In the coming decades, the countries of the South will be facing the aging of the population faster than the countries of the North. This will have long-term economic consequences for the South but also for the North through the changing of international capital flows. To study the latter, we build a simple two-region two-period overlapping generations (OLG) model, assuming fully integrated financial markets. This allows us to determine the analytical expression of the world interest rate dynamics at general equilibrium and the resulting capital flows accruing to each of the two regions (the North and the South). From there, we analyze how a reduction in either fertility or mortality alters the magnitude of the international capital flows. Contradictory effects are evidenced. To clear-up any ambiguity and to study the South's demographic transition, which involves a succession of shocks, we propose numerical simulations. Even if the results stress that the institutional context and technological catching-up may matter, they suggest in a rather general way that the declines in both fertility and mortality tend to reduce the relative capital needs of the Southern economies and consequently their capital inflows. This, in turn, would be beneficial to the North's productive capacity, which should then hold more capital.

This paper examines the consequences of international financial integration in a two-sector standard incomplete markets model with occupational choice under risk and financial constraints affecting entrepreneurial activity. We endogenize international productivity differences and discuss the implications of international integration for the macroeconomy, inequality, and welfare. Lending countries are characterized by tighter domestic constraints and experience an increase in gross national product, whereas the gross domestic product effect is ambiguous. We conclude that international integration is beneficial only for economies where there are substantial financial constraints on entrepreneurial activity. Otherwise, a majority of households suffer, due to the unequal distribution of welfare gains and losses across the heterogeneous population.

After the 2001 crisis, Turkey continued to pursue the radical market-oriented reform strategy that had started in the early 1980s and followed the philosophy of the Washington Consensus. Gross domestic product (GDP) growth in the post-2001 period was relatively high, but it was a “jobless” growth caused by substantial productivity increases generated largely by intensifying the work process rather than by technological advancements. Economic growth in the post-2001 period benefited society very unequally. The growth regime of Turkey is vulnerable owing to high current account deficit; high currency mismatch, particularly in the corporate sector; high income inequality; high unemployment; and an unsatisfactory development of the industrial sector, despite some successes. We recommend a new development regime with selective capital controls, a balanced current account, an active industrial policy by the government, stronger trade unions and employers’ associations engaged in social dialogue combined with coordinated wage bargaining on the sectoral level, and last but not least, redistributive policies aiming to achieve a more equal income distribution.

This paper reviews the impact of financial globalisation on credit dynamics. In particular, it argues that financial globalisation fundamentally alters credit demand and credit supply, since borrowers and lenders have foreign options as well as domestic options in terms of the selection of projects and funding sources. The rapid accumulation of large cross-border debt positions was a central feature in the boom phase of the European credit cycle during 2003–8 and has influenced the nature of the post-2008 financial crisis. Finally, the paper considers the range of policy reforms needed to improve macro-financial stability under international financial integration.