How do democratic states induce citizens to comply with government directives during times of acute crisis? Focusing on the onset of the Covid‐19 pandemic in France, I argue that the tools states use to activate adherence to public health advice have predictable and variable effects on citizens’ willingness to change their routine private behaviours, both because of variation in their levels of restrictiveness but also because of differences in people's political motivations to comply with them. Using data collected in March 2020, I show that people's reports of changes in their behavioural routines are affected by the signals governments send, how they send them and the level of enforcement. I find that a nationally televised speech by President Macron calling for cooperative behaviour and announcing new restrictions elevated people's willingness to comply. Moreover, while co‐partisanship with the incumbent government increased compliance reports before the President's primetime television address, presidential approval boosted reports of compliance after.

When reporting on election results, the media declare parties as election ‘winners’ or ‘losers’, which has important consequences for voter perceptions and government formation. This article investigates news coverage of parties’ electoral performance in proportional representation systems, in which election results are often less clear‐cut compared to majoritarian systems. It tests the extent to which news coverage of parties’ electoral performance is based on objective measures or on party ideology. Its focus on the aftermath of the 2019 European Parliament election allows holding the electoral context constant across the 16 countries under study. Results from a Heckman selection model show that alongside a party's status as plurality winner and changes in electoral support, parties with radical socio‐cultural policy positions are both more likely to be covered and declared election winners in the news. These results have important implications for citizens’ attitudes and perceived party legitimacy in democratic societies.

This article explores how citizens’ legitimacy perceptions are affected when decision makers deviate from the recommendations of a deliberative mini-public (DMP), and what can be done to mitigate negative consequences. The results of a preregistered vignette experiment in Belgium (N = 2659) support our two main expectations. First, citizens’ legitimacy perceptions decrease when politicians do not follow the outcome of a DMP. Second, when politicians communicate responsively about this – meaning that they show respect for the recommendations and publicly justify why they deviated from them – legitimacy perceptions substantially increase, generally reaching the level of those cases where recommendations are followed. Diving deeper into this result also shows that for this effect to occur, citizens must find the provided reasoning valid and acceptable. Finally, the results hold among both policy winners and policy losers. These findings have implications for the literature on democratic innovations, empirical legitimacy, and political representation, but also for policymakers striving to combine arrangements of public participation that go beyond triviality, with political responsibility for the whole, and sustained mechanisms for accountability.

What can policy makers do in day-to-day decision making to strengthen citizens' belief that the political system is legitimate? Much literature has highlighted that the realization of citizens' personal preferences in policy making is an important driver of legitimacy beliefs. We argue that citizens, in addition, also care about whether a policy represents the preferences of the majority of citizens, even if their personal preference diverges from the majority's. Using the case of the European Union (EU) as a system that has recurringly experienced crises of public legitimacy, we conduct a vignette survey experiment in which respondents assess the legitimacy of fictitious EU decisions that vary in how they were taken and whose preferences they represent. Results from original surveys conducted in the five largest EU countries show that the congruence of EU decisions not only with personal opinion but also with different forms of majority opinion significantly strengthens legitimacy beliefs. We also show that the most likely mechanism behind this finding is the application of a ‘consensus heuristic’, by which respondents use majority opinion as a cue to identify legitimate decisions. In contrast, procedural features such as the consultation of interest groups or the inclusiveness of decision making in the institutions have little effect on legitimacy beliefs. These findings suggest that policy makers can address legitimacy deficits by strengthening majority representation, which will have both egotropic and sociotropic effects.

The Great Recession that started in 2007/2008 has been the worst economic downturn since the crisis of the 1930s in Europe. It led to a major sovereign debt crisis, which is arguably the biggest challenge for the European Union (EU) and its common currency. Not since the 1950s have advanced democracies experienced such a dramatic external imposition of austerity and structural reform policies through inter‐ or supranational organisations such as the EU and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or as implicitly requested by international financial markets. Did this massive interference with the room for maneuver of parliaments and governments in many countries erode support for national democracy in the crisis since 2007? Did citizens realise that their national democratic institutions were no longer able to effectively decide on major economic and social policies, on economic and welfare state institutions? And did they react by concluding that this constrained democracy no longer merited further support? These are the questions guiding this article, which compares 26 EU countries in 2007–2011 and re‐analyses 78 national surveys. Aggregate data from these surveys is analysed in a time‐series cross‐section design to examine changes in democratic support at the country level. The hypotheses also are tested at the individual level by estimating a series of cross‐classified multilevel logistic regression models. Support for national democracy – operationalised as satisfaction with the way democracy works and as trust in parliament – declined dramatically during the crisis. This was caused both by international organisations and markets interfering with national democratic procedures and by the deteriorating situation of the national economy as perceived by individual citizens.

Interest groups are often included as key actors in consultation processes, with the aim of making policy more effective, fair and representative. At the same time, their influence is frequently viewed with suspicion. This research note uses survey experiments in Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States (N = 9,357) to explore how the ties citizens hold to different types of interest groups affect their perceived legitimacy of involving them in parliamentary hearings. We find that affective, behavioural and attitudinal ties shape how citizens evaluate the representation of groups, but that there are important differences between ties to different group types: ties to cause groups representing societal interests are more consequential than ties to business interests. These findings underline important heterogeneity in how different interest groups relate to their constituencies and have implications for accountability relationships between citizens and policymakers. The heightened sensitivity of citizens with ties to cause groups regarding their representation underscores the need to actively nurture and involve these groups in policy making.

International nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) are frequently criticized for failing to adequately represent or engage with grassroots stakeholders. Yet most explanations of this shortcoming have focused on factors external to the organizations, e.g., economic pressures that privilege donor interests. What has been largely lacking is an examination of the role of internal INGO characteristics. We address this by examining INGOs’ legitimacy standards: how INGOs understand themselves to be doing the right thing and seek to convey that righteousness to others. Drawing on the literature from business ethics and organizational behavior, we show that organizations’ self-selected standards of legitimacy are key drivers of behavior. Using an analysis of 57 American INGO websites, we identify 11 legitimacy types and examine their usage. We find that while most INGOs make a series of technical legitimacy claims that seem designed to attract donors, they simultaneously employ additional legitimacy standards that do not seem to be externally dictated. These additional standards generally prioritize adherence to a cause rather than stakeholder input. The findings suggest that challenges to INGO representivity or responsiveness result not only from external pressures, but also from INGOs’ own choice of values.

Small States in World Markets is about political efficacy and legitimation rather than scoring who is ahead in the economic sweepstakes. Its case for democratic corporatism rests on norms, particularly stability, rather than on narrow measures of economic efficiency. But stability, and the efficacious management of the economy and social problems requires a degree of technocracy that undermines the legitimacy of the management process itself by helping to produce populist revolts.

This paper draws upon accountability and legitimacy theories to explore for what social enterprises are accountable, how they communicate accountability, and to what extent they publicly communicate accountability. Case study methodology was employed, examining four work-integrated social enterprises in Australia. Data collection involved interviews with managers of each social enterprise, and a review of various secondary data including social enterprise websites and internal and external reports. Findings reveal a temporal dimension of accountability, as social enterprises acknowledged their dual social and financial accountability, but prioritised financial over social performance. Communication of social performance was limited, with publicly available reports partial and selective in nature. Communication of financial performance was even more limited, reporting typically directed to internal stakeholders. Implications include the need for social enterprises to communicate social and financial performance more broadly, in order to advance their legitimacy from moral (based on intentions) to consequential (based on achievements).

In accounts of institutional change, discursive institutionalists point to the role of economic and political ideas in upending institutional stability and providing the raw material for the establishment of a new institutional setup. This approach has typically entailed a conceptualisation of ideas as coherent and monolithic and actors as almost automatically following the precepts of the ideas they hold and support. Recent theorising stresses how ideas are in fact composite and heterogeneous, and actors pragmatic and strategic in how they employ ideas in political struggles. However, this change of focus has, until recently, not included how foundational ideas of a polity, often referred to as ‘public philosophies’, are theorised to impact on institution‐building. Drawing on French Pragmatic Sociology, and taking as a starting point recent efforts within discursive institutionalism to conceptualise the dynamic nature of public philosophies, this article seeks to foreground moral justification in accounts of ideational and institutional change. It suggests that public philosophies are reflexively used by actors in continual processes of normative justification that may produce significant policy shifts over time. The empirical relevance of the argument is demonstrated through an analysis of gradual ideational and institutional change in French labour market policy, specifically the development from the state‐guaranteed minimum income scheme of 1988 to the neoliberal make‐work‐pay logic of the 2009 scheme, Revenu de solidarité active. The analysis shows that public and moral justifications have underpinned and gradually shaped these radical changes.

A previous article in this journal presented a conceptualisation of the political legitimacy of the state and its operationalisation for 72 countries c. 2000. This article provides an updated dataset of state legitimacy for 52 countries c. 2008 using the same conceptualisation. It presents a brief discussion of the comparative results of the two datasets.

This paper explores the legitimacy of third sector organizations in the policy process in the United Kingdom. It draws on empirical research to examine how legitimacy is defined, both by third sector organizations and by those they target within government. The paper argues that while many third sector organizations give high priority to political forms of legitimacy—in the sense of participatory structures and accountability to members and beneficiaries—government is generally more likely to give priority to technical forms of legitimacy, e.g., the quality of research and the ability to implement policy. Nonetheless, political legitimacy is still important, first because this is the form of legitimacy that third sector organizations claim for themselves and second because, as government gives way to governance with an increase in partnerships and collaboration, the dilemmas faced by third sector organizations in achieving political legitimacy are being faced on a broader canvas.

Civil societies are usually seen as facilitators of democracy or as oppositional powers withstanding authoritarian rule. However, more and more often civil society organizations (CSOs) appear to contribute to the legitimacy of non-democratic incumbents. Taking the example of contemporary Russia, this paper argues that state funding for CSOs under authoritarian regime conditions serves for securing regime legitimacy in two respects—by supporting CSOs contribution to public welfare and by transmitting state-led legitimacy discourse to the civil society sector. The analysis of applications submitted between 2013 and 2016 to the Presidential Grant Competition (PGC), the biggest public funding programme for CSOs in Russia, shows that the state is (1) supporting CSO activities above all in social, health and education-related fields, and (2) privileging projects that relate to a state-led conservative public discourse not only but foremost within those welfare-related fields. These results highlight the importance of investigating state support to CSOs in order to access the changing role of civil society under authoritarian regime conditions.

This article examines the links between legitimacy, politicisation and the rise of political dissensus in the context of the implementation of the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF). In particular, it assesses democratic, technocratic and procedural legitimacy against the vertical, inter-level relations between EU institutions and national authorities in the elaboration of the National Recovery and Resilience Plans (NRRPs), with a particular focus on the case of Italy. The article shows that the implementation of the RRF tends to centralise powers in national executives and their technical-administrative structures to the detriment of national legislatures. This gives rise to a “legitimacy disequilibrium” in the implementation of the RRF characterised by a strong technocratic and a weak democratic legitimacy. Challenging the coordinative Europeanisation literature, the article thus argues that the implementation of the RRF is potentially subject to dynamics of politicisation. As a matter of fact, the observed legitimacy disequilibrium resulting from the implementation of the RRF is open to politicisation from party actors in the member states, thus assuming salience in national public debates. Finally, the article illustrates how the politicisation of NRRPs can become a factor in the wider process of political dissensus in the EU, involving contestation by different types of actors (EU institutions, member state governments and national parties), operating at different levels (EU and national), and with different aims.