The 1996 cerebrospinal meningitis epidemic in Nigeria exemplified a medical situation that was linked with political concerns at the local, national, and international levels. It is argued that these political aspects must be understood, as they have implications for the treatment of future outbreaks. This article examines local attempts to stem the epidemic, on the basis of participant observation and epidemiological data collected from the north of Kaduna State. The epidemic is then considered in the national context: general deterioration of the health care system associated with economic decline, a national structural adjustment programme and crisis of political leadership. The local and national contexts of the 1996 epidemic are related to the view, held by many Nigerians, that reports of the epidemic's severity and the subsequent Saudi ban on Nigerians making the pilgrimage to Mecca reflected international politics, particularly the uneasy relations between the Nigerian, Saudi Arabian, and US governments, as well as health concerns. The article concludes with some recommendations for a national policy and for community health initiatives that take the politics and economics of cerebrospinal meningitis immunisation and treatment into account.

The history of the town of Mokolo, in the heart of the land of the Mafa (in northern Cameroon), exhibits a specific pattern of urbanisation that seems characteristic of Islamic frontier zones generally in Africa. The town was founded as a settlement for converted slaves towards the end of the nineteenth century by Fulbe chiefs who regularly raided the area. Since that time urbanisation has largely gone hand in hand with Islamisation. It has involved, therefore, a marked change of identity for Mafa converts in the town, with drastic consequences for their relationship with their areas of origin in the mountains. The article emphasises, moreover, that the implications of Islamisation/urbanisation differ along gender lines. Although for both men and women the Muslim community in town provided specific forms of social security, the motives for migration, and the ways men and women were included in the urban community, differed sharply. In the 1980s, owing to political changes at the national level, the pressure to convert to Islam decreased throughout northern Cameroon. Since then the number of migrants to town who do not convert has increased rapidly. Mokolo used to be a Muslim town. In the 1990s, however, it has become more and more a Mafa town, and thus symbolises the revival of Mafa ethnicity as a truly region-wide force.

Since 1982 the Mouvement des forces démocratique casamançais has been fighting for the independence of the Casamance region of Senegal. In 1989, when the Mouvement initiated a sustained military campaign, Senegal's official and independent press began to provide intensive coverage of its activities and objectives. This article documents the arguments for and against Casamançais independence as documented by Senegal's press in the year following the resurgence of this conflict. The Mouvement's leadership has consistently maintained that its efforts to win independence for the Casamance are legitimate because France created the Casamance. The French, it argues, never intended the Casamance to be administratively incorporated into Senegal. Conversely, those opposed to the Mouvement have attempted to delegitimise its activities by claiming that it represents the interests of the Jola, just one of the Casamance's many ethnic groups. It is argued that the Senegalese government and other opponents of the Mouvement have attempted to label the independence movement an ethnic movement because of a distinction in African political ideology between nationalism and ethnicity. According to this ideology, nationalism, and other legitimate forms of political mobilisation, should represent a plural constituency. Those that represent the narrow interests of a single ethnic group are not considered legitimate.