This article provides the contextual background to the symposium on Populist Discourses and Political Communication in Southern Europe. It explains the symposium’s objectives and introduces the rationale of its articles on Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain. Within this context, the editors also highlight the specific conditions for the emergence of typical forms of Southern European populism, as well as its distinctive features, focusing on the challenges populism poses to politics and media research. The implications of the phenomenon for the future of the European project are also addressed.

The aim of this article is questioning the commonly held assumption that Problem-Based Learning (PBL) is necessarily good for students. Drawing on the experience of teaching a postgraduate module about terrorism and the media as a case study, it shows that PBL can definitely benefit the Political Communication curriculum. However, this is only part of the story. PBL, in fact, appears to have an ‘amplifier’ effect on the learning outcomes of a module: the achievement of outstanding results for those who are committed to the coursework; lower achievement than would have been gained through more ‘traditional’ learning methods for those who do not fully engage with it. As the case study suggests, students’ individual expectations and previous experiences of coursework, although currently overlooked, appear to make all the difference within the learning process.

Social media have changed the way politicians communicate with and relate to their constituencies during election campaigns and routine periods alike. Many scholars have postulated that populists would benefit most from the new digital media. Despite their growing importance, few studies have addressed the features of online populist communication and how to assess its success. The purpose of this article is to fill this gap by providing a framework for the analysis of populist communication on social media. Taking the case of Italy’s Lega Nord (Northern League (LN)) as an example, the article will clarify which aspects of online communication are most valued by LN supporters, in relation to both the key elements of populism (references to ‘the people’, ‘elites’ and ‘others’) and the expression of an emotional style in the messages. The article analyses the controlled communication that LN and its leader, Matteo Salvini, published on their Facebook profiles during a sample period of 30 days. Our findings demonstrate that populism, emotional style and, in general, the role of the leader as a source of communication positively affect the ‘likeability’ of a message.

The symposium is motivated by the question of how the war in Ukraine is ‘framed’ and ‘narrated’ in media outside the West. It aims to shed light on the diverse ways in which information is manipulated and disseminated to serve political interests. The emphasis on developing an interdisciplinary conceptual prism is particularly noteworthy. Integrating insights from International Relations, Geopolitics, and Media and Communication studies offers a holistic understanding of the complex dynamics at play. Moreover, by highlighting the influence of foreign propaganda and disinformation campaigns, the symposium underscores the importance of critically analysing media representations in shaping public perceptions and potentially influencing foreign policies. Understanding these dynamics is crucial for mitigating the impact of misinformation and fostering informed public discourse on global conflicts. The symposium promises to contribute significantly to the scholarly understanding of the nexus between conflict and communication, while also offering valuable insights for policymakers and media practitioners alike.

Portuguese politics and mainstream media have been resistant to the recent spread of populism. This article examines the specific features of Portuguese politics and media that might explain the apparent exception, and puts it to test by analysing the prevalence of populist discourses and styles of communication in different types of online media. The sample is composed of mediated and unmediated messages on immigration and corruption, two issues that are commonly present in populist discourses by both right- and left-wing political actors. Overall, the content analysis shows that although populist discourses are not recurrent in politics and media, social media have amplified the visibility of this kind of discourses in Portugal.

Social media are the great social leveler – or so some commentators would have us believe. Social media put the power of communication directly into the average person’s hands. They also present opportunities for politicians to improve their contacts with the common person – to directly share their messages with and better understand the concerns of constituents. This study explores whether and to what extent the potential for such citizen–politician engagement is fulfilled. Deploying an original dataset of tweets from politicians in the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States, this exploratory study examines the interlocutors with whom politicians engage reciprocally via Twitter. The results show that a large share of politicians’ genuinely reciprocal exchanges includes average citizens. Although there is much room for improvement, this study suggests that Twitter is indeed opening spaces for citizens and policymakers to engage one another on matters of political import.

Previous research suggests the effects of negative campaigning are highly conditional on country context and the specific messages that are used. In this paper, we present an experiment on negative campaigning in an unexamined context in which existing studies could point to differing outcomes. We examine the effect of attacks placed in campaign leaflets on a candidate’s personal traits and policy positions in Great Britain. Unlike prior studies, our treatments are contrast ads and not purely negative ads. While the inclusion of positive messaging from the sponsor could increase voters’ parasocial relationship with the candidate, shielding them from backlash, the results from our experiment suggest that British voters view attacks on personal traits as too negative and lower their evaluation of the sponsor as a result.

Can American state legislators use social media to influence the political behaviors and attitudes of the public by crafting strategic messages? While elected officials from every level of government use social media, it is not clear how the public responds to their individual posts. I argue that the rhetorical strategies employed by legislators can have a direct impact on their online constituencies, moderated by the existence of a copartisan relationship. I test my argument using a simulated social media environment embedded within a traditional survey experiment to mimic the impact of real-life social media posts. I find that legislators’ social media posts influence their approval ratings, and at times, the public’s trust in government. However, I do not find evidence that small numbers of social media posts affect a willingness to participate in politics.

A successful energy transition requires the reallocation of private capital away from fossil fuel assets to greener alternatives. This transition is typically hindered by investors’ focus on today’s returns. In times of crisis, however, credible and unambiguous political signals about the future profitability of green industries can steer investments toward low-carbon assets. Drawing on European Union interventions during the onset of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, we present an event study of daily stock market returns following the most salient policy announcements by the European Commission in 2022. Our analysis shows that markets for shares of EU-based energy firms were initially prepared to move capital to cleaner companies, suggesting support for the clean energy transition. However, the short-lived distributional effects materialized only for announcements that could unmistakably be understood as unwavering commitments to the EU’s green renewal, while more ambiguous announcements did not have the same distributional implications. Our findings emphasize that repeated and unambiguous political signals during crisis episodes can create favorable market conditions, at least in the short term, to support capital reallocation toward greener stocks.

This article focuses on the effects of different communication modes – ‘contestatory’, ‘collaborative’, and ‘open’ (and two control groups – ‘information-only’ and a ‘placebo’ group) on reasoning and opinion formation in the context of conflictive collective decision problems. Focusing on two population-based survey experiments in Germany and Austria on the prioritization of health or freedom (Germany) and the introduction of mandatory vaccination (Austria) in the COVID-19 crisis, we find an important trade-off: while a contestatory and open mode enhances in-depth reasoning, a collaborative mode promotes constructive thinking. Regarding opinion formation, we find that when societal polarization is not extreme, communication modes do not matter for opinion (de-)polarization; here, the exposure to information is all that is needed to move minds. In highly polarized situations, however, open communication is the only way to communicatively reach out to people. Our results contradict both advocates of a contestatory and collaborative renewal of public discourse.

How do far-right actors influence mainstream parties over time? Previous research shows that mainstream parties contribute to the electoral success of far-right parties through coalitions or policy alliances. However, a long-term perspective on the influence of far-right actors, including parties, civil society organisations, and social movements, on mainstream parties’ communication is lacking. This article investigates how far-right actors and issues have influenced mainstream parties’ communication in Germany since the 1990s. Using automated text analysis, we analyse 520,408 articles from six newspapers. First, we semi-automatically collect far-right actors and mainstream parties and implement a structural topic model to analyse their issue agendas. Second, we use time-series analysis to examine agenda-setting effects and their drivers. The results show that far-right influence on mainstream parties’ communication has increased, particularly among opposition parties and around issues of Islam and migration. Notably, the agenda-setting effect cuts across party ideologies, indicating mainstream parties’ impact on the rise of the far right in democracies.

Which Canadian Members of Parliament (MPs) are on Bluesky and what types of content do they share? Taking up calls for more mere description of how emerging social media platforms are used in their initial period of operation, this research note describes how many MPs are using Bluesky and what types of content they share. Of the 123 MPs already on Bluesky, we find that they apply the same logic and understanding of platform affordances from Twitter (now X), with posts most frequently discussing policy, the Ottawa bubble and their constituency. This research note contributes to our understanding of how MPs use Bluesky to communicate with the public in a high-choice media environment.

Scholarship has identified key determinants of people’s belief in misinformation predominantly from English-language contexts. However, multilingual citizens often consume news media in multiple languages. We study how the language of consumption affects belief in misinformation and true news articles in multilingual environments. We suggest that language may pass on specific cues affecting how bilinguals evaluate information. In a ten-week survey experiment with bilingual adults in Ukraine, we measured if subjects evaluating information in their less-preferred language were less likely to believe it. We find those who prefer Ukrainian are less likely to believe both false and true stories written in Russian by approximately 0.2 standard deviation units. Conversely, those who prefer Russian show increased belief in false stories in Ukrainian, though this effect is less robust. A secondary digital media literacy intervention does not increase discernment as it reduces belief in both true and false stories equally.

Religious language plays a pivotal role in shaping political behavior and attitudes. This study investigates how representatives utilize religious rhetoric when addressing the House floor and their constituents, and how this language is influenced by congressional leadership. The inauguration of openly religious Mike Johnson as House Speaker in 2023 provides a unique case to explore these dynamics. Using difference-in-differences and triple difference models, we analyze House speeches and newsletters from before and after Johnson became House Speaker to assess changes in religious speech between Republican and Democratic representatives. Our findings reveal a significant increase in newsletters using religious language sent out by Republicans after Johnson became Speaker, while religious speech on the House floor remains unchanged. Overall, our findings contribute to the literature on the relationship between religion, partisanship, and Congressional leadership, highlighting the potential influence of the Speaker of the House on religious communication to constituents.

This study assesses the validity and reliability of empirical strategies derived from the study of European populisms by applying them to the case of Canada. Using a dataset of 5,845 original tweets by Canadian federal party leaders in 2022, we compare the prevalence and intensity of three characteristic populist discourses: “people-centrism,” “anti-elitism” and “exclusion of others.” Our results raise questions about the role of party ideology in shaping populist communication styles, by revealing a convergence among opposition leaders around primarily economic representations of the “people” and political portrayals of the “elite.” We also confirm the hunch that Canada is “exceptional” with respect to the prevalence of “exclusion of others,” demonstrating that this discourse is rare and has not been embraced by mainstream politics. Finally, the study adds to the skepticism about the value of “people-centrism” to operationalizing populism, given the widespread nature of this discourse.

European countries have been important supporters of Ukraine since the 2022 invasion by Russia. Responding to the invasion, however, was not the only challenge facing these countries in 2022. A tough domestic economic situation caused by high inflation and skyrocketing energy prices gave rise to public resentment accusing governments of favoring Ukraine and Ukrainian refugees over their own citizens. Yet, communicating governments’ policies on Ukraine efficiently and having the public on board matters because lack of public support may endanger the countries’ ability to help Ukraine in the war. Given the importance of political communication, we use the case of Czechia to explore the role of empathy in political communication between Ukraine and Ukrainian refugees. We build on existing studies which suggest that empathy in communication has the potential to decrease polarization of public opinion and that candidates using empathetic communication are viewed more positively. First, in a rhetorical analysis, we demonstrate that empathy with citizens’ concerns is not a part of the government’s defense of its refugee policy. Then, in an original survey experiment, we show that contrary to expectations, expressing empathy with citizens’ concerns does not significantly increase public support for help to refugees.