Qualitative research methods, defined as the collection and analysis of non-numerical data to understand concepts and experiences, are often used to inform mental health practice and policies. When utilising qualitative research methods, it is important that the researcher uses an explicit theoretical framework to guide the study. A theoretical framework informs how researchers engage with a topic or problem, report on their work with participants, describe key concepts and address assumptions within the research questions and procedures. In this article, we describe the basic concepts underpinning three of the most commonly used frameworks in mental health research: positivism, interpretivism and critical realism. We also describe how these theoretical frameworks may guide the qualitative process, including the theoretical and methodological approaches chosen and the ways in which these theoretical frameworks can be applied in practice. To enhance understanding of these frameworks, we include examples of how such frameworks can be used in qualitative mental health research.

Doctrinal legal scholarship faces persistent challenges from empirical approaches, but such criticism rarely seeks to encounter doctrine on its own terms. In this article, we seek to excavate the theoretical and methodological basis of doctrinal legal scholarship by situating the discipline in a hermeneutic continuum between theory and practice, or law’s engagement with the social world. We first unfold this dynamic as an exercise in methodological interpretivism and ontological hermeneutics and then turn to explicate our analysis with examples drawn from tort law and international criminal law. We ultimately argue that law can never be strictly circumscribed as an empirical object because law cannot be disassociated from an agent’s reasons, which are continuously bound up in a hermeneutic circle, and which the scholar must enter into to achieve legal understanding. Unavoidably, therefore, doctrinal legal scholarship becomes part of the very object it is investigating.

Ronald Dworkin maintains that a system of coercive government is a genuinely legal one if and only if it exhibits fidelity to a conception of the rule of law as valuable for the constitutive contribution it makes to the treatment of all its individual human subjects with equal concern and respect. This requires a particular type of institutional structure, namely one that satisfies the criteria that constitute government according to the rule of law, and a particular political culture or ethos on the part of both rulers and ruled that Dworkin labels law as integrity. The existing practice of global coercive government may well satisfy neither of these conditions. If so, then given Dworkin's account of law, international law is not really law. Importantly, this is a practical claim, not a descriptive/explanatory one. Specifically, it entails that international officials are sometimes morally permitted to tell noble lies regarding what the ‘law’ is, to refuse to pronounce on questions of ‘law’, and to refrain from applying and enforcing actors' ‘legal’ rights and duties.

In this article, I argue that Dworkin’s one-system view of law and morality is not as easy to refute or dismiss as some would suggest. In a recent article, Dindjer criticizes a new kind of opposition to legal positivism characterized by both its opposition to a two-system view of law and morality and its promotion of a one-system alternative picture. By re-examining Dworkin’s criticisms of the two-system view and by providing additional reasoning of my own, I show that Dworkin’s one-system interpretative approach is not just sensible but also promising in refocusing contemporary debates in general jurisprudence on a moral and political reading of the structural features of law.

What are human rights? What makes a particular human rights claim ‘genuine’ or ‘valid’? These are difficult questions with which current philosophical literature on human rights is concerned. They are also the same kind of questions that legal philosophers asked about Law throughout the 20th century. Drawing from the similarities between the two fields, I attempt to do with the concept of human rights something similar to what Ronald Dworkin accomplished with that of Law in Law’s Empire. First, I offer a critique of the two dominant perspectives on human rights—the Orthodox and Political views—that is similar in character to Dworkin’s Semantic Sting objection to Legal Positivism. Second, I sketch an alternative, Dworkinian-inspired framework that seeks to develop the notion of human rights as an interpretive concept. According to this framework, different accounts of human rights are to be understood as expressing different interpretations of the point (or purpose) of human rights practice.

Recent global events demonstrate that analytical frameworks to aid professionals in healthcare ethics must consider the pervasive role of social structures in the emergence of bioethical issues. To address this, the authors propose a new sociologically informed approach to healthcare ethics that they term “social bioethics.” Their approach is animated by the interpretive social sciences to highlight how social structures operate vis-à-vis the everyday practices and moral reasoning of individuals, a phenomenon known as social discourse. As an exemplar, the authors use social bioethics to reframe common ethical issues in psychiatric services and discuss potential implications. Lastly, the authors discuss how social bioethics illuminates the ways healthcare ethics consultants in both policy and clinical decision-making participate in and shape broader social, political, and economic systems, which then cyclically informs the design and delivery of healthcare.

Positivists and interpretivists (Dworkinians) might accept that conceptual facts about the law—facts about the content of the concept of law—can obtain in the absence of communities with law practices. But they would deny that legal facts can obtain in such communities’ absence. Under the moral impact theory, by contrast, legal facts can precede all communities with law practices. I identify a set of legal facts in private international law—the law of jurisdiction—that concerns when a community's law practices can, and cannot, have the legal effects that the practices claim to have. This law is noncommunitarian, in the sense that it precedes the communities to which it applies. In this law's light, the legal effects of communities’ law practices are legally coordinated (or, at the very least, can be shown to legally conflict). Although interest in, and even commitment to, a noncommunitarian law of jurisdiction has receded among private international law theorists, I argue that some well-placed questions can elicit from all of us a commitment to this law. And this commitment is a reason to believe that the moral impact theory is correct.

In cases that come before the International Court of Justice (‘the ICJ’, or ‘the Court’), its own jurisprudence looms large. This is despite the fact that no rule of stare decisis operates before the ICJ. The juxtaposition of the facts expressed in these two statements has generated significant doctrinal and theoretical debate. In this article I propose a novel theoretical framework for understanding the role that precedent has traditionally played in proceedings before the Court, and that which it should play in the future.

This theoretical framework rests upon a constructive interpretation of the doctrine of stare decisis. I examine the historical institutional practice of the Court in order to determine the range of possible versions of the doctrine which, in Dworkin’s words, ‘fit’ this practice. Noting that there is more than one potential version of stare decisis which fits the Court’s practice, I next consider which is justified as the version which best reflects the value of this doctrine. Having shown that the value that stare decisis strives to achieve is contextual justice, I argue that only a weak version of horizontal stare decisis can justify this doctrine. My ultimate claim is that the Court’s principal concern when considering whether to follow or depart from its own jurisprudence should be that of achieving justice in the context of that particular case, and not merely ensuring consistency, predictability or efficiency.

This article engages with Meg Russell and Ruxandra Serban's (2021) argument that the Westminster model is ‘a concept stretched beyond repair’ that deserves ‘to be retired’. We examine the logic, theory and methods that led to such a powerful, potent and provocative argument. We suggest their approach may have inadvertently ‘muddied’ an already muddled concept. We assess the implications of ‘muddying’ for their conclusion that the Westminster model is, in essence, a dead concept in need of a decent funeral. We suggest the concept is ‘stretched but not snapped’ by developing a simple four-perspective broadening of the analytical lens. This approach aids understanding about what the concept covers, how it is operationalized and why it remains useful in comparative research.