of the EU-UK Withdrawal Agreement. The second aim is to examine the extent to which those right to work rules are reflective of the status of the right to work as a fundamental social right. It is argued that Brexit unmoors the right to work from EU free movement rules, thereby undermining the normative value of that right, while exacerbating flaws in domestic rules governing access to employment for both national and migrant workers.

Theoretical models are presented of the effects of space, facilities and group size on the behaviour of chickens at high stocking densities, with relevance for all animals. The appropriateness of each model is supported by published data, although such data are scant for some important variables. Freedom of movement is analysed by taking the area of a hen as 475 cm2 and finding the number of free bird spaces left at different space allowances. This provides support for current recommendations of a maximum of seven laying hens per m2 on deep litter, but suggests that a maximum for broilers of 34 kg/m2 unacceptably restricts freedom of movement. In cages, freedom of movement increases with space allowance per hen, and, for a given space allowance, with cage and group size. Nesting behaviour is analysed for synchrony, which decreases with group size. Perching and feeding are often synchronous and the space needed for these is determined by body width. Recommendations are derived for hens in furnished cages. The main part of the cage should be as large as possible; an absolute minimum of 600 cm2 per bird is suggested, but 675 cm2 per bird is probably the minimum practical. Perch and feeder space should be provided at 14 cm or more per bird, with a possible derogation for light hybrids to 12 cm. The number of nest spaces needed varies with the number of birds, with nest spaces being 300 cm2 each. These recommendations sum to a minimum of 800 cm2 per bird for groups of eight or more, 850 cm2 for groups of four to seven, and 900 cm2 for groups of three or fewer, plus litter area. Crowding is primarily caused by limited space allowance, but for a given space allowance it is worse in small enclosures and groups.

International humanitarian law (IHL) categorically prohibits all types of collective punishment. However, neither treaty nor customary sources provide a clear definition of what should be deemed a collective punishment. Given this lack of clarity, it is no surprise that little attention has been paid to the way in which resorting to different forms of collective punishment during a belligerent occupation might lead to additional violations of international law, including IHL and international human rights law (IHRL). This article explores the notion of collective punishment under the law of occupation and connects it with other relevant rules of international law. Based on this analysis, and using the Occupied Palestinian Territory as a case study, the article argues that violating the prohibition of collective punishment in a situation of belligerent occupation in all likelihood will trigger the breach of other concomitant rules of IHL and IHRL, thus shedding light on the scope of the prohibition contained in Article 33 of the Fourth Geneva Convention.

The Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) concluded between the UK and Ireland in May 2019 provides one of the few clear legacies of Theresa May’s premiership. The Common Travel Area (CTA) between Ireland, the UK, the Channel Islands, and the Isle of Man provides the basis for domestic immigration and nationality laws which permit Irish citizens to reside in the UK and for them to be treated as “not foreign” in the context of UK domestic laws concerning access to healthcare, employment, social security, political participation, and education. Yet it has long lacked legal definition. The UK and Ireland reciprocate, to a rough extent, these rights for each other’s citizens. The MoU and related developments mark the first steps towards clarifying the CTA’s scope. The rush to conclude this MoU and alter parts of both countries’ domestic law relating to the CTA nonetheless illustrate the fragile state of Ireland–UK relations with Brexit looming. This Article explores whether these reforms will enable people who rely upon the CTA as a foundation of life outside their home country to protect their interests through litigation, and reflects upon the relationship between these arrangements and the protections for EU citizens proposed under the UK–EU Withdrawal Agreement.

The article discusses three liberal arguments about freedom of movement: immigration as a remedy for global injustice in the distribution of opportunities, freedom of movement as an integral aspect of individual autonomy, and immigration control as implied in democratic self-determination and citizenship. The article shows how these apparently irreconcilable stances can be reconstructed as partially overlapping once we realize that liberal citizenship provides not only reasons for closure but entails a bundle of mobility rights and is open for access by migrant stakeholders.

Read carefully: A Community national leaves his or her home state (the ‘first country’) to work in a host member state (the ‘second country’). While in the second country, he or she exercises the right to family reunification with a spouse, partner or dependent who is not a national of any EU or EEA member state (a ‘third-country’ national). When the Community national returns to the first country together with the family member, what determines the family member's right of residence in the first country? Community law – in which case the Community national would continue to enjoy the right of family reunification as before? Or the national immigration law of the first country, which could potentially dictate more restrictive conditions for family reunification?