Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Contributors
- Preface
- Introduction
- PART I NORMATIVE REASONS FOR BELIEF
- PART II REASONS AND EPISTEMIC JUSTIFICATION
- 6 Reasons and belief's justification
- 7 Perception, generality, and reasons
- 8 Immediate warrant, epistemic responsibility, and Moorean dogmatism
- 9 Primitively rational belief-forming processes
- 10 What does it take to “have” a reason?
- 11 Knowledge and reasons for belief
- 12 What is the swamping problem?
- References
- Index
6 - Reasons and belief's justification
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 July 2011
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Contributors
- Preface
- Introduction
- PART I NORMATIVE REASONS FOR BELIEF
- PART II REASONS AND EPISTEMIC JUSTIFICATION
- 6 Reasons and belief's justification
- 7 Perception, generality, and reasons
- 8 Immediate warrant, epistemic responsibility, and Moorean dogmatism
- 9 Primitively rational belief-forming processes
- 10 What does it take to “have” a reason?
- 11 Knowledge and reasons for belief
- 12 What is the swamping problem?
- References
- Index
Summary
INTRODUCTION
There's little to say about justification that cannot be said in terms of reasons. If you Φ and thereby do all that the reasons demanded, it cannot be that you oughtn't have Φ'd. If it's not the case that you oughtn't have Φ'd, there's no further question as to whether your Φ-ing was justified. Having done all that you should, there's no reason left standing to demand that you refrain from Φ-ing. There's nothing that could stand in the way of the justification of your actions or attitudes. Here's our first connection. If you've done all that the reasons demand, nothing prevents your actions or attitudes from being justified. On the other hand, we shouldn't believe or act without adequate justification. When you oughtn't to Φ, there's an undefeated reason that demands that you refrain from Φ-ing. It's because of this reason that Φ-ing is beyond justification and the most you could hope for is an excuse. Think of cases of conflicting reasons. The only way to justify Φ-ing in the face of reasons that count against Φ-ing is to point to considerations that defeat these reasons. If the reasons you need cannot be found (i.e. reasons that defeat the case against Φ-ing), we can say that Φ-ing cannot be justified because there are reasons that demand that you not Φ that are not defeated. Here's our second connection. Fail to do what the relevant reasons demand and your actions and attitudes are beyond justification.
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- Reasons for Belief , pp. 111 - 130Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2011
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