We call multioperation any operation that return for even argument a set of values instead of a single value. Through multioperations we can define an algebraic structure equipped with at least one multioperation. This kind of structure is called multialgebra. The study of them began in 1934 with the publication of a paper of Marty. In the realm of Logic, multialgebras were considered by Avron and his collaborators under the name of non-deterministic matrices (or Nmatrices) and used as semantics tool for characterizing some logics which cannot be characterized by a single finite matrix. Carnielli and Coniglio introduced the semantics of swap structures for LFIs (Logics of Formal Inconsistency), which are Nmatrices defined over triples in a Boolean algebra, generalizing Avron’s semantics. In this thesis, we will introduce a new method of algebraization of logics based on multialgebras and swap structures that is similar to classical algebraization method of Lindenbaum-Tarski, but more extensive because it can be applied to systems such that some operators are non-congruential. In particular, this method will be applied to a family of non-normal modal logics and to some LFIs that are not algebraizable by the very general techniques introduced by Blok and Pigozzi. We also will obtain representation theorems for some LFIs and we will prove that, within out approach, the classes of swap structures for some axiomatic extensions of mbC are a subclass of the class of swap structures for the logic mbC.

Abstract prepared by Ana Claudia de Jesus Golzio.

E-mail: anaclaudiagolzio@yahoo.com.br

URL: http://repositorio.unicamp.br/jspui/handle/REPOSIP/322436

This paper generalises an argument for probabilism due to Lindley [9]. I extend the argument to a number of non-classical logical settings whose truth-values, seen here as ideal aims for belief, are in the set $\{0,1\}$, and where logical consequence $\models $ is given the “no-drop” characterization. First I will show that, in each of these settings, an agent’s credence can only avoid accuracy-domination if its canonical transform is a (possibly non-classical) probability function. In other words, if an agent values accuracy as the fundamental epistemic virtue, it is a necessary requirement for rationality that her credence have some probabilistic structure. Then I show that for a certain class of reasonable measures of inaccuracy, having such a probabilistic structure is sufficient to avoid accuracy-domination in these non-classical settings.

We determine the modal logic of fixed-point models of truth and their axiomatizations by Solomon Feferman via Solovay-style completeness results. Given a fixed-point model $\mathcal {M}$ , or an axiomatization S thereof, we find a modal logic M such that a modal sentence $\varphi $ is a theorem of M if and only if the sentence $\varphi ^*$ obtained by translating the modal operator with the truth predicate is true in $\mathcal {M}$ or a theorem of S under all such translations. To this end, we introduce a novel version of possible worlds semantics featuring both classical and nonclassical worlds and establish the completeness of a family of noncongruent modal logics whose internal logic is nonclassical with respect to this semantics.

Standard reasoning about Kripke semantics for modal logic is almost always based on a background framework of classical logic. Can proofs for familiar definability theorems be carried out using a nonclassical substructural logic as the metatheory? This article presents a semantics for positive substructural modal logic and studies the connection between frame conditions and formulas, via definability theorems. The novelty is that all the proofs are carried out with a noncontractive logic in the background. This sheds light on which modal principles are invariant under changes of metalogic, and provides (further) evidence for the general viability of nonclassical mathematics.

An exact truthmaker for A is a state which, as well as guaranteeing A’s truth, is wholly relevant to it. States with parts irrelevant to whether A is true do not count as exact truthmakers for A. Giving semantics in this way produces a very unusual consequence relation, on which conjunctions do not entail their conjuncts. This feature makes the resulting logic highly unusual. In this paper, we set out formal semantics for exact truthmaking and characterise the resulting notion of entailment, showing that it is compact and decidable. We then investigate the effect of various restrictions on the semantics. We also formulate a sequent-style proof system for exact entailment and give soundness and completeness results.

In recent work Philip Welch has proven the existence of ‘ineffable liars’ for Hartry Field’s theory of truth. These are offered as liar-like sentences that escape classification in Field’s transfinite hierarchy of determinateness operators. In this article I present a slightly more general characterization of the ineffability phenomenon, and discuss its philosophical significance. I show the ineffable sentences to be less ‘liar-like’ than they appear in Welch’s presentation. I also point to some open technical problems whose resolution would greatly clarify the philosophical issues raised by the ineffability phenomenon.

B. Kooi and A. Tamminga present a correspondence analysis for extensions of G. Priest’s logic of paradox. Each unary or binary extension is characterizable by a special operator and analyzable via a sound and complete natural deduction system. The present paper develops a sound and complete proof searching technique for the binary extensions of the logic of paradox.