Chapter 3 - The epistemic “ought”

Summary

This chapter considers whether, in epistemology, ought implies can. It offers an account of the epistemic ought. This account of oughts and cans will be virtue theoretic in that epistemic norms are cashed out in terms of proper functioning and essential kinds. In order to isolate the kind of can that is implied by the epistemic ought, the chapter considers three recently proposed views of the epistemic ought. It turns out that, while each of these views is insightful, and to some extent true, none of them is explanatorily adequate. Nicholas Wolterstorff clarifies the notion of proper functioning at issue by appeal to other, typically non-epistemic. Richard Feldman takes the epistemic ought to fall into a general category of ought that he calls role oughts. The criticism of Feldman's account of the epistemic ought was anticipated by Hilary Kornblith, in an article critical of Feldman's account of the ought.