Under closed-list proportional representation, a party's electoral list determines the order in which legislative seats are allocated to candidates. When candidates differ in their ability, parties face a trade-off between competence and incentives. Ranking candidates in decreasing order of competence ensures that elected politicians are most competent. Yet, party lists create incentives for candidates that may lead parties not to place their best candidates at the top of the list. We examine this trade-off in a game-theoretical model in which parties rank their candidates on a list, candidates choose their campaign effort, and the election is a team contest for multiple prizes. We analyze how the candidates’ objectives, voters’ attention and media coverage, incumbency, the number of parties competing in the election, and the electoral environment influence how parties rank candidates.

Recent meta-analyses suggest that certain drugs act as cognitive enhancers and can increase attentional investment and performance even for healthy adults. The current review examines the potential of behavioral economics enhancers (BEEs) for similarly improving cognitive performance and judgments. Traditionally, behavioral economics theory has adopted a skeptical approach regarding the notion of whether individuals can overcome judgment biases through variables that increase cognitive effort. We focus mostly on the effects of two BEEs: incentivization and losses. Summarizing results from different meta-analyses, we find a small but robust positive effect size for BEEs, with comparable effect sizes to those found in studies of pharmacological cognitive enhancers.

Scholars of International Organizations (IOs) increasingly use elite surveys to study the preferences and decisions of policymakers. When designing these surveys, one central concern is low statistical power, because respondents are typically recruited from a small and inaccessible population. However, much of what we know about how to incentivize elites to participate in surveys is based on anecdotal reflections, rather than systematic evidence on which incentives work best. In this article, we study the efficacy of three incentives in a preregistered experiment with World Bank staff. These incentives were the chance to win an Amazon voucher, a donation made to a relevant charity, and a promise to provide a detailed report on the findings. We find that no incentive outperformed the control group, and the monetary incentive decreased the number of respondents on average by one-third compared to the control group (from around 8% to around 5%).

The constructs of motivation (or needs, motives, etc.) to explain higher-order behavior have burgeoned in psychology. In this article, we critically evaluate such high-level motivation constructs that many researchers define as causal determinants of behavior. We identify a fundamental issue with this predominant view of motivation, which we called the black-box problem. Specifically, high-level motivation constructs have been considered as causally instigating a wide range of higher-order behavior, but this does not explain what they actually are or how behavioral tendencies are generated. The black box problem inevitably makes the construct ill-defined and jeopardizes its theoretical status. To address the problem, we discuss the importance of mental computational processes underlying motivated behavior. Critically, from this perspective, motivation is not a unitary construct that causes a wide range of higher-order behavior --- it is an emergent property that people construe through the regularities of subjective experiences and behavior. The proposed perspective opens new avenues for future theoretical development, i.e., the examination of how motivated behavior is realized through mental computational processes.

The Global Financial Crisis of 2007–2008 has elicited various debates, ranging from ethics over the stability of the banking system to subtle technical issues regarding the Gaussian and other copulas. We want to look at the crisis from a particular perspective. Credit derivatives have much in common with treaty reinsurance, including risk transfer via pooling and layering, scarce data, skewed distributions, and a limited number of specialised players in the market. This leads to a special mixture of mathematical/statistical and behavioural challenges. Reinsurers have been struggling to cope with these, not always successfully, but they have learned some lessons over the course of more than one century in business. This has led to certain rules being adopted by the reinsurance market and to a certain mindset being adopted by the individuals working in the industry. Some cultures established in the reinsurance world could possibly inspire markets like the credit derivatives market, but the subtle differences between the two worlds matter. We will see that traditional reinsurance has built-in incentives for (some) fairness, while securitisation can foster opportunism.

This commentary highlights the scientific history of the NIH-Moderna COVID-19 vaccine and corroborates Sarpatwari’s theme of private capture of value created by the public. The commentary also identifies missteps by the Trump and Biden Administrations and offers policy recommendations: better contracts with and incentives for pharmaceutical manufacturers and a not-for-profit “public option” for pharmaceutical development.

The Rhino Bond is the first financial instrument dedicated to protecting a species. The Bond allows investors to invest in the conservation of the black rhinoceros Diceros bicornis, with the amount of money returned by the investment depending on whether rhinoceros numbers increase (and by how much). In this paper we focus on how the Bond was brought into being. We draw on an analysis of organizational reports along with data collected from interviews with key informants to investigate the roles of the various stakeholders in the Bond, how species and sites were selected, the motivations and experiences of the stakeholders and the involvement of stakeholders in decision-making. We found that although conservation actors are attracted by the potential for new funding, they have experienced challenges navigating complex financial instruments. The needs of financial actors often dictated decision-making, with implications for the species and sites chosen for the Bond. As profits are tied to an increase in population size of a specific species (which needs to be monitored), the instrument has favoured large and easily counted species and populations. Only some sites were able to meet the stringent conditions of financial instruments, including metrics on financial sustainability. We argue that the dominance of financial principles and motives means that not all species or sites will be viable candidates for investment and that conservation finance should not be seen as a panacea.

A free world is one in which human beings can live free, self-directed lives. A great obstacle to such a world is severe poverty, still blighting the lives of half of humankind. We have the resources, technologies, and administrative capacities to eradicate severe poverty, but doing so requires some restructuring of existing social arrangements. We might begin with the current regime governing innovation, which has monopoly markups as its key funding source. Such monopoly rents encourage the quest for innovations, but also greatly impede their diffusion. This headwind harms the poor, who cannot afford monopoly prices and whose specific needs innovators thus tend to ignore. It also works against potential innovations whose benefits would mostly go to third parties whom buyers care little about. Both problems can be much alleviated through a supplementary alternative reward mechanism that would enable innovators to exchange their monopoly privileges on any patentable technology for impact rewards based on the social benefits achieved with it. By promoting innovations and their diffusion together, international impact funds would bring substantial gains in justice and cost-effectiveness, especially in the pharmaceutical and green-technology sectors.

The act of whistleblowing is not common in Nigeria; this can be attributed to the cultural norms of Nigerian society where deference is paid to those in positions of power and it is often viewed as taboo to speak up against them. This problem of not speaking up is further compounded by the lack of robust whistleblowing legislation which protects whistleblowers from reprisals. The need to protect whistleblowers was brought to the forefront after the implementation in 2016 of the Nigerian stopgap policy on whistleblowing, leading to the Whistleblower Protection Bill proposed in 2019, legislation that seeks to provide wider protection to whistleblowers. This article examines this bill, identifying its limitations; it does not rehash previous scholarly debates about whether incentives are necessary, but rather focuses on bringing the Nigerian perspective to the fore, thus contributing to the existing literature in this area.

Politics is full of people who don't care about the facts. Still, while not caring about the facts, they are often concerned to present themselves as caring about them. Politics, in other words, is full of bullshitters. But why? In this paper I develop an incentives-based analysis of bullshit in politics, arguing that it is often a rational response to the incentives facing different groups of agents. In a slogan: bullshit in politics pays, sometimes literally. After first outlining an account of bullshit, I discuss the incentives driving three different groups of agents to bullshit: politicians, the media, and voters. I then examine several existing proposals to combat bullshit in politics, arguing that each will fail because they ignore the relevant underlying incentives. I conclude somewhat pessimistically that a certain amount of bullshit in politics is inevitable.