Kidney failure is a major killer. Many lives could be saved through organ donation if people were less reluctant to part with their spare kidney. Should we incentive donation by paying people to do it?

Non-native speech is difficult for native listeners to understand. While listeners can learn to understand non-native speech after exposure, it is unclear how to optimize this learning. Experimental subjects transcribed non-native speech and were paid either a flat rate or based on their performance. Participants who were paid based on performance demonstrated improved performance overall and faster learning than participants who were paid a flat rate. These results suggest that exposure alone is not sufficient to optimize learning of non-native speech and that current models of this process must be revised to account for the effects of motivation and incentive.

The Ratio-Bias phenomenon, observed by psychologist Seymour Epstein and colleagues, is a systematic manifestation of irrationality. When offered a choice between two lotteries, individuals consistently choose the lottery with the greater number of potential successes, even when it offers a smaller probability of success. In the current study, we conduct experiments to confirm this phenomenon and test for the existence of Bias as distinct from general irrationality. Moreover, we examine the effect of introducing a monetary incentive of varying size (depending on the treatment) on the extent of irrational choices within this framework. We confirm the existence of the Bias. Moreover, the existence of an incentive significantly reduces the extent of irrationality exhibited, and that this effect is roughly linear in response to changes in the size of the incentive within the magnitudes investigated.

We tested the effectiveness of performance-based incentive structures using three incentive structures — commission base, best only and flat fee — and two levels of context — no context and house-selling — in an experiment in which participants made decisions in a variant of the secretary problem. Key measures of performance were the amount of search and the rounds in which the very best (optimal) offer was chosen. We found that having a commission-based proportional incentive did not produce better performance than having a flat payment for any of the performance measures considered. However, another performance-based incentive — the best only — increased the length of their searches and led to more optimal offers. These results applied both when there was no context and when the context was selling a house.

Since 2005, owners of draught and pack horses, mules and donkeys in nine districts of Uttar Pradesh, India, have received support from a UK-based charity, the Brooke. One thousand, three hundred and ninety-six village-level groups of owners and carers, responsible for 29,500 animals, were facilitated to develop their own welfare assessment protocols using a participatory learning and action process adapted from recognised good practice in human social development. Each group assessed the welfare of their animals collectively, using findings to generate action plans for improving equine health, husbandry and working practices. Welfare assessments were repeated at 1 to 3 month intervals. Competitiveness between participants to improve their animals’ welfare acted as a driver to increase the number of indicators and sensitivity of rating scales, enabling differentiation of small, incremental improvements in order to identify a ‘winner’ of each welfare assessment. Binary or three-point ‘traffic light’ (red-amber-green) scales evolved into a range of 5-, 10-, 20-point or continuous scales, then into multi-level and weighted measures to quantify the welfare improvements seen. Efforts to aggregate multi-dimensional indicators into a single ‘winning’ score led to indices describing welfare at individual animal level (‘welfare index’) and population level (‘village index’). Benefits of owner-driven monitoring include high levels of commitment and strong peer motivation or pressure to take action. Welfare monitoring and action to improve welfare are integrated within a single process carried out by the same people, in contrast to the separation of evaluation and implementation of welfare improvement seen in inspection or accreditation schemes. Challenges include aggregation of results from a variety of protocols for external analysis, reporting or certification.

One of the main catalysts for the shift towards renewable energies has been the practice of support schemes in a key number of EU member states. Some of these states have since withdrawn or revoked much of their original support, which has resulted in investment treaty arbitrations being filed against them under the Energy Charter Treaty. Arguably, a balance should be found between investors’ legitimate expectations concerning the stability of the legal framework and the host states’ right to adapt regulations to new needs. This can be achieved by clarifying and delimiting the principle of fair and equitable treatment, and by encapsulating it in a more precise set of rules. Due to its open character, this principle could otherwise become too intrusive a standard of judicial review for the exercise of sovereign power by host states. It could be diluted into a rhetorical framework inviting uncertainty and subjective judgment. While the focus of this article is on energy, the concern for legal stability equally applies to all those sectors where large upfront investments are required, which can only be recouped in the long run.

In this address, I distinguish and explore three conceptions of wages. A wage is a reward, given in recognition of the performance of a valued task. It is also an incentive: a way to entice workers to take and keep jobs, and to motivate them to work hard. Finally, a wage is a price of labor, and like all prices, conveys valuable information about relative scarcity. I show that each conception of wages has its own normative logic, or appropriate justification, and these logics can come apart. This explains some of the debate about wages and makes the project of justifying a wage simpliciter difficult. I identify which logic we should choose, since we must choose, and say what this means for how we should think about the justification of pay.

Poaching is cryptically but rapidly driving many species towards extinction. Knowledge of population trends of exploited species and incentives for poaching is necessary to inform appropriate conservation measures. We estimated the abundance of four ungulate species in Golestan National Park, Iran, the country's oldest protected area, where poaching of ungulates is widespread. We used line transect surveys (186 km), camera trapping (2,777 camera-nights), point counts (64 scans) and dung counts (along 38 km), and compared population estimates with those from earlier records. We also investigated the incentives for poaching, using a semi-structured interview survey. Population estimates for 2011–2014 indicated a 66–89% decline in three ungulate species (bezoar goat Capra aegagrus, red deer Cervus elaphus and urial Ovis vignei) compared to 1970–1978. Only wild boar Sus scrofa showed a population increase (of 58%) during the same period, possibly facilitated by religious restrictions regarding the consumption of this species. The incentives for poaching were categorized (in a non-ordinal manner) as subsistence, pleasure, tradition, trade of wild meat, and conflict with conservation regulations and bodies. The decline in hunted ungulates in this Park appears to be the result of rampant poaching, and a similar trend is evident in other protected areas in the country. We suggest the adoption of participatory conservation strategies, improvement of law enforcement practices and cooperation with international experts to reduce poaching in these protected areas. Taking into account the incentives for poaching, a combination of economic and non-economic strategies should be considered.

Feed is a strong incentive for encouraging cows in automatic milking systems (AMS) to voluntarily move around the farm and achieve milkings distributed across the 24 h day. It has been reported that cows show preferences for some forages over others, and it is possible that offering preferred forages may increase cow traffic. A preliminary investigation was conducted to determine the effect of offering a forage crop for grazing on premilking voluntary waiting times in a pasture-based robotic rotary system. Cows were offered one of two treatments (SOYBEAN or GRASS) in a cross-over design. A restricted maximum likelihood procedure was used to model voluntary waiting times. Mean voluntary waiting time was 45.5±6.0 min, with no difference detected between treatments. High and mid-production cows spent <44 min/milking in the premilking yard compared with >55 min/milking for low-production cows, whereas waiting time increased as queue length increased. Voluntary waiting time was 23% and 80% longer when cows were fetched from the paddock or had a period of forced waiting before volunteering for milking, respectively. The time it took cows to return to the dairy since last exiting was not affected by treatment, with a mean return time of 13.7±0.6 h. Although offering SOYBEAN did not encourage cows to traffic more readily through the premilking yard, the concept of incorporating forage crops in AMS still remains encouraging if the aim is to increase the volume or quantity of home-grown feed rather than improving cow traffic.