The European Union has become an important leader in international environmental affairs – particularly through the negotiation of multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) with favourable terms. In this article, EU environmental leadership is studied from a new perspective, focusing on the ratification stage of environmental regime formation. Specifically, it investigates whether the EU is also capable of motivating third states to join its preferred MEAs. It is argued that third states join the EU's preferred MEAs to signal their compliance with EU environmental standards in an effort to become eligible for various rewards that the EU could potentially offer, including a credible membership perspective, access to its lucrative markets, and aid and assistance. The argument is tested by examining the ratification behaviour of 25 non‐EU Member States with regard to all 21 MEAs negotiated under the auspices of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE). The results provide robust support for the theory that EU rewards motivate third states to ratify these treaties. The results withstand a number of statistical tests, even when alternative explanatory factors such as trade intensities, transnational communication and geographic proximity are controlled for. The study is the first large‐scale demonstration of the EU's external influence at the ratification stage of environmental regime formation. By identifying three different channels of EU influence, the research permits a more refined understanding of the EU's role as a promoter of environmental protection standards.

Do more rules improve overall policy performance? To answer this question, we look at rule growth in the area of environmental policy from an aggregate perspective. We argue that impactful growth in rules crucially depends on implementation capacities. If such capacities are limited, countries are at risk of ‘empty’ rule growth where they lack the ability to implement their ever‐growing stock of policies. Hence, rules are a necessary, yet not sufficient condition for achieving sectoral policy objectives. We underpin our argument with an analysis of the impact of a new, encompassing measure of environmental rule growth covering 13 countries from 1980 to 2010. These findings call for ‘sustainable statehood’ where the growth in rules should not outpace the expansion in administrative capacities.

The climate crisis looms but support for fuel taxation is low. How to boost support? The obvious way is to make the connection to the climate crisis explicit. Many observers fear, however, that policy myopia renders this strategy ineffective: As the consequences of the climate crisis are long‐term and insecure, people are loath to pay for costly countermeasures in the short term. We look at policy distraction as a second potential drag. We argue that climate crisis‐induced support for fuel taxation can also be undermined by other salient events which divert attention. To test our argument, we conduct a large‐scale survey experiment with more than 21,000 respondents in 17 European countries. Our results show that a simple climate crisis prime raises support for fuel taxation by 12 percentage points. The effect decreases but remains substantial when stressing the long time horizon of the climate crisis. It almost disappears when other current crises (COVID‐19 and Russian military aggression) are mentioned. Thus, distraction by concurrent events is a serious impediment to mobilising support for fuel taxation.

Most countries struggle to implement CO2 reducing policies. Implementation is politically difficult since it typically forces politicians to trade‐off different concerns. The literature on how parties and members of parliament (MPs) handle these trade‐offs is sparse. We use structural topic models to study how MPs in an oil dependent environment responded to a shock in the oil price that created spatially concentrated costs of climate policies. We leverage the rapid oil price drop between parliamentary sessions and MPs’ constituency adherence in a difference‐in‐differences framework to identify if MPs respond differently to variation in the salience of trade‐offs. We find that MPs facing high political costs of climate policies tried to avoid environmental topics, while less affected MPs talked more about investments in green energy when the oil price declined. Our results suggest that the oil price bust created a ‘window of opportunity’ for advocates of the ‘ green shift’.

This article recalls a distinction between research designs that focus on either the ‘causes of effects’ or the ‘effects of causes’ and compares it to a related but not identical distinction between the aims of developing and testing theoretical explanations. Using a study on environmental policy-making in the European Union as an example, the roles of process tracing and cross-case analysis in different combinations of these categories are highlighted.

In political research, scholars have increasingly paid attention to the political challenges of integrating new public policies into existing policy subsystems, which bears important implications for the study of eco-social policy and politics. By drawing on policy integration research, we identify and discuss insights and lessons deriving from policy integration scholarship, which appear to be relevant for understanding policy linkages between the social and environmental domains especially regarding the European Green Deal (EGD). More specifically, we focus on the following two aspects: (1) the elements of policy design and implementation practices that are deemed to be helpful for ensuring equilibrium between social and environmental goals and (2) political factors that are likely to affect policy integration dynamics along the social and environmental aspects (eco-social nexus). This article contributes to the literature by tracing novel research trajectories for the eco-social debate to explore in the policy integration perspective.

Different streams of political research have pointed to two macro‐phenomena that appear as opposite at first glance: On the one hand, the increasing delegation of competencies to jurisdictions beyond the central government, resulting in the denationalization of political authority. On the other, the passing of reforms that reassert the centre of the nation state through policy integration and administrative coordination. In this article, we argue that these two processes can be analysed under a unified framework in terms of multilevel dynamics, whereby delegation ultimately elicits recentring reforms at the national level. To examine this argument and break down the mechanisms at work, we develop two sets of hypotheses: first, we theorise how the delegation of competencies to international organisations, sub‐national entities and independent agencies can eventually trigger recentring reforms; second, we propose that the capacity to act attributed to these actors also shapes such reforms. Our empirical analysis relies on an original dataset across four policy fields and 13 countries. By using multilevel regression models, we show that especially the delegation of competencies to agencies at the national level as well as the double delegation to European agencies increases the probability that governments pass recentring reforms. Furthermore, if these agencies have a stronger capacity to act, recentring becomes more likely. Our findings contribute to the development of multilevel governance as a dynamic theory of policy making.

This article examines ratification of the Kyoto Protocol across 26 transitional economies of Europe and Eurasia for the period of 1998–2009; the period between the Kyoto Protocol and the 2009 Copenhagen meeting. The dependent variable measures whether or not the country has ratified the Kyoto Protocol in a given year. The key variable of interest is the strength of domestic non-governmental organizations (NGOs). To account for the nascent stage of the NGO sector, I measure NGO strength as a “stock” and as a “flow” variable. Using an event-history model, I examine the impact of the NGO strength while controlling for other domestic-based and international drivers of treaty ratification. All time-variant independent variables are lagged by a year. My analysis suggests that the stock of domestic NGO strength is a significant predictor of the timing of ratification. Further, EU accession pressures, ratification levels in contiguous countries, and domestic economic cycle impact the timing of ratification of the treaty.

In the hydrofracturing controversy in New York advocates hotly contested notions of the problem, what should be done, by whom, and how. This controversy can be characterized as “crowded advocacy,” involving intense mobilization and counter-mobilization of advocates with competing perspectives. Extant theories about the expansion of advocacy organizations are unclear about how advocates’ interactions shape the policy arena, particularly when there is competition within and across multiple coalitions. This article contributes by asking: How do advocates’ interactive framing dynamics shape public discourse when advocacy is crowded? It assumes that advocacy in general, and framing in particular, evolves as advocates respond to each other. I find that competing “discourse coalitions” collectively influence public discourse by articulating divergent notions of (1) what constitutes credible knowledge, (2) who can speak with authority on the issues, and (3) what institutional arrangements should be activated to manage risks. The consequence is that advocates have to react to others' framing on these issues—to defend their knowledge, their credibility, and specific institutions, rather than arguing their case on the merits. The implication is that advocacy is not only the means of influence (strategy) but also creates the context of advocacy in particular ways in a crowded field.

Second-order beliefs – what political actors think others think – can shape agenda-setting and even shift public opinion. Because of the collective-action nature of mitigating human-caused climate change, such second-order political beliefs are particularly important to study. Through an innovative survey design focusing on a policy proposal to introduce meat-free days in canteens, we present the first simultaneous comparison of ordinary citizens’, locally elected political representatives’, and centrally employed public administrators’ own opinions and their ability to accurately identify the majority position of citizens. While citizens are split in their opinion on meat-free days in canteens, a clear majority of unelected elites support it, and most elected elites do not support this policy. Nonetheless, we find that all three groups tend to underestimate the level of policy support among citizens. Through rigorous analysis, we show that elected elites are significantly more likely to underestimate public support for a meat-free day compared to citizens and unelected elites. These results provide important insights into the dynamics of democratic governance and suggest that underestimation of citizens’ support for climate policies may further complicate an already challenging policy area.

Environmental issues have an international dimension, with causes and consequences that extend beyond national borders—including the effects of the policies designed to address them. This paper investigates how different levels of environmental regulation influence the long-term spatial distribution of firms and households. The results suggest that only highly asymmetric regulations align with the Pollution Haven Hypothesis, causing firms to cluster in areas with lax environmental standards. In contrast, moderate differences in regulation tend to improve environmental quality across regions and can generate positive spillovers for countries adopting greener policies, such as attracting new residents and stimulating investment. While this lends support to the Porter Hypothesis, it does so through a less conventional mechanism. Rather than fostering innovation, stringent regulations enhances regional attractiveness by expanding the market size.