In this study, we engage in a deep dive into Black Americans views of the Congressional Black Caucus. We argue that given the goals of the organization, Black people should be the CBC’s strongest supporters. We also anticipate that age will be a major cleavage in support for the CBC among Black people. We test our hypotheses using the 2020 Collaborative Multiracial Post-Election Survey (CMPS). We find that Black people, and older Black people in particular, are the most supportive of the CBC. Moreover, we find that disparities in support among the youngest and oldest Black respondents are greater than the differences between Black and White people in our analysis. We empirically explore the causes of this intergenerational rift and show that younger Black Americans’ lower levels of support for the organization are in part tied to their lower levels of linked fate and their perception that elected officials do not work to advance their interest in government.

This project investigates how skin tone and gender of Black political candidates work together to influence White Americans’ evaluations. Drawing on the colorism literature and group position theory, I develop a theoretical framework anticipating how the skin tone of Black candidates may influence White voters’ perceptions. Two survey experiments were conducted on nationally representative samples. Both studies highlight that skin tone is meaningful to White voters’ evaluations, but in nuanced ways based on gender. Specifically, the darker-skinned Black female candidate is evaluated more positively than her lighter-skinned female and darker-skinned male counterpart across multiple domains, including vote choice and expected job performance. These findings suggest that gender can attenuate the negative stereotypes typically associated with darker skin tone in some contexts. These findings underscore the importance of theorizing about race as a multidimensional construct, with implications for understanding hierarchy, intergroup relations, and electoral politics in a diversifying American racial landscape.

The nonreligious—atheists, agnostics, and nones—are on track to become America’s largest religious group between 2030 and 2040. The group’s rapid growth is largely attributed to widespread disaffiliation from Christian traditions across racial and ethnic identities. However, a significant portion of the population is now 2nd generation nonreligious, meaning that they not only never identified with a faith tradition but were raised in a nonreligious household by nonreligious parents. A significant body of work in psychology shows differences between those who convert away from religious identification and lifelong nonbelievers across intersecting identities. Yet, no work exists examining how this distinction impacts ideology or political beliefs that affect how voters’ identities interact with political outcomes. This study investigates the ideological and political differences between ex-Christian members of the nonreligious community and lifelong nonbelievers across multiple facets of identity, using data from the 2020 Collaborative Multiracial Post-Election Survey (CMPS).

In an era of globalization, increasingly interconnected labor markets have intensified competition for skilled talent, particularly among countries in the Global North such as Canada. While Canada’s immigration policy prioritizes education and professional experience, these same credentials are often devalued upon arrival, as systemic barriers limit access to commensurate employment. This study examines the employment experiences of skilled, racialized immigrants in British Columbia, exploring how institutional narratives of meritocracy conceal exclusion, credential systems reinforce epistemic hierarchies, and settlement services pathologize migrant experiences. Using a qualitative design with four focus group discussions (n = 18), the study integrates critical migration theory, intersectionality, and decolonial social work to analyze the structural marginalization of skilled, racialized immigrants. Findings reveal a central paradox: the very system that celebrates global talent simultaneously erodes its value through credential gatekeeping, discriminatory hiring practices, and labor market practices that privilege local over global expertise. By situating these barriers within broader colonial and epistemic hierarchies, the study argues that integration must be understood not as individual adaptation but as institutional transformation. It contributes to critical debates on skilled migration, equity, and the reproduction of colonial logics within Canada’s labor market.

Felon disenfranchisement, while ostensibly race neutral, bars more Black Americans from voting than White Americans. This has promulgated claims that felon disenfranchisement is used to limit Black political influence. However, we lack systematic evidence tying perceptions of racial political power to support for disenfranchising felons. Utilizing the racial threat framework, we argue that White Americans who perceive Black Americans as too politically powerful will be more supportive of disenfranchising felons, particularly right-leaning White Americans. Using data from the 2020 and 2024 ANES, we find perceptions of political threat are associated with greater support for felon disenfranchisement. In further support for the political racial threat hypothesis, we find perceptions of Black political power increase support among those on the political right while decreasing support among the political left. Importantly, these results hold after controlling for economic and symbolic threat, general Black affect, crime spending preferences, and Black population size. These results suggest political racial threat significantly influences support for felon disenfranchisement among White Americans, and conditionally on political leanings, underscoring the role of political racial threat in whether White Americans think felons should be allowed to vote.

The term “Women of Color” (WoC) has seen a marked rise in usage, yet little is known about how it functions as a coalitional identity with political significance. I argue that WoC operates both as a descriptor and an identity. As a descriptor, it resembles a panethnic label for nonwhite women. When adopted as an identity—the focus of this study—it may carry deeper significance connected to its progressive roots. Scholars often categorize all racially diverse women as WoC based on presumed experiences of oppression. However, this assumption overlooks variation in race-gendered discrimination shaped by factors such as appearance and class. Women who are perceived as white or those with lighter skin tones, for example, may not experience racialization in the same ways as other nonwhite women. Given the label’s association with liberal political views and its emphasis on “color,” some women may choose not to adopt it or may be uncertain about their inclusion. Using 2020 CMPS data, this study builds on WoC scholarship by incorporating Asian women and compares their experiences and attitudes to those of Latina and Black women. Results show that the majority of Asian women identify as a WoC and report high levels of WoC-linked fate. Among Asian women, personal experiences with discrimination and empathy toward other marginalized groups are especially important in WoC identity formation. WoC-linked fate also demonstrates political relevance across all three groups, showing a positive relationship with support for undocumented immigrants and the #MeToo movement.

This study examines intergroup bias among members of the Swedish-speaking minority in Finland—a high-status ethnolinguistic minority group. Drawing on social identity theory and intergroup threat theory, the study explores ingroup favoritism and identifies key predictors of individual-level bias. Using survey data from 1,096 Swedish-speaking Finns, the study uses trait-based evaluations of both ingroup and outgroup members. Results show that intergroup bias is prevalent, particularly in the form of ingroup favoritism for positive traits. Analyses reveal that strong ethnolinguistic identity and perceived intergroup threat significantly predict higher levels of bias, while language identity, Finnish language proficiency, and intergroup contact show no consistent relationships. These findings suggest that even in socially stable and egalitarian contexts, perceived threats to group identity can sustain intergroup bias.

This article examines how intersectional ideologies and experiences of marginalization affect the extent to which African Americans support or oppose the marginalization of LGBTQ+ communities. We posit that awareness of the race-gender positionality of African American women, as well as the unique positionalities of other marginalized African American subgroups, is critical to understanding the conditions under which Black Americans embrace LGBTQ+ rights and communities. Using the Black respondent subsample of the 2016 Collaborative Multiracial Post-Election Study, we test the extent to which intersectional theories explain African American cross-group consciousness with LGBTQ+ persons and support for LGBTQ+ rights and communities. In doing so, we distinguish multiple mechanisms through which identity intersections affect African American1 political attitudes, and we find that, though intersecting marginalized identities can be critical to fomenting African Americans’ support for the rights and concerns of LGBTQ+ communities, not all intersections lead to a more inclusive Black politics.

Drawing from an interpretivist framework, this paper proposes Black Embodied Political Subjectivity (BEPS) as a conceptual framework that foregrounds the body, affect, and historical memory as critical to political subjectivity. BEPS draws on Black political thought to challenge dominant epistemologies that prioritize disembodied rationality and abstract ideological commitments over lived, felt, and corporeal political experiences. Rather than treating the body as an inert vessel or secondary site of politics, BEPS argues that the body is central to the ways Black people negotiate, contest, and reconstitute power in lived political contexts.

Media attention to policing has brought a proliferation of narratives seeking to contextualize incidents of police violence. Here, we test whether exposure to such narratives shift Americans’ opinion or behavior. To do so, we first identify and track the media prevalence of two of these narratives: one focused on racial bias in policing and a second focused on the dangers of the profession. Despite the presence of these narratives in media, we find, experimentally, that public opinion about police violence is stable, regardless of the media narrative used. Finally, to better understand these null results, we use a content analysis of open-ended responses to uncover the demographic and ideological characteristics that are most more deterministic of their reactions to police violence. Altogether, these findings indicate attitudes about policing and planned political participation are ossified and unresponsive to media narratives.

What explains the attitudes of diasporas toward their ancestral homeland? One answer suggests some pull toward the country of origin (“ancestral homeland”) based on a shared cultural identity. In contrast, another explanation looks at how host country (“contemporary homeland”) politics surrounding the “perpetual foreigners” can push the diaspora toward their ancestral homeland. In this paper, we recognize that the link between the diaspora and the ancestral homeland is malleable. Specifically, we focus on the linguistic link—which can vary both spatially and temporally. We argue that when individuals of the diaspora do not speak the ancestral homeland language with their family at home, the primordial ethnic bond is weakened, and thus, they are less positive toward their ancestral homeland. We test our argument by focusing on the ethnic Chinese diaspora globally. Using the Sinophone Borderlands Survey, we identify and test whether those who speak Standard Chinese at home are more pro-China than their coethnics who speak a non-Standard Chinese vernacular. The results highlight that while the ethnic Chinese diaspora is more positive toward China than the non-ethnic Chinese respondents, what matters is whether a, and if so, which, Chinese vernacular is spoken.

A key component of the authoritarian worldview is social conformity, which manifests in a need to minimize threats to social order. This desire for stability often leads authoritarians to hold systematic and approving attitudes toward law enforcement. Previous scholarship suggests that authoritarianism is linked to attitudes shaped by the social dominance of one’s group identity. We extend this framework to Hispanic populations, whose identities historically fall outside the dominant social order, to examine whether authoritarianism predicts support for law enforcement. Using data from the 2020 American National Election Study (ANES), we employ regression models to examine the relationship between authoritarianism, ethnicity, and attitudes toward law enforcement. Results indicate that authoritarians express more favorable views of law enforcement across non-Hispanic white and Hispanic respondents, with a stronger effect among Hispanics. Positive feelings toward whites are also associated with higher levels of authoritarianism and greater support for police, underscoring the importance of white identity salience in shaping political attitudes. These findings demonstrate that authoritarianism functions as a psychological orientation emphasizing order and conformity rather than a defensive response to marginalization. Our results contribute to understanding how racial identity salience and acculturation processes shape the relationship between worldview and support for state authority.

Questions about race and representation often hinge on the public’s beliefs about which policies affect different communities, yet there is limited evidence on how these associations are actually perceived. Using a nationally representative survey experiment, we examine how the issue priorities of political candidates shape perceptions of who they represent. Most policy areas are perceived to benefit White Americans; only a few, especially criminal justice and poverty, are strongly associated with African Americans. We also show that perceptions of candidate ideology and race correlate with perceptions of Black representation, but mediation analysis reveals that criminal justice is associated with Black representation above and beyond ideological inferences. Finally, analyzing nearly 200,000 congressional newsletters and find that while race is rarely explicitly mentioned, Black Americans are most frequently referenced in the context of criminal justice and poverty. Together, these results underscore how race-policy associations operate through both public perception and elite messaging, shaping broader understandings of political representation.

Local prosecutors in the United States have significant discretion in the criminal legal system and have traditionally wielded their power in a way that contributes to mass incarceration. Since 2016, however, “progressive” prosecutors have been elected in growing numbers on pledges to mitigate the racialized harms of mass incarceration. While scholars tie progressive prosecutors’ elections to the Movement for Black Lives (BLM), less is known about countermovement efforts—including recalls, impeachments, and suspensions, examples of extra-electoral challenges—opposing these prosecutors. To address this gap, I constructed an original database of all local prosecutors in 2012 and/or 2022 in the country’s 300 most populous jurisdictions. Findings reveal that extra-electoral challenges disproportionately target women of color, disproportionately occur in Republican-controlled states, and have nearly tripled over the last decade. I argue that extra-electoral challenges constitute a novel movement repertoire used by the political right to challenge racial justice efforts following BLM.

Turnout appeals are amplified in highly polarized, hotly contested elections like 2020. The political environment included social justice unrest, overt appeals to white male voters, and new voting procedures which resonated differently across intersectional identities. Gender and race politics intertwined to create a charged environment for mobilization and for social pressure to vote. We expect the nature and effectiveness of turnout appeals to have varied by race and gender intersections. In addition, given past behavior and the climate of protest, we expect individuals under 30 were less responsive to social pressures to vote. Using data from the 2020 Collaborative Multiracial Post-Election Survey (CMPS 2020), we examine whether individuals with different intersectional identities varied in their perception of social pressure to vote as well as in the effectiveness of that pressure. We find that voters are sensitive to social pressure appeals, but both perception and responsiveness vary with intersectional identity.

Do appeals to Black voters necessarily detract white voters from supporting the left? Extant studies have yielded mixed answers to this question by examining voter turnout data. We use two survey experiments to test how framing politicians as either supportive of or hostile to the #BlackLivesMatter (BLM) and #SayHerName (SHN) movements affected the willingness of voters to support them during the 2020 Senate runoff elections in Georgia. We find that Democratic-leaning respondents in both a national sample of Black respondents and a sample of White respondents in Georgia were more likely to support politicians whom we framed as supportive of the BLM and SHN movements. These findings illustrate the potential potency of messaging strategies grounded in racial justice themes for mobilizing Democratic-leaning voters in American elections.

A large body of research shows that members of Congress disproportionately represent the interests of copartisans and affluent Americans. Is there also racial disparity in representation? I draw on three standards of political equality—proportionality, race-conscious egalitarianism, and pluralism—and assess the extent to which minority representation satisfies each. To do so, I match roll-call votes in the U.S. House of Representatives to survey data fielded prior to each vote (2006–2016) and use multilevel regression and poststratification to estimate racial subgroups’ opinions. I then examine how closely House members’ voting aligns with these opinions, focusing on districts where White and minority preferences differ. My analysis rules out “coincidental representation’ driven by similar opinions across groups and accounts for how much of each racial group’s national population resides in each district. Among districts where racial group opinions differ, I find strong support for the proportionality over the race-conscious egalitarian standard: Racial minority representation is substantially greater in majority–minority districts than in those that are not. However, I find strong evidence for the race-conscious egalitarian standard among Democratic legislators and moderate evidence for the pluralist standard among all legislators, as voting tends to align with racial minority opinion on explicitly race-targeted bills.

The insurrection and its aftermath remain salient to contemporary American Politics. Existing scholarship has shown the insurrection was fueled by an effort to return Donald Trump to power while also protesting the decline of the non-Hispanic white population. Scholars also discuss the impact of continuous division across partisan and ideological lines. We are interested in exploring if these divisions are visible across attitudes of non-Hispanic white, Black, Hispanic, and Asian American/Pacific Islander respondents in a nationally representative survey. We explore the following research question. Does the impact of partisanship, ideology, and attitudes toward Trump’s responsibility affect the attitudes of respondents from various racial and ethnic groups? We use the 2020 Collaborative Multiracial Post-Election Survey (CMPS) to complete our analyses. We contribute to the existing literature by examining whether partisanship, ideology, and attitudes toward Trump lead to potential differences across race and ethnicity. We find that respondents across all racial and ethnic groups share similar evaluations of the insurrection, the president’s role, and the rioters, particularly when they hold identical partisan and ideological views and identify the president as the cause of the insurrection.

Recent debates over how to address racial injustice in the United States often center on two types of policies: redistributive measures that redress material inequities between groups and symbolic reforms that challenge dominant racial narratives. How do citizens evaluate these differing approaches to advancing racial justice? How do recent removals of Confederate symbols shape support for each of these policy types? In a survey of American adults, we find that support for redistributive and symbolic policies is positively correlated across partisan, racial, and regional lines. However, when pressed, respondents express a stronger preference for redistributive measures, often viewing symbolic reforms as insufficient or distracting. In an experimental framework, we find that informing respondents about recent Confederate statue removals does not significantly alter support for either policy type. Looking at qualitative reactions to the treatment, we identify a plausible explanation for this null finding: most respondents see the removals as a fight over history and less directly relevant to a broader racial justice policy agenda.

Central to the UK’s Referendum on EU membership, immigration concerns underpinned support for Leave. This article examines ethnic minority support for Brexit, comparing their immigration attitudes with white British voters. Why immigrants and ethnic minorities would support immigration controls through voting Leave presents a theoretical puzzle with existing research finding they generally hold positive attitudes to immigration. Drawing on focus groups and interviews, I find opposition to Eastern European immigration motivated ethnic minority Leave support, who bolstered their own position as “good” immigrants while denigrating Eastern Europeans as “bad” immigrants. This echoes emerging trends of minoritized groups opposing newer migrants, including increased Latino/x support for Trump in 2024. White British Leave voters, however, rarely distinguished between EU and non-EU migrants, often including British ethnic minorities in their “mental image” of immigrants. Thus, tighter borders may do little to quell qualms over immigration which (partly) reflect concerns over rising racial diversity.