When we witness another person experiencing pain, be it emotional or physical, we have an empathic reaction. And even if we commit a harmful action against another person, we most of the time experience guilt in the aftermath, which prevents us from performing the same action in the future. Guilt and empathy are critical moral emotions that together usually prevent us from harming others. However, as this chapter shows, systematic processes of classification and dehumanization at play before a genocide can alter moral emotions towards another part of the population. Activity in empathy-related brain regions is generally reduced towards individuals that we consider as outgroup or towards dehumanized individuals. Neuroscience studies have further shown that when obeying orders to hurt another person, neural activity in empathy- and guilt-related brain regions is reduced compared to acting freely. Such results show how obeying orders diminishes our aversion to harming others.

This chapter discusses the field of moral development and explores what this research field can tell us about virtue development, which is a relatively neglected topic in virtue theory. The chapter is primarily about moral development in children, both because there is substantial scientific interest in this population and because virtue development must begin in childhood. Moral development research illuminates three apparently naturally developing preconditions for virtue development: (1) the ability to choose, (2) an interest in collective welfare, and (3) an interest in ethical normativity. Moral development research is also compatible with the STRIVE-4 Model in that it is primarily quantitative. Moral development generally does not focus on traits, with the exception of some research on moral identity, moral emotions, and moral exemplars. The chapter concludes by exploring how virtue science can contribute to moral development research, including an increased emphasis on (1) person-centered research, (2) the contextualizing of development in situations and roles, (3) flourishing, and (4) practical wisdom.

This chapter compares and contrasts the thought of three philosophers – Bernard Williams, Charles Taylor, and Martha Nussbaum – who developed influential and idiosyncratic ways of reforming Anglo-American moral philosophy. Their positions substantially overlap inasmuch as they hold that the goods of human life are necessarily multiple and persistently in conflict, which has implications for the structure and content of ethical life everywhere. All three are of interest to anthropology because they hold that history, culture, social relations, and biographical experience make a difference to the goods and values that inform human life, and therefore that moral philosophy needs to be, to at least a very large degree, an empirical, descriptive, and comparative discipline. The different, sometimes even rival, ways in which they pursue that project offer anthropologists of ethics the chance to reflect on how and why they might develop an anthropology that would fulfil these authors’ different visions of moral philosophy.

Although recent research has begun examining the construct more widely, there exist several gaps in scholarship. One such area is the influence, association, and role of affective factors in determining whether and to what extent an entity engages in dark creativity. After introducing concepts like negative and malevolent creativity, this chapter reviews the existing literature on the link between affective factors and creativity. Thereafter, the features of dark personality traits, like psychopathy, are examined with reference to affective considerations such as low empathy in producing original harm. Owing to the relationship between dark creativity and moral concerns, we also examine how moral emotions like guilt and shame (or lack thereof) may contribute to an understanding of such creativity. The chapter concludes with suggestions for future research and avenues for interdisciplinary studies.

In this chapter, we discuss the evolution of the field of ‘ethics of nuclear energy’, regarding its past, present and future. We will first review the history of this field in the previous four decades, focusing on new and emerging challenges of nuclear energy production and waste disposal, in light of several important developments. Four of the most pressing ethical challenges will be further reviewed in the chapter. First, what is a morally ‘acceptable’ nuclear energy production method, if we consider the existing and possible new technologies? Second, provided a new tendency to consider nuclear waste disposal with several countries, what would be the new ethical and governance challenges of these multinational collaborations? Third, how should we deal with the (safety) challenges of the new geographic distribution of nuclear energy, tilting towards emerging economies with less experience with nuclear technology? Fourth, nuclear energy projects engender highly emotional controversies. Neither ignoring the emotions of the public nor taking them as a reason to prohibit or restrict a technology – we call them technocratic populist pitfalls respectively – seem to be able to guide responsible policy making.

In this chapter, we discuss the evolution of the field of ‘ethics of nuclear energy’, regarding its past, present and future. We will first review the history of this field in the previous four decades, focusing on new and emerging challenges of nuclear energy production and waste disposal, in light of several important developments. Four of the most pressing ethical challenges will be further reviewed in the chapter. First, what is a morally ‘acceptable’ nuclear energy production method, if we consider the existing and possible new technologies? Second, provided a new tendency to consider nuclear waste disposal with several countries, what would be the new ethical and governance challenges of these multinational collaborations? Third, how should we deal with the (safety) challenges of the new geographic distribution of nuclear energy, tilting towards emerging economies with less experience with nuclear technology? Fourth, nuclear energy projects engender highly emotional controversies. Neither ignoring the emotions of the public nor taking them as a reason to prohibit or restrict a technology – we call them technocratic populist pitfalls respectively – seem to be able to guide responsible policy making.