We augment the survey-based studies of attitudes toward feminism with comparative, contextual perspectives emphasizing the importance of social structure and culture. In doing so, we are able to assess the relative merits of two very different structural theories. Most researchers implicitly assume a simple linear effect of social context on attitudes. On the other hand, some early works on American conservatism suggest to us that status discontent may be a better explanation. We explicate these two approaches and derive a series of testable hypotheses for each. We then examine the validity of these theories utilizing data from nine European nations.

Recent literature attributes the relative scarcity of open international markets to the prisoner's dilemma structure of state preferences with respect to trade. We argue that the prisoner's dilemma representation does not reflect the most critical aspect of free trade agreements in an anarchic international system, namely, their security externalities. We consider these external effects explicitly. Doing so leads us to two conclusions: (1) free trade is more likely within, rather than across, political-military alliances; and (2) alliances are more likely to evolve into free-trade coalitions if they are embedded in bipolar systems than in multipolar systems. Using data drawn from an 80-year period beginning in 1905, we test these hypotheses. The results of the analysis make it clear that alliances do have a direct, statistically significant, and large impact on bilateral trade flows and that this relationship is stronger in bipolar, rather than in multipolar, systems.

Electoral competition is a concept that has played a central role in much of the state politics literature. One commonly used indicator of competition in the states is the Ranney index. We offer an alternative indicator of competition, one based on district-level outcomes of state legislative elections. After evaluating both indicators in terms of validity and reliability, the analysis suggests that the district-level indicator is both empirically and intuitively superior as a measure of electoral competition. The implications of this finding are discussed.

The Tiebout model of competition in the local market for public goods is an important and controversial theory. The current debate revolves around the apparent disparity between macro empirical studies that show greater efficiency in the supply of public goods in polycentric regions compared to consolidated ones and micro evidence of widespread citizen-consumer ignorance, which has been used to argue that individual actions cannot plausibly lead to efficiency-enhancing competition between local governments. We argue that competitive markets can be driven by a subset of informed consumers who shop around between alternate suppliers and produce pressure for competitive outcomes from which all consumers benefit. Using data from a survey of over five hundred households, we analyze the role of these marginal citizen-consumers and incorporate the costs of information gathering and the strategic interests of local governments into the competitive market model.

Each year thousands of cases and litigants come to the Supreme Court. How can the Court find the most important cases to decide? The law of obscenity illustrates particularly well the Court's problem as it constructs its plenary agenda. Using data drawn from petitions for certiorari and jurisdictional statements filed with the Supreme Court from 1955 to 1987, we formulate and test a model of case selection in which professional obscenity lawyers and organized interests figure as critical elements in the process of agenda building. We also encounter strong evidence of the Court's differential treatment of several different litigants. Moreover, the calculus of selection changed markedly over time, as the Court itself changed; the Burger Court and Warren Court weighed several of the criteria quite differently.

In spite of the fact that political eras in the United States are widely (and often ambiguously) defined in terms of a general policy sentiment or mood, political scientists have done little in the way of rigorous analysis regarding this subject. I argue that shifts in domestic policy sentiment along a liberal–conservative continuum may be understood in part as responses to changing economic expectations. Specifically, expectations of a strong economy result in greater support for liberal domestic policies, whereas anticipation of declining economic conditions pushes the national policy mood to the right. Using quarterly data for the period 1968–88, I present a multiple-time-series error correction model that lends considerable support to the hypothesis.

When the United States began its overt military conflict with Iraq in January 1991, the news media focused unceasingly on the Gulf crisis. Using national survey data, we show that this emphasis altered the ingredients of Americans' assessments of George Bush's performance. After the war, assessments were based more on beliefs about Bush's effectiveness in managing the conflict and less on confidence in his handling of other foreign relations matters or the domestic economy. Consequently, Bush's overall performance ratings increased dramatically following the war. We also show that the media's impact on political judgments was regulated by citizens' levels of political knowledge, exposure to political news, and interest in the war. Greater impact was associated with higher levels of knowledge and lower levels of exposure and interest. These findings challenge traditional views of these dimensions of political involvement and support a view derived from contemporary psychological theories of information processing.

The destruction of the space shuttle Challenger was a tremendous blow to American space policy. To what extent was this loss the result of organizational factors at the National Aeronautics and Space Administration? To discuss this question analytically, we need a theory of organizational reliability and agency behavior. Martin Landau's work on redundancy and administrative performance provides a good starting point for such an effort. Expanding on Landau's work, I formulate a more comprehensive theory of organizational reliability that incorporates both type I and type II errors. These principles are then applied in a study of NASA and its administrative behavior before and after the Challenger accident.

I test two theories of the political processes of trade unions. The first argues that wage moderation depends on a centralized labor movement. The second contends that, institutional conditions permitting, unions' coordination of bargaining strategies is sufficient. Coordination is most likely to he achieved when there are small number of unions that do not compete for members, that is, when union monopoly is high. Important empirical anomalies may be resolved by analyzing the effects of union centralization and monopoly separately, rather than combining them into a composite index of corporatism. Reanalyzing comparative data from Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development countries between 1963 and 1985 largely corroborates the hypothesis that monopoly is more important than either centralization or composite indices of corporatism for national economic performance. The conceptual rationale underlying indices of corporatism should be reexamined.

In his article in the June 1991 issue of this Review, Ted Hopf challenged the argument that bipolar systems are inherently more stable than multipolar configurations of power. He reported that the international situation in sixteenth century Europe became only marginally more stable with a shift from a multipolar to a bipolar system. He argued for attention to the offensive-defensive balance, rather than systemic polarity. Manus Midlarsky accounts for Hopf's findings, and for evidence of multipolarity and increased conflict in the early seventeenth and twentieth centuries, by proposing a relationship between polarity and war that is contingent on scarcity of desired international resources. Midlarsky argues for more attention to contingent relationships generally and draws implications for current and future probabilities of conflict in a multipolar world. Hopf responds by pointing out the need for further development of Midlarsky's analysis, the possible compatibility between Midlarsky's formulation and his own focus on the offensive-defensive balance, and the desirability of a productive unity of the two research programs.

In their 1987 article in this Review, Muller and Seligson used logged ordinary least-squares (LOLS) to estimate the effect of income inequality on cross-national levels of deaths by political violence. T. Y. Wang challenges the robustness of the main conclusion and argues for the application of a maximum likelihood approach—the exponential Poisson regression (EPR) model—rather than LOLS. He concludes that the widely used LOLS approach yields misleading conclusions when applied to event count data. Dixon, Muller, and Seligson replicate previous work using both LOLS and EPR approaches and conclude that in most—but not all—respects the two approaches yield similar results, supporting the effect of inequality when the specifications are identical. They also argue (in response to concerns expressed by Brockett 1992) that the inequality results are robust when account is taken systematically of the best information on underreporting of deaths.

Modern realism claims that the fear that others will enjoy relatively greater benefits frequently impedes international cooperation. Recent articles in this Review by Duncan Snidal and Robert Powell modeled conditions under which the impact of relative gains varied. Joseph Grieco criticizes Snidal's model as based on assumptions that allow him to avoid, rather than confront, the realist arguments. He also argues that Powell's model, while constructive, ignores important additional sources of sensitivity to relative gains. In response, Powell discusses the value of alternative assumptions about preferences and constraints in international relations. Snidal defends his analysis and presents an additional proof to support the independence of his central result—the diminishing impact of relative gains with increasing numbers of states—from assumptions of concern to Grieco. Both responders emphasize their work as contributing to a contextually rich theory of international politics that builds on elements of both realism and neo-liberalism.

In their 1990 Review article, Ian Budge and Richard Hofferbert analyzed the relationship between party platform emphases, control of the White House, and national government spending priorities, reporting strong evidence of a “party mandate” connection between them. Gary King and Michael Laver successfully replicate the original analysis, critique the interpretation of the causal effects, and present a reanalysis showing that platforms have small or nonexistent effects on spending. In response, Budge, Hofferbert, and Michael McDonald agree that their language was somewhat inconsistent on both interactions and causality but defend their conceptualization of “mandates” as involving only an association, not necessarily a causal connection, between party commitments and government policy. Hence, while the causes of government policy are of interest, noncausal associations are sufficient as evidence of party mandates in American politics.

The mechanical effect of electoral systems, identified by Maurice Duverger, can be estimated by means of a quantitative model. The model predicts the range within which the effective number of parties in a district should fall for a given magnitude (number of seats) of the district. At the national level, a related model predicts the effective number of parties based on the effective magnitude and the number of seats in the national assembly. The institutional variables considered—magnitude and assembly size—define a great portion of the structural constraints within which a given country's politics must take place. The model developed provides a good fit to data in spite of its having been developed from outrageously simple starting assumptions.