We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.
To save content items to your account,
please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies.
If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account.
Find out more about saving content to .
To save content items to your Kindle, first ensure no-reply@cambridge.org
is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings
on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part
of your Kindle email address below.
Find out more about saving to your Kindle.
Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations.
‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi.
‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.
I provide a Stufenleiter of human intuition that systematizes Kant’s discussions. Starting with intuition überhaupt, as object-giving representation, I distinguish spontaneous from receptive intuition. I divide receptive intuition into sensible and non-sensible; and divide sensible intuition into inner and outer sense, under which our human varieties of temporal and spatial intuition fall as instances (not species). This chapter offers detailed accounts of givenness and of cognitive spontaneity (the other differentia are addressed in Chapter 8). I argue that givenness, the fundamental criterion of intuition überhaupt, involves securing both (i) the existence of the object and (ii) thought’s cognitive access to it. One might worry that these functions could come apart. I address this worry by developing a novel interpretation of spontaneity and its opposite, receptivity. As applied to representations, I argue, these notions are fundamentally epistemic and explanatory. This is why the functions cannot come apart and why a representation that performs one function spontaneously (or, as the case may be, receptively) must also perform the other spontaneously (or receptively).
One of the earliest issues in cognitive ethology concerns about the meaning of animal signals. This chapter takes a new look at this debate in the light of recent developments in the philosophy of language under the heading of "neo-expressivism" (Bar-On). It provides three approaches to the study of animal communication: an approach that emphasizes its affective function, an approach that emphasizes its referential function, and an approach that combines both. The chapter presents four "conceptualist" principles characterized by Gunther: compositionality; cognitive significance; reference determinacy; and force independence. It discusses the application of these four principles of conceptuality to animal communication. If the issue for understanding non-human animal communication were that of truth-evaluability alone, perhaps either a conceptualist or non-conceptualist account would be appropriate, even non-conceptual content (NCC) can be true or false. The chapter concludes by proposing some future directions that continuation of the discussion might take.
Recommend this
Email your librarian or administrator to recommend adding this to your organisation's collection.