Feminist analysis in international law began to emerge two decades ago. It has taken many different forms and is now a lively feature of international legal debate. But has it had any effect? And is it worth pursuing? In this short article, I will argue that feminists have been successful in bringing the language of women’s empowerment into international law but less adept at identifying methods to give this language life on the ground.

This paper historicizes the current challenges brought about by digitization to the Third World by revisiting a movement launched by the Non-Aligned Movement countries during the 1970s and early 1980s. Also known as the New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO), the movement contested the dominant liberal notion of freedom of information and spotlighted the critically material inequality and power asymmetry often concealed by the liberal vision of the free flow of information. Not only did NWICO present a counter-model to the liberal notion of freedom of information, it also provides a vital case for understanding the interrelations between information and domination and the role of international law therein. This paper retells the story of NWICO, its normative ambition as well as its internal contentions and practical limitations, and reflects on its legacy for TWAIL scholarship and the current politics of digitization.

International organizations have been described metaphorically as the Frankenstein of international law. They are created by states and yet more often than not they assume powers that humble their creators. This paper presents a different metaphor to describe the Association of Southeast Asian Nations [ASEAN]. Created in 2007, ASEAN, it is argued, resembles the fettered wayang kulit in Indonesian theatre. It is an international organization which is controlled by its Member States in various ways. This paper analyzes three forms of ASEAN's fetters: constitutional, extra-constitutional, and practical. Constitutional fetters refer to the structural control embedded in the ASEAN Charter. Extra-constitutional fetters refer to rules of procedure that close the openness of the constitutional text. Finally, practical fetters refer to the ways the Member States limit ASEAN's legal personality in practice. Through these control mechanisms, ASEAN has so far acted on the stage of world politics according to the narrative of its puppet masters.

Home is not a familiar concept in international law. This paper looks at land grabbing and international law from the perspective of home. Through a case-study of a land grab in the context of a World Bank development project at Boeung Kak Lake in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, it argues that international law is involved in profound transformations of home. By making visible how experiences of loss, suffering, and struggle, as well as radical engagement, emerge from international law’s “homemaking” work, it also argues that the concept of home opens up a terrain of experience that cannot be captured or expressed in international law. The perspective from home in the land-grabbing debate is particularly important where not only is land at risk of capture for economic gain, but so too are the personal lifeworlds that homes represent.

Learning from past atrocities, Cambodia has taken positive steps to ensure that future international crimes may be adequately prosecuted through its ratification of the Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) in 2002. However, an effective accountability mechanism and deterrence for any future crimes requires more than simply joining the ICC. There is a growing consensus that Member States should adopt the ICC crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes as part of their domestic law, as the absence of legislation may result in an inability to prosecute under the principle of complementarity. Cambodia has followed this trend and enacted implementing legislation into its new 2009 Cambodian Criminal Code (CCC). Scrutinizing the enacted international crimes provisions in the CCC, it becomes apparent that some modifications and reform to the current Cambodian criminal statutes are necessary in order to comply with the complementarity principle in the ICC Statute.

On 12 July 2016, the Arbitral Tribunal formed under Annex VII of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea issued its decision on the proceeding brought by the Philippines against China relating to certain activities in the South China Sea. The Tribunal’s decision was hotly anticipated as it dealt with various important issues relating to law of the sea and the interpretation of the Convention. It dealt with issues including the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, the legal status of maritime features, historic rights, and duty to preserve the marine environment. Although it remains to be seen whether states will follow the Tribunal’s precedent, questions arose on whether such precedent can be applied to other unresolved issues in other parts of the world. This paper looks at the application of the precedent established by the South China Sea arbitration to the situation involving Dokdo between Korea and Japan.

The dispute settlement mechanism [DSM] under preferential trade agreements [PTAs] is crucial to ensure adequate implementation and enforcement of commitments among contracting parties. The DSM has evolved from political/diplomatic styles with a low level of legalism to judicial styles with a high level of legalism. Indonesia has also experienced this evolution process in its PTAs. This paper aims to show the evolution of the DSM in Indonesian PTAs, analyzing several related factors behind this trend. The paper argues that the evolution of the DSM from the GATT to WTO, Indonesia's participation in regional trade agreement, that is, ASEAN, the influence of trade partners, the existence of domestic factors, and the ongoing WTO dispute encourage the evolution of the DSM in Indonesian PTAs from political styles to more judicial styles with a high level of legalism.

The politically sensitive nature of Chinese investments in Sri Lanka has made investment protection by the China-Sri Lanka BIT highly relevant. However, the treaty has a pro-state orientation, with limited protection for investors. This gives rise to a modern paradox in which China has become the top investor in Sri Lanka, despite the absence of an international protective framework for their activities. Chinese investors are apparently managing this paradox mainly through commercial diplomacy. As an alternative to a rights-based approach, this may signal a return to a power-based approach to settling investment disputes, with the Chinese government a leading actor therein. This will be particularly prominent in the context of the Belt and Road Initiative. While win-win co-operation is a stated principle of Chinese investment policy, whether mutually beneficial outcomes can be sustained with the asymmetrical power dynamics between China and BRI states remains to be seen.

This paper provides a first-ever detailed study of NPM provisions in all stand-alone BITs which are in force in South Asian countries. It studies 147 BITs of South Asian countries in order to map the NPM provisions in them. It makes an in-depth analysis of the NPM provisions found in these BITs, and then makes an analysis of the consequences of not having NPM provisions in BITs. This follows the dissection of the NPM provisions found, so as to study each and every permissible objective and nexus requirement link in these provisions. This is followed by suggestions and conclusions, where the paper holds that NPM provisions are not sufficiently used in the BITs of these countries and these countries should incorporate this provision more frequently in order to ensure some much-needed regulatory latitude to these countries.

From both a geographical and geopolitical perspective, Southeast Asia is a particularly interesting case-study for maritime delimitation. Despite the existence of significant obstacles to maritime boundary-making, including a complex coastal geography and a multitude of territorial and jurisdictional disputes, Southeast Asia has been described as the “scene of very active and innovative ocean boundary diplomacy”. The objective of this paper is to examine Southeast Asian approaches to maritime boundaries. First, it seeks to identify whether there are common trends and practices in Southeast Asian practice which have contributed to the high number of maritime boundaries concluded by Southeast Asian states. Second, the paper will explore the extent to which Southeast Asian practice has contributed to the normative development of international law on maritime delimitation. Third, the paper will discuss whether there are any lessons to be learned from Southeast Asian practice that can be used to settle unresolved maritime boundary issues in the region.

The International Criminal Court (ICC) was established to prosecute crimes that “threaten the peace, security and well-being of the world”. Maritime piracy has a long history as a threat to international security and was in fact the first international crime. Yet piracy was excluded from the Rome Statute. In the years since the drafting of the Rome Statute, piracy has increased dramatically to become more like the threat it was in the “Golden Age of Piracy”. Criminal accountability for piracy has been minimal, due to logistical and jurisdictional difficulties. This paper offers an analysis of the potential of the ICC for prosecuting pirates: why it should be considered as a potential forum for ensuring criminal accountability for piracy, how piracy fits within the ICC's jurisdiction, and whether or not piracy should be added to the Rome Statute as a stand-alone crime or under the rubric of crimes against humanity.

This paper examines the UN Security Council’s [UNSC] response to the environmental impact of the 1990–91 Gulf War and its relevance to ongoing debates on environmental protection during armed conflict. With Resolution 687/91, the UNSC referred to “environmental damage and depletion of natural resources” in the context of war reparations, and established the UN Compensation Commission [UNCC] to process environmental claims. Whilst this is often hailed as a success story, this paper raises questions about certain dimensions of the UNCC: the choice of the applicable law; the decision-making process, particularly in relation to causation and remedies; and its punitive/biased nature. It argues that the successful outcome of the environmental compensation regime cannot be separated from the UNCC’s exceptional application of international legal norms. By drawing attention to this “logic of exception”, I suggest that alternative responses, more attentive to the dynamics of contemporary conflicts and their multiple environmental impacts, should be imagined.

International Criminal Law [ICL] contains a number of general principles, which form the foundations of and conditions for holding individuals criminally responsible for crimes under international law (genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression), and other crimes against the peace and security of mankind. Most general principles of ICL have been adequately implemented in the current (second) edition of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan. This paper assesses the quality of and identifies the lacunae in the implementation of Kazakhstan’s Criminal Code, with a view to suggesting further improvements to this Code.

This paper is a response to the latest Bangladesh/Myanmar case decided by the ITLOS on 14 March 2012, which is the first case concerning delimitation of the continental shelf beyond 200 nm. The paper aims to discuss the status and role of natural prolongation in delimiting this area. Natural prolongation constitutes the legal basis for entitlement to the continental shelf beyond 200 nm. Also, natural prolongation should play a role as a relevant circumstance in delimiting the continental shelf beyond 200 nm. To address these two issues, the judgment of the Bangladesh/Myanmar case will also be reviewed. Both the interpretation of the meaning of natural prolongation and its exclusion in the delimitation process are not convincing. Hence, the Judgment's future influence on the continental shelf delimitation is limited.

Infrastructure has been the focus of geopolitically significant regional strategies, including the Belt and Road Initiative and the Asian Highway. Mega-infrastructure projects are thought to offer crucial stimulus to support economic recovery and “infrastructure diplomacy” efforts. Transportation projects, like roads, are material objects that offer complex questions for international law, most obviously when projects or their impacts cross borders. They are long-term and long-distance, with varying impacts upon closer and further populations and environments across the construction and life of the asset. This article draws on insights from new materialism to analyse what infrastructure's entanglements might suggest about international law. The relationship between international law and transportation infrastructure is contingent. However, there is a pattern to this contingency that foregrounds funding “gaps”, investment protections, and risk assessments, which minimizes intersecting impacts and human/non-human relationships.

The Chinese traditional maritime boundary line (U-line) in the South China Sea (SCS) and its validity under international law have been challenged by bordering states and some scholars. In 2012, Franckx and Benatar questioned the validity of the U-line in view of factors such as the intent of the state reflected by the map, the cartographer's neutrality, technical accuracy, consistency of the cartographic material, and recognition and acquiescence by the international community. This paper points out that the SCS U-line drawn by the Chinese government in 1947, at the median position between China's SCS islands and reefs, and the coastlines of bordering states, reflects the scope of China's claims and intent. The consistency of the claims has been maintained by the PRC after 1949, and the claims have been recognised or acquiesced to by bordering states over quite a long period. Therefore, the U-line has probative force under international law.