In this essay I suggest a correlation between the integration level of an international institution and the public discourse about the lack of democracy and legitimacy in the institution’s structure and functioning. This discourse includes ideas for remedial action at both the national and international levels; it also becomes inevitably intertwined with other reform proposals that may call for an incremental or—particularly in the case of a more integrated organization—a radical restructuring. Having originated in the highly integrated European Community, the debate on the “democracy-legitimacy deficit” has reached other institutions, particularly the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the international financial bodies, and has become one component of the backlash rhetoric against “globalization.”

The aftermath of military conflict can be an occasion for transforming politics and society. In postwar Europe, aided by the Marshall Plan, statesmen such as Jean Monnet and Konrad Adenauer rebuilt the smoking ruins of an international conflict into an economic community with a strong democratic ethos, a common political identity, and a workable social balance. The old rivalries of the continent were abated by joint-security commitments, and the sense of Europe as a political space was strengthened by the human rights standards of the Helsinki process.

The demise of custom as a source of international law has been widely forecasted. This is because both the nature and the relative importance of custom’s constituent elements are contentious. At the same time, custom has become an increasingly significant source of law in important areas such as human rights obligations. Codification conventions, academic commentary, and the case law of the International Court of Justice (the Court) have also contributed to a contemporary resurrection of custom. These developments have resulted in two apparently opposing approaches, which I term “traditional custom” and “modern custom.” The renaissance of custom requires the articulation of a coherent theory that can accommodate its classic foundations and contemporary developments. This article seeks to provide an enriched theoretical account of custom that incorporates both the traditional and the modern approaches rather than advocating one approach over the other.

Since the founding of the United Nations, the number of treaties and the matters they address have expanded vastly. It is increasingly common to find the same subjects addressed in complementary global, regional, and bilateral treaties. Many of these treaties contain provisions on the settlement of disputes regarding the interpretation or application of that treaty itself. Only some of those provisions establish compulsoryjurisdiction. These circumstances suggest an increasing probability that a dispute will arise between states under the substantive provisions of two complementary treaties with dispute settlement clauses, only one of which provides for compulsory arbitration or adjudication either in general or with respect to that dispute.

Although still in the early stages of their institutional life, die International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and for Rwanda (ICTR) provide a unique empirical basis for evaluating the impact of international criminaljustice on postconflict peace building. The pursuit of justice may be dismissed as a well-intentioned, but futile, ritualistic attempt to restore equilibrium to a moral universe overwhelmed by evil. Moreover, measuring the capacity of punishment to prevent criminal conduct is an elusive undertaking, especially when a society is gripped by widespread habitual violence and an inverted morality has elevated otherwise “deviant” crimes to the highest expression of group loyalty. Yet an appreciation of die determinate causes of such large-scale violence demonstrates that stigmatization of criminal conduct may have far-reaching consequences, promoting postconflict reconciliation and changing die broader rules of international relations and legitimacy.

How does the World Trade Organization (WTO) relate to the wider corpus of public international law? What, in turn, is the role of public international law in WTO dispute settlement? This paper aims at resolving these two difficult questions. No straightforward answers to them can be found in WTO rules. Yet answering them has major ramifications both for the WTO (is the WTO a largely “self-contained regime” or is it not?) and for international law (is the future of international law further fragmentation or increased unity?). This exercise will be conducted under the law as it stands today—that is, the law as it may be invoked at present before the WTO “judiciary” (panels and the Appellate Body). Of course, WTO members (viz., the WTO “legislator”) could clarify or change the relationship between WTO rules and other rules of international law. However, it is unlikely that such changes will occur any time soon. In part I, I examine the general relationship between public international law and WTO law. I then assess, more specifically, the role of public international law in WTO dispute settlement in part II and offer some conclusions in part III.

The most salient feature of dispute settlement in the World Trade Organization (WTO) is the possibility of authorizing a trade sanction against a scofflaw member government. This feature, however, is a mixed blessing. On the one hand, it fortifies WTO rules and promotes respect for them. On the other hand, it drains away the benefits of free trade and provokes “sanction envy.” Undoubtedly, putting teeth in the WTO was one of the key achievements of the Uruguay Round ending in 1994, and a very significant step in the evolution of international economic law.1 Yet after six years of experience, WTO observers are questioning whether the availability of trade enforcement is sensible.2 This article undertakes an appraisal of trade sanctions as a WTO instrument, and concludes that this practice undermines the trading system. In view of this dysfunction, the article explores alternatives to trade enforcement and points to some softer measures that might have promise.

The commitment of the United States to its treaty obligations has recently been put in question by two persistent histories of treaty violation—the refusal to pay U.S. United Nations dues in full until the contentious and tenuous settlement of early 2001 and the repeated failure to advise alien prisoners of their rights under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. Official advocacy of an antimissile defense system has also raised concern about the United States’ continuing fidelity to the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.

Transitional states have elected divergent strategies in dealing with their pasts. Some have opted not to confront the past at all by invoking general amnesty laws, whereas others have determined that some form of accountability is needed. Postapartheid South Africa presents a novel illustration of the attempts of a transitional state to balance the legal, political, practical, and cultural interests of its society as it moves toward the democratic ideal. In this vein, the purpose of this paper is twofold: first, to examine whether individual amnesty was the optimal method of accountability for South Africa to deal with its past; and second, to analyze the extent to which the Amnesty Committee has succeeded in its application of the individual-amnesty provisions and the effects of those efforts.

Within the span of only a few months in 1999, the United Nations was faced with one of the greatest challenges in its recent history: to serve as an interim government in Kosovo and East Timor.

In Kosovo, in response to massive attacks on the Kosovar Albanian population, including orchestrated and wide-scale “ethnic cleansing,” the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) conducted an eleven-week air campaign against Yugoslav and Serbian security forces and paramilitary groups. The campaign resulted in the agreement of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to withdraw all Yugoslav and Serbian security forces from the territory. On June 10,1999, one day after the suspension of NATO’s air strikes, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1244 (1999), establishing the United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK).

A “second liberation” swept the African continent beginning in 1989. In many places, multiparty elections and a measured optimism gained ground. Yet during the 1990s, the spirit of moderation and tolerance typical of the early independence movements began to fray. The recent armed conflicts of Central and West Africa and the columns of refugees crossing borders have served as a blunt reminder of the fragility of many of the continent’s democratic experiments.

In this new era, law plays a central, visible, yet delicate role in many peace settlements and democratic transitions, from South Africa to Ghana. Africa’s courts have been challenged to provide the kinds of basic dispute resolution that lie at the core of what it means to be a “government.” At the same time, Africanjudges are mindful of Learned Hand’s caution in The Spirit of Liberty, taped above a secretary’s desk in Uganda. “Liberty lies in the hearts of men and women,” Hand wrote. “[W]hen it dies there, no constitution, no law, no court can save it; no constitution, no law, no court can even do much to help it.” The success of a postconflict transition will depend, in part, on the role of courts in sustaining a spirit of liberty and tolerance in their societies.