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This chapter reviews the perspectives and levels of an analysis that inform how an observation is made. This is done by demonstrating that there are two perspectives (language use and the human factor) and five levels (summation, description, interpretation, evaluation, and transformation) of analysis in discourse analysis. These perspectives and levels can be used to understand the frameworks of established methodologies, such as conversation analysis, critical discourse analysis, and narrative analysis. After reading this chapter, readers will know that the analytic process can combine different perspectives and levels of analysis.
This chapter is written for conversation analysts and is methodological. It discusses, in a step-by-step fashion, how to code practices of action (e.g., particles, gaze orientation) and/or social actions (e.g., inviting, information seeking) for purposes of their statistical association in ways that respect conversation-analytic (CA) principles (e.g., the prioritization of social action, the importance of sequential position, order at all points, the relevance of codes to participants). As such, this chapter focuses on coding as part of engaging in basic CA and advancing its findings, for example as a tool of both discovery and proof (e.g., regarding action formation and sequential implicature). While not its main focus, this chapter should also be useful to analysts seeking to associate interactional variables with demographic, social-psychological, and/or institutional-outcome variables. The chapter’s advice is grounded in case studies of published CA research utilizing coding and statistics (e.g., those of Gail Jefferson, Charles Goodwin, and the present author). These case studies are elaborated by discussions of cautions when creating code categories, inter-rater reliability, the maintenance of a codebook, and the validity of statistical association itself. Both misperceptions and limitations of coding are addressed.
Conversations involving people with communication disorders or other forms of communicative impairment, such as those with dementia, autism, aphasia, or hearing impairment, differ in systematic ways from typical conversations (i.e., those involving participants without significant communicative or cognitive challenges). Drawing from CA work over the last few decades, this chapter discusses methodological issues involved in data collection in this field and in the transcription and analysis of these types of data. Analysis of the ways in which these interactions are distinctive and ‘atypical’ as regards social actions and the practices used in their construction and deployment involves a form of comparative analysis drawing on CA findings concerning typical interaction. The chapter also discusses other, more explicit, forms of comparative analysis regularly undertaken in this field, including comparison of participants’ conversations over time, and the comparison of how conversations involving participants with one type of communicative impairment compare with those of participants with a different form of impairment. One way in which the latter type of investigation can be developed is discussed in relation to a certain interactional feature – here, interruptive, other-initiation of repair – and how it may be traced across conversations involving participants with different communicative impairments.
The All-Affected Principle is of limited help in thinking about immigration. Immigration raises important normative questions about who should have access to citizenship, what is required for the full social and economic inclusion of immigrants, what legal rights immigrants admitted by a state should have, how migrants who enter and settle without permission should be treated, what criteria should be used in selecting and excluding immigrants, what states ought to do in dealing with refugees, and whether controlling immigration is really morally justifiable at all. The All-Affected Principle is directly relevant only to the first question of who should have access to citizenship, and even in that case, it needs to be supplemented. The other questions are not primarily about who should participate in democratic decision-making but about what justice requires and about the moral constraints on democratic discretion. So, using the All-Affected Principle to think about those questions would not help, and starting from that principle in thinking about immigration might lead us to miss the key normative issues.
A conceptual framework, called Innovation of Health Technology Assessment Methods (IHTAM), has been developed to facilitate the understanding of how to innovate methods of health technology assessment (HTA). However, the framework applicability has not been evaluated in practice. Hence, we aimed to explore framework applicability in three cases of method innovation that are part of the HTx project and to develop a roadmap to improve framework applicability.
Methods
The IHTAM framework was applied to three cases of innovating HTA methods. We collected feedback from case study leaders and consortium members after a training session, an approximately 1-year follow-up of periodic case study meetings, and a general assembly meeting where innovation progresses of the three cases were reported through surveys and interviews. Feedback was then summarized using an open-coding technique.
Results
According to feedback, the framework provided a structured way of deliberation and helped to improve collaboration among HTA stakeholders. However, framework applicability could be improved if it was complemented by a roadmap with a loop structure to provide tailored guidance for different cases, and with items to elaborate actions to be taken by stakeholders. Accordingly, a 48-item roadmap was developed.
Conclusions
The IHTAM framework was generally applicable to the three case studies. A roadmap, with loop structure and actionable items, could complement the framework, and may provide HTA stakeholders with tailored guidance on developing new methods. To further examine the framework applicability, we recommend stakeholders to apply the IHTAM framework and its roadmap in future practice.
The aim of this chapter is to reconceptualise climate politics as a struggle to name the problem and thereby determine how it is known and acted upon. I suggest that underpinning the visible elements of contestation over the reality of climate change, who is responsible and by how much, is a struggle over order – the distribution of economic, social and political resources and the values that organise it as such. Describing the politics of climate change as a field of activity orientated around determining the meaning of the problem enables me to situate the IPCC centrally within this struggle as the key site in producing international assessments of the issue. The IPCC’s role in establishing collective interest in climate change and the knowledge base for action has generated the structures and forces in which the IPCC as an organisation and method for producing authoritative ways to know climate change has emerged, which in the book, I identify as the IPCC’s practice of and for writing climate change.
Managing knowledge successfully is key for an organization to increase its innovative potential. The InKTI method supports the improvement of knowledge transfers in product and production engineering. To ensure acceptance, applicability, and contribution to success in practice, it is necessary to validate the InKTI method. This paper focuses on evaluating the contribution to success in a Live-Lab study with student engineering teams. Based on the results two consecutive field studies have been conducted to evaluate not only the success but also support, and applicability of the InKTI method.
The body fluid spaces consist of the plasma, the interstitial fluid volume, and the intracellular fluid volume. The sizes of these spaces are tightly controlled by hormonal and neuronal mechanisms, but their size may be of interest to assess by scientific methods, as disturbances often occur in the wake of trauma and surgery.
A key approach is to use a tracer, by which the volume of distribution of an injected substance is measured after full distribution. Useful tracers must solely occupy a specific body fluid space. The volume effect of an infusion fluid can be calculated by applying a tracer method before and after the administration.
Guiding estimates of the sizes of the body volumes can be obtained by bioimpedance measurements and anthropometric equations.
The Hb concentration is a frequently used endogenous tracer of changes in blood volume. Hb is the inverse of the blood water concentration and Hb changes indicate the volume of distribution of an infused water volume. Volume kinetics is based on mathematical modeling of Hb changes over time, which, together with measurements of the urinary excretion, can be used to analyze and simulate the distribution and elimination of infusion fluids over time.
This article raises the question of whether bioethics qualifies as a discipline. According to a standard definition of discipline as “a field of study following specific and well-established methodological rules” bioethics is not a specific discipline as there are no explicit “well-established methodological rules.” The article investigates whether the methodological rules can be implicit, and whether bioethics can follow specific methodological rules within subdisciplines or for specific tasks. As this does not appear to be the case, the article examines whether bioethics’ adherence to specific quality criteria (instead of methodological rules) or pursuing of a common goal can make it qualify as a discipline. Unfortunately, the result is negative. Then, the article scrutinizes whether referring to bioethics institutions and professional qualifications can ascertain bioethics as a discipline. However, this makes the definition of bioethics circular. The article ends by admitting that bioethics can qualify as a discipline according to broader definitions of discipline, for example, as an “area of knowledge, research and education.” However, this would reduce bioethics’ potential for demarcation and identity-building. Thus, to consolidate the discipline of bioethics and increase its impact, we should explicate and elaborate on its methodology.
The introduction explains the purpose of this book and situates this book in the relevant literature. It discusses the meaning of securitization as used in this book, and it introduces Just Securitization Theory on which the theory of the moral duty to secure developed in this book builds. It also discusses the methods employed and methodology informing this work. Finally, it provides a chapter overview.
While postcolonial approaches to International Relations have offered new concepts, methods, and political imaginaries of global politics, postsocialism has been absent as an analytical and political approach. Postsocialism has been mainly a descriptive term naming the temporal transition of the Second World to liberal democracy and market economy or the geopolitical space of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Building on literature that has connected postsocialism and postcolonialism analytically and politically, particularly feminist work that has reclaimed postsocialism to understand the global legacies of socialism in the present, this article proposes to unpack dimensions of postsocialism as method and critique. Postsocialism as method attends to how socialist legacies endure and are transformed in the present while holding together contradictions and ambivalences. Postsocialism as critique is oriented to transversal solidarities and the epistemic vocabularies that can undergird these struggles. To trace these dimensions of method and critique, the article is situated empirically within debates about borders and migration. Postsocialism is not intended to replace or displace other critical approaches but to pluralise our vocabularies and multiply political interventions.
I raise three objections for Gava’s thesis that the primary task of the Critique of Pure Reason is to develop a doctrine of method for metaphysics, understood as an account of the special kind of unity that a body of cognitions must exhibit to count as a science. First, I argue that this thesis has difficulty accommodating Kant’s concern with explaining the possibility of synthetic a priori judgements. This concern is motivated by a question that is prior to the issue of scientific unity. Second, I argue that the context of the passage in which Kant calls the Critique a treatise on method makes clear that the remark concerns the Copernican Turn. This suggests that the method treated in the book is the procedure required by the Copernican Turn. Third, I dispute Gava’s claim that the idea that confers unity on metaphysics is the cosmopolitan concept of philosophy.
I respond to Karin de Boer, Thomas Land, and Claudio La Rocca’s comments on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason and the Method of Metaphysics (CUP 2023). I first provide a quick outline of some of the main claims I make in the book. I then directly address their criticisms, which I group into three categories. The first group of comments raises doubts concerning my characterization of the central tasks of the critique of pure reason. The second targets the fact that I downplay faculty analysis as an essential characteristic of the critique. The third has to do with my claim that the Critique of Pure Reason aims to show that metaphysics is capable of architectonic unity, where this unity is only achievable when we construe metaphysics according to the worldly concept of philosophy.
To compare the agreement and cost of two recall methods for estimating children’s minimum dietary diversity (MDD).
Design:
We assessed child’s dietary intake on two consecutive days: an observation on day one, followed by two recall methods (list-based recall and multiple-pass recall) administered in random order by different enumerators at two different times on day two. We compared the estimated MDD prevalence using survey-weighted linear probability models following a two one-sided test equivalence testing approach. We also estimated the cost-effectiveness of the two methods.
Setting:
Cambodia (Kampong Thom, Siem Reap, Battambang, and Pursat provinces) and Zambia (Chipata, Katete, Lundazi, Nyimba, and Petauke districts).
Participants:
Children aged 6–23 months: 636 in Cambodia and 608 in Zambia.
Results:
MDD estimations from both recall methods were equivalent to the observation in Cambodia but not in Zambia. Both methods were equivalent to the observation in capturing most food groups. Both methods were highly sensitive although the multiple-pass method accurately classified a higher proportion of children meeting MDD than the list-based method in both countries. Both methods were highly specific in Cambodia but moderately so in Zambia. Cost-effectiveness was better for the list-based recall method in both countries.
Conclusion:
The two recall methods estimated MDD and most other infant and young child feeding indicators equivalently in Cambodia but not in Zambia, compared to the observation. The list-based method produced slightly more accurate estimates of MDD at the population level, took less time to administer and was less costly to implement.
The article addresses some aspects of Gava’s book, highlighting two main points: (1) the notion of philosophy in a cosmic sense; (2) its connection with the meaning of the concept of method. Regarding (1) I show how Gava’s interpretation of the systematic concept of philosophy does not account adequately for the scholastic concept. This has consequences for the notion of philosophy in a cosmic sense itself; its nature as an objective archetype and its personification in the ideal of a master of wisdom are not properly emphasized. These features are closely related to Kant’s claim that philosophy cannot be learned, which is connected with Kant’s peculiar idea of method. Regarding (2), I argue that ‘method’ for Kant does not concern only the construction of scientific systems, but also the establishment of a way of thinking, a stance embracing thought and action. The meaning of the postulates and the notion of ‘faith’ thus acquire a ‘weaker’ connotation, as an attitude, habitus, aimed at the establishment and promotion of a ‘life-structuring’ rationality, and not as an alternative route to a theoretical ‘commitment’.
Wittgenstein said, 'really one should write philosophy only as one writes a poem'. This Element provides a comprehensive explanation of what he possibly meant by the statement, and why the statement is a correct description of Wittgenstein's philosophy. It connects the statement with Wittgenstein's idea of philosophical clarification, the methods he uses in it and the masters he acknowledges as the sources for his ways of 'moving his thought'. The Element introduces distinctions that are essential for approaching the multilayered complex of Wittgenstein's oeuvre. One is the distinction between writing philosophical clarifications for himself on the one hand and forming philosophical books for his reader on the other. While poetry was central to both activities, it was mandatory for the second. Indeed, for creating the perfect philosophical book, Wittgenstein thought he lacked precisely what some of his masters possessed: poetic genius.
Translation in a global world is not only literary but also profoundly performative, embedded in how ideas and gestures, sounds and voices transform and move. We draw from dominant theorizations about translation as literary work and rise up to the challenge of thinking translation performatively, within a theatrical setting and beyond, as a medium, a mode and a method. Our inter-related arguments therefore sit at the intersection of three disciplinary (or interdisciplinary) formations – Comparative Literature, Translation Studies and Theatre and Performance Studies – even as they attempt to bridge another set of enduring divides, between theoretical and practical approaches to translation, between Theatre and Performance Studies. In sum, we argue that performance emerges as a generative and indispensable frame and method for thinking translation as an act that is not only transdisciplinary but also necessarily trans-medial.
In the empirical exploration of ethical pedagogies, a quartet of themes are salient. The classic theme of and debate over the relative weighting of nature over nurture is inescapable. A second concerns the extent to which any given repertoire of norms, values, exemplars, and ideals are written in sociocultural stone versus the extent to which they are malleable, fluid, of unstable valence, and liable to elimination or supplementation. A third concerns the degree to which the techniques of the ethical pedagogue are informal or formal. A fourth concerns the place that ethical students occupy within the dynamics of incorporation and objectification. Neglect any of these themes and infelicities can result. Among them, the crucial role that childhood socialization plays in ethical formation might not receive the acknowledgement it is due. The distinction between ethics and ethos might suffer conflation. Worst of all, the anthropologist of ethics might run the risk of slipping into methodological or – even worse – ontological individualism. Proper attention to ethical pedagogies can ameliorate such infelicities. It can also facilitate recognizing that pedagogies, at whatever stage in the life course, are foundational to ethical formation, deformation, and reformation.