The modern state, by contrast to the Aristotelian regime, is essentially impersonal. For Machiavelli, stato is extremely personal; yet, it is argued, Machiavelli laid the foundation for the modern state in his general and impartial advice to acquire stato. The argument proceeds by an analysis of Machiavelli's use of stato, after a brief consideration of its medieval counterparts.

Hegel's theory of crime and punishment is tested by raising against it three difficult questions: Why must we punish the criminal? Must the punishment fit the crime? Is insanity an acceptable defense? It is argued that a Hegelian approach can generate plausible answers to these questions, answers that help to explain and justify a number of our own morally implicated practices. It is further argued that Hegel's method of arriving at such answers is by no means alien to those employed by contemporary analytic philosophers.

Has the scope of public planning in contemporary capitalist economies promoted or hindered economic growth and income distribution? We explore this question by assessing the impact of various mechanisms for raising government revenues on investment, growth, and income distribution in 22 developed market economy countries. The article considers whether growth and distribution are affected differently by governments' relative reliance on personal and corporate income taxes, social security contributions, property taxes, and sales and value added taxes, or by the relative progressivity of tax mechanisms. Our findings lend support to the assertion that fiscal instruments (especially personal income taxes) can be used successfully to achieve greater income equality. On the other hand, these findings run counter to the conventional notion that an automatic trade-off exists between an active public sector and a dynamic, expanding economy: although there is surely some tension between the economic goals of growth and equality, it is not at all clear that they are necessarily incompatible or that government can contribute only to the latter.

In two recent articles, Inglehart (1981, 1982) arrives at the conclusion that the decline of materialism in postwar Japan is the result of generational change and period effects. Aging effects cannot be demonstrated empirically. This article challenges his views. It will be shown that a life-cycle explanation can claim as much empirical evidence as a generational explanation, as long as the overall goodness of fit and the sign and strength of the age effects and cohort effects are the only criteria the decision is based upon. Particularly, a two-dimensional age-period model fits the data nearly as well as the cohort-period model that Inglehart proposes. Theoretical considerations, however, plead for a three-dimensional solution that includes some cohort effects beside period and aging effects for those generations that grew up in the postwar era. Such a model can also be established empirically.

Although France is not among those countries most frequently cited as examples of the trend toward corporatism, some observers have seen evidence of corporatist patterns of interest group-government contacts. Others assert that French groups have a distinctive protest form of action, and still others see France as a preserve of traditional pluralism. Interviews with 99 French interest group leaders in 1979 suggest that the pluralist model most accurately describes the actions reported by these leaders. Although the group leaders described some corporatist activities, such as participation in statutory commissions, and indicated a willingness to engage in protest, the most common actions were those more consistent with pluralism: personal contacts with government officials and lobbying. These activities were also the forms judged to be most effective in influencing policy, although the overall impression was of a political system in which organized interests had relatively limited impact.

This article extends recent work on political tolerance to a cross-national context. In it we argue that a content-controlled measurement strategy is ideal for cross-cultural research, and we examine the dual processes of target group selection and of deciding the extent to which one tolerates target groups, once they are selected. We argue that the first process is rooted in concerns of social adjustment, and the second in externalization and object appraisal. This leads to a certain set of predictions, which we modify slightly when we combine this social psychological theory with a cross-national research design, one we ultimately label a modified most-different-systems design. The same individual level model is estimated on the U.S. and on the Israeli data, and the results suggest that although the social and psychological processes underlying political tolerance are very similar in the two contexts, there are significant political differences between the two nations which do affect the impact of individual-level variables on tolerance.

This article translates several explanations for contextual effects upon politics into mathematical, dynamic representations. These representations are used to consider several questions. Under what circumstances does the social context lead to durability and volatility in mass political preferences? Do different specifications of contextual influence lead to different conclusions regarding its dynamic consequences? Does the social context have different dynamic implications for individual preference and for the aggregate preferences of the population as a whole? These questions are not addressed by gathering and analyzing data, but rather by examining the deductive consequences of the various explanations for contextual influence.

Recent studies of party activists in the United States have shown an influx of issue-oriented activists into the presidential nominating process since the 1960s. These new activists are described as dogmatic ideologues more interested in promoting their issue concerns than in nominating an electable candidate. Based on our survey of 17,628 delegates attending party conventions in 11 states during the 1980 Democratic and Republican presidential nomination campaigns, we show that activists in both parties weighed electability more heavily than ideology in choosing a party nominee. This finding is in sharp contrast to a strong preference among these same activists for ideological purity over electability when they are presented with questions, typical of past studies, that pose the trade-off only in very general and abstract terms. A partial replication using data from the CPS survey of delegates to the 1972 Democratic national convention supports our findings and leads us to assert that previous studies have underestimated the concern of contemporary party activists with winning.

This article presents a model of individuals' party identification that contrasts with previous models. Past models, with the few recent exceptions noted, assume a hierarchical relationship either from identification to other aspects of political behavior, such as the perception and evaluation of issues and candidates, or from these behaviors to party identifications. The model discussed here places party within a dynamic concept of the electoral process and tests several hypotheses about factors producing changes in identifications. The first factor, consistent with the spatial-type issue voting models, estimates the effects of the relative proximity of each party to the individual's own policy preferences. Second, we examine the effect of the actual voting decision on subsequent identifications, with the expectation that if votes differ from previous identifications, there is a resulting shift in partisanship. Finally, we examine the hypothesis that identifications become less susceptible to change as people age and accumulate political experience. When combined with other research, the results indicate a model of the electoral process in which party identifications are both influenced by circumstances specific to each election and influence other behaviors. This nonrecursive model has a number of implications for the development and evolution of individual and aggregate partisanship. These implications are discussed at the end of the article.

A unidimensional spatial model is proposed in this article. Although its formal structure parallels the spatial model of electoral competition, this model examines the decisions of individuals as they choose whether or not to become activists in one of two political parties. An individual “calculus of participation” is developed that is similar to the spatial interpretation of the “calculus of voting.” This calculus is then generalized by examining conditions that may hold for aggregate activism probabilities, and the relationship between the two forms is investigated. Some results are then presented which concern the distributions of activists in the two parties. These results in general conform to the existence of “party cleavages,” in which there are two stable (equilibrium) distributions of activists, such that the two parties' activists are relatively cohesive internally and relatively distinctive externally. Finally, some suggestions are offered about how this model can be combined with the spatial model of candidate competition to provide a more complete model of elections.