Economic interventionism in the form of subsidization and operation of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) is today among the main frontlines of international trade conflicts. Along with trade restrictions and new legislation designed to impact cross-border investment, mergers, and acquisitions, the use of subsidies and countervailing measures by governments and trade-distorting effects of SOEs have lately caused harsh controversies within and outside the World Trade Organization (WTO) between its members. Going forward, there are reasons to expect these tensions to intensify rather than diminish in number and importance. This Special Issue aims at examining the development of international trade rules regulating state interventionism against the background of the Covid-19 global pandemic and present shifts in global geopolitics and the economy. This introduction, in presenting the state of the art on the questions tackled by this Special Issue and highlighting its contribution to existing literature on the topic, offers different considerations aimed at bringing together various trends emerging from the Articles contained in this Special Issue. It also explores avenues for further research and reflection.

International trade law has long been the site of a battle over who or what the state can represent. Today, that battle is taking a new form. While for decades the WTO was considered a centerpiece of the international economic order, the policy landscape is now awash with claims that the US should abandon WTO disciplines, critiques of the WTO as the vehicle for a coherent neoliberalism, and concerns about the implications of trade law for domestic industry, democratic participation, climate action, and national security. While I am a long-standing critic of trade law’s excesses, I don’t see that sudden shift as a cause for celebration. In order to understand why, I argue that it is necessary to pay careful attention to the different forms the battle for the state at the WTO has taken. This article explores the conditions and stakes of three key moments in that battle – the negotiation of the GATT and the era of decolonization, the end of the Cold War and the creation of the WTO, and the recent transformations caused by the decline of US power, the rise of China, and the systemic shock of climate change. I conclude that we cannot automatically apply critiques developed in earlier eras to the current situation.

Much has been written about changing the world's perception of international trade—from an area of development that will accelerate climate change to a powerful tool that can drive climate action. This article elaborates on four mechanisms of international trade law developed and honed by the World Trade Organization (WTO) that can play a pivotal role in accelerating climate action. The four mechanisms are the WTO's dispute resolution system, the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT), the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), and the regional trade agreements (RTAs) negotiated under the WTO framework. Elucidating the WTO's role, this article supports the proposition that every multilateral institution can rise to the occasion and spearhead climate action in its own unique capacity.

In today's data-driven economy, data have been dubbed as the new oil. Hence, a close relationship is shared between the increasing amounts of international investments and the increasing volumes of cross-border data flows. The aim of this article is to discuss the legal aspects of the new data paradigm in the international economy and place this discussion in the larger framework of globalization and the Liberal International Order. The central thesis of the article revolves around the crucial role played by domestic laws in the fragmentation of international investment law. The article further discusses the interplay between national and international legal landscapes and how the changing nature of the Liberal International Order is affecting the flow of data across borders. In this context, it also discusses the issues that are presented by a lack of any comprehensive international framework governing Cross-Border Data Flows. The need to update existing agreements and laws in order to factor in digital investment is also highlighted.

Long examined by the academic literature as a challenging technical-legal fiction with a strong geopolitical impact, border carbon adjustment is on its way to becoming a European reality. This Article provides an overview of the European legislative process with a comparison of the initial Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (‘CBAM’) project presented by the Commission in July 2021 with the positions formalised by the European Parliament and the Council in 2022. With a detour through the doctrine of international law and building upon the work of Professor Thomas Cottier on the concept of Common Concern of Humankind (‘CCH’) in international law, the Article examines the European CBAM, and more broadly, the recent multiplication of unilateral environmental initiatives with extraterritorial impacts, as a contextual transition from a logic of coexistence to a logic of cooperation in the field of environmental policies. It concludes on the necessity to design the European CBAM accordingly, by redistributing its direct revenues and developing open and inclusive cooperation frameworks, to accelerate this transition in the field of industrial decarbonisation.

After US President Joe Biden took office, some believed he would take a different path from that of his predecessor and that the Trump years were over. However, one of President Biden’s first moves was to strengthen American protectionism by heightening the United States’s “Buy America” and “Buy American” requirements. With this, the American government procurement market started to close off even more, and Canadian suppliers, in turn, grew worried. Given the United States’s international procurement commitments and the specificity of the Buy American Act and the Buy America Policy, this article explores the pathways to favourable treatment of Canadian suppliers in keeping with applicable international trade rules.

In the wake of the demise of the WTO's Appellate Body, there has been a growing trend of states resorting to the dispute settlement mechanisms under their regional trade agreements (RTAs) to resolve international trade disputes. While the vast majority of these mechanisms have never been used, many contain defective procedural provisions that are likely to slow down or completely derail the dispute settlement process should those provisions be invoked. This is particularly true of mechanisms that effectively permit a respondent to block or delay the composition of a panel to hear a dispute. This article examines the issues of ‘panel blocking’ and panel composition delay tactics in RTA dispute settlement with reference to both past and present practice, and provides a textual analysis of a cross-section of existing RTAs to identify procedural defects and prescribe solutions for ensuring timely panel composition in future disputes.

In 2021, the United States challenged Canadian dairy import tariff rate quotas (TRQs) before the first state-to-state arbitration panel under Chapter 31 of the Canada-United States-Mexico Agreement (CUSMA). The panel held that the method of allocation of TRQs limited the US dairy industry’s access to the Canadian market and therefore violated CUSMA provisions. However, the panel also acknowledged that the Canadian supply management system for dairy products is a unique regulatory framework for production control, pricing mechanisms, and import control. This article explores the case as a test of the functioning of the improved CUSMA dispute settlement process and of Canada’s ability to protect its supply management system for dairy products from renewed pressure coming from its most important trade partner.

This article explores how sovereignty fictions have been used to advance different legal, political and economic aims in the articulation of the United Kingdom's future approach to global regulation. By mapping the transformative shifts in sovereignty paradigms, this article highlights the disconnect between the absolutist sovereignty popularised in the UK government's political rhetoric and the concept of regulatory sovereignty that underpins the UK's future trading strategy. To maintain its status as a global leader in regulation and standards-setting, the UK government will need to diffuse power and delegate autonomy through networked orders of public and private actors. These competing sovereignty paradigms are analysed with reference to European Union (EU) law and practice, to highlight the opportunities and challenges for the UK as an independent trade actor. This article concludes by evaluating how sovereignty fictions can disrupt the objectives of the UK's proposed ‘common law’ approach to regulatory governance and discusses the policy interventions that may be required to enable the UK to harness its potential as a regulatory leader.

Article 16 of the Ireland–Northern Ireland Protocol annexed to the EU–UK Withdrawal Agreement is an escape clause which allows the parties to deviate from their obligations under certain conditions. This article maps out the main features of the safeguards provision in the Protocol in light of international trade law and international relations literature on treaty design. It provides a detailed examination of the safeguards provision in the Protocol and highlights the key design flaws associated with this regime as well as some potential solutions to such flaws.

Individuals have long occupied a precarious position within international law. Historically, conceived as the relation between states, international law rarely saw a need to consider individual claims; it was, instead, the role of states to bring claims on behalf of their nationals. As international law has become increasingly fragmented, however, globalization has thrust the individual onto the international legal plane.

Within this landscape, we briefly consider individuals’ claims across three separate international regimes: (i) the International Court of Justice, (ii) investment treaties, and (iii) the World Trade Organization. We find that barriers for individuals’ recognition as rights holders persist across each. First, jurisdictional barriers remain fundamentally problematic for recognizing individuals’ claims. Second, the longstanding focus on treaty interpretation techniques has yielded little, if any, demonstrable impact on recognizing individuals’ rights. Third, mere reliance on reflecting human rights values, rather than specific and concrete structural reforms, has proven incompatible with realizing individuals’ rights within these three systems.

Individuals qua rights holders have, rather acutely, recently experienced deeply troubling human rights violations on several fronts. Fundamentally, international law must protect human rights. This moment invites us to consider the systems on the international legal plane for individuals to seek such remedy and what barriers must be addressed to further such efforts.