This article uses a socio-legal perspective to analyze the use of ethics guidelines as a governance tool in the development and use of artificial intelligence (AI). This has become a central policy area in several large jurisdictions, including China and Japan, as well as the EU, focused on here. Particular emphasis in this article is placed on the Ethics Guidelines for Trustworthy AI published by the EU Commission’s High-Level Expert Group on Artificial Intelligence in April 2019, as well as the White Paper on AI, published by the EU Commission in February 2020. The guidelines are reflected against partially overlapping and already-existing legislation as well as the ephemeral concept construct surrounding AI as such. The article concludes by pointing to (1) the challenges of a temporal discrepancy between technological and legal change, (2) the need for moving from principle to process in the governance of AI, and (3) the multidisciplinary needs in the study of contemporary applications of data-dependent AI.

Online supply-chain financing has been a relatively novel funding channel for suppliers as small- and medium-sized enterprises (“SMEs”) to obtain loans in that the revolution of financial technology (“FinTech”) transforms traditional supply-chain financing, which used to be administered only by official banks, to an online model also used by electronic commerce platforms (“e-commerce platform”). Endeavours towards financial inclusion of the underserved SMEs could rationalize why we should allow for or encourage FinTech innovations exemplified by the online supply-chain financing mentioned above. What would be an adaptive regulatory regime for such innovative FinTech-enabled financial services as the online supply-chain financing? Within our conceptual framework to regulate the FinTech industry at the early stage, rather than rigorous rules traditionally placed on large financial institutions, a principles-based strategy should be adopted to strike a balance between financial stability and access to financial services advanced by disruptive innovations. As a necessary complement, regulatory sandboxes would be needed to spur a shift in institutional philosophy to a principles-based regulatory regime. In other words, the regulatory attitude of FinTech regulation should be humble and light-touch to promote innovation for improving digital financial inclusion, albeit on the premise of containing potential systemic risk and protecting consumer interest in the meantime.

This article focuses on the war on drugs in the Philippines in order to explore issues related to extra-judicial killing, which remains common in many countries that have abolished the death penalty and in many more that retain it but seldom carry out judicial executions. In the first year of Rodrigo Duterte’s presidency (2016–17), thousands of people were killed by police or by vigilantes who were encouraged to prosecute his war on drugs. At a time when democracy is in retreat in many parts of the world, this case illustrates how popular harsh punishment can be in states that have failed to meet their citizens’ hopes for freedom, economic growth, and security.

This article identifies and conceptualizes the structural features of the Party-state and proposes a “dual normative system” as a framework to interpret the constitutional reality of China. This framework has four components: (1) structural integration of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP or the Party) and the state; (2) reserved delegation of authority to the state; (3) bifurcation of state decision-making processes; and (4) cohabitation of the two normative systems: one of the Party and one of the state. This article demonstrates that the political reforms in China since the 1980s have not separated the power of the Party and the state, but have created an increasingly institutionalized dual normative system that is more complex compared with the previous fused system, yet more pliable to adjustments and more open to different interpretations, including to that of the “Party-state constitutionalism”, which interprets the “rule of law” as compatible with the rule of the Party.

This article addresses the dilemmas and compromises in legal practice around the issue of child marriage in Indonesia. Although the government set development goals that include ending child marriage and complying with human rights standard, it is facing considerable resistance. We researched the state legal system and law in practice to understand this resistance, finding that: (1) law-making in family law involves conflict between progressive and conservative ideas; (2) consequently there is friction within current family law and laws regarding human rights; (3) judges use their discretion to achieve compromises between state laws and local norms; and (4) state law is creatively interpreted and applied at village level. The resistance at all these levels, arising from the religious concerns of conservative Muslims in a rapidly modernizing Indonesian society, is a formidable obstacle for the government to achieve its development goals. Adolescent sexuality is at the heart of these tensions.

Arguing for renewed attention to legal status as a problem of material forms and the practices around them, this paper builds, from an examination of documents in use, a theory of how competing notions of personhood shape legal status for Burmese people in Mae Sot, Thailand. It finds that there exist in Mae Sot two modes of documentary practice through which the legal status of Burmese people is apprehended. “Modes of documentary practice” refer not only to records, papers, certificates, cards, and forms, but to the patterns of filling in, wielding, explaining, and referencing a variety of print matter. The two modes identified in this paper exist in a feedback loop, with the result that Burmese people in Mae Sot are increasingly individuated as being part of a group for whom legal status is irrelevant and legal indistinctiveness is the norm.

In recent years, the Chinese Communist Party has declared that its governance must dominate over all aspects of law-making and enforcement, declaring that its leadership must be implemented across the entire process of governing the country in accordance with the law. Contemporaneous to this new way of thinking about the law-Party nexus is a propaganda push to integrate moral values into the law. This paper is about moralizing governance in the Xi Jinping era. It explores the ideology behind the promotion of this morals–law integration, focusing on the Socialist Core Values in the legal realm under the current Xi Jinping administration. We do so from two interrelated perspectives. The first examines the relationship between law and morality. Here, we argue that the Party’s calls for a law–morality amalgam can be understood as a form of “pan-moralism.” The second looks at the supremacy of Party rule, extending the theory of the “Leviathan” proposed by Thomas Hobbes to take into account the Party’s morality push. This two-pronged argument enables us to assert that the Xi Jinping administration is creating a “virtuous Leviathan.”

Generally speaking there has been a relative dearth of serious scholarship focusing on the evolution of Indian labour law in its economic, social, and political contexts. Such work as there is tends to be constituted of fragmented and short journal articles and notes, including those by labour economists and industrial relations scholars. The present work undertakes a survey of the literature in the field, examining first the various periods through which Indian labour law has evolved up to the present time, and second the extent to which the labour law system can be seen to have fulfilled its two core objectives: the protection of labour and the maintenance of industrial peace. The survey reveals that Indian “labour law” in the formal sense has very little purchase in terms of its application in pursuit of its objects. This, in turn, suggests that some other approach is required to reach a more grounded and accurate understanding of how, and to what effect, labour is regulated in India.

This paper analyses how the interaction of law and qing (情) shapes ordinary Chinese people’s legal consciousness. Ordinary Chinese people rely on qing, or the normal feelings, or attitudes of the public, to judge whether a particular law is just and how they should react to the law. By investigating Chinese leftover women’s legal consciousness regarding marriage and childbearing, this article has developed a theory to discuss Chinese people’s different forms of legal consciousness either when the law is in opposition to qing or when it is in alliance with qing. I argue that these variations of legal consciousness result from the dynamic relationship between qing and different types and levels of legality, including state law.

By severely constraining the political personhood of temporary migrant workers, states’ use of deportation laws seeks to curb agitation among these workers. Despite this, various episodes of unrest have been witnessed in both liberal and illiberal regimes across Asia. Drawing on a case study of Bangladeshi migrant construction workers in Singapore, this paper examines the development of migrant labour politics as deportation laws, and their enforcement, construct these workers as “use-and-discard” economic subjects. Data for the paper are drawn from multi-level sources—government, industry, media, and non-governmental organization (NGO) reports; interviews with key actors; and a participant observation stint in a construction firm—collected between 2010 and 2014. The paper argues that, rather than solely constraining, deportability serves as a constituent of certain forms of tactical worker contestations in the workplace. Specifically, under different workplace conditions, deportability can translate into differing forms of worker tactics, ranging from accommodation to confrontation and desertion. The outcomes of these strategies, in turn, have significant repercussions for the ways in which civil society groups and state-actors, respectively, challenge and reconfigure the political personhood of temporary migrant workers.

The Chinese judicial system has long been influenced by a populist legal ideology that prioritizes public accountability and political legitimacy over professional autonomy. In recent years, however, the Chinese legal profession has begun to mobilize collectively, albeit episodically, to challenge this populism. Drawing on legal documents, interviews, media reports, and online discussions, this paper provides a scholarly analysis of the Li Zhuang case in 2009−11, in which the fate of an individual criminal defence lawyer was linked with the main ideological conflict in China’s legal system and the highest-level political struggles in the Chinese state. It demonstrates that, although populism remains an intimidating force in China’s judicial practice, lawyers, scholars, and other legal professionals may be laying a foundation for collective solidarity to pursue professionalism through their mobilization against populism.

Existing scholarship of China’s legal institutions has primarily focused on individual institutions, such as the court, the police, or the legal profession. This article proposes a relational approach to the study of political-legal institutions in China. To understand the order and exercise of power by various political-legal institutions, the relational approach emphasizes the spatial positions of actors or institutions (the police, courts, lawyers, etc.) within the broader political-legal system and their mutual interactions. We suggest that the changing ideas of the Chinese leadership about the role of law as an instrument of governance have shaped the relations between various legal and political institutions. The interactions of these political-legal institutions (e.g. the “iron triangle” of the police, the court and the procuracy) further reveal the dynamics of power relations at work.

This paper addresses the controversial concept of legal culture. It first considers the different meanings of the term and the variety of debates in which it figures. It then goes on to consider difficulties in deciding the units to which the term “legal culture” is applied, and the problems in using the term in explanations. It concludes by examining the way assumptions about what gives legal culture its coherence have implications for explaining how and when it changes. In each section of the argument an attempt is also made to show the relevance of these questions for the Asian Journal of Law and Society as seen in the papers published in its first issue.

This paper extends the empirical analysis on the determinants of judicial behaviour by measuring the ideal points for the Justices of the Philippine Supreme Court for 1986−2010. The Philippines is an interesting case given the US influence in designing the Supreme Court while the political and social context differs significantly. The estimated ideal points allow us to focus on political coalitions based on presidential appointments. We find strong evidence to support the existence of such coalitions along a government-opposition policy space. Implications for comparative judicial politics are discussed.

This article examines the legal framework regulating unskilled and low-skilled migrant workers in Singapore. It argues that the current legal framework discriminates against these migrant workers and conceptualizes them as undesirable for inclusion in the wider society. This, it is contended, is premised on the assumption that migrant workers could be sequestered from the local population to some extent. This article provides some challenges to this assumption, highlighting instead some of the broader social and political consequences of this exclusionary legal framework. Consequently, it is argued that a more inclusive and integrationist approach is needed, and some positive developments are highlighted.

The paths to digital justice focus on the challenges of contemporary digital societies in reaching automated decision-making processes through software, algorithms, and information technology without loss of its human quality and the guarantees of due process. In this context, this article reflects on the possibilities of establishing judicial robots in substitution for human judges, by examining whether artificial intelligence and algorithms may support judicial decision-making independently and without human supervision. The point of departure for this analysis comes from the experience of criminal justice systems with software for judgment of the possibility of recidivism of criminal defendants. Algorithmic decision-making may improve the public good in support of judicial decision-making, but the analysis of current technology and our standards for due process of law recommends caution on the conclusion that robots may replace human judges and satisfy our expectations for explainability and fairness in adjudication.

While online dispute resolution (ODR) and online courts have become a global phenomenon, China is unique in its way of constructing a “smart-courts” system. This paper argues that the Chinese smart courts are embedded in China’s larger strategy of capturing new opportunities offered by the information and communications technology (ICT) revolution. Adoption of cutting-edge ICT by courts is not an initiative taken by the courts themselves; rather, it is a call from the party-state with strong policy push. The paper also makes two observations on the nature of smart courts in China. One is that Chinese courts are using ICT, especially artificial intelligence, both to enhance hierarchical control and to improve the formal quality of law. Another is that the “Internet courts” are established to solve disputes arising from online transactions, rather than serve as piloting courts with general implications for the shape of future courts in China. Therefore, while boldly experimenting new technologies (such as blockchains) in the judicial process, Internet courts in China are also charged with the responsibility of developing legal doctrines in cases within their jurisdictions. The case of China thus shows the profound interaction between law and technology. Whether technology is disruptive depends on human design and efforts.

This paper analyzes how activists used a parliamentary petition to overcome legal and political barriers and mobilize openly for gay rights for the first time in Singapore. Unlike societies where rights mobilization has political legitimacy, exercising and claiming rights in the de facto one-party state are non-conformist behaviours and face greater limitations. Gay rights activists in Singapore not only struggle with the state and their opponents over the right to equality; compared to their counterparts in liberal democracies, they also have to overcome stronger restrictions on political access and civil-political liberties that enable or protect rights mobilization. This paper therefore describes and analyzes a politics of rights under authoritarian conditions and the complicated consequences of legal resistance and rights mobilization. Although the petition campaign transformed collective grievances, expanded activists’ support base, and opened up new tactical possibilities, it also provoked intense, third-party opposition and foreclosed other avenues of mobilization.

Since 1990, successive waves of foreign experts have introduced legal transplants into Cambodia dealing with the possession, use, and ownership of land. The Land Law of 2001, sponsored by the World Bank, first created a registration system that made land ownership dependent exclusively on a central cadastral registry. The 2007 Civil Code, sponsored by the Japanese International Cooperation Agency, subsequently cast doubt on the exclusivity of the registry by declaring it only presumptive evidence of ownership. Both laws are based on foreign models that presume economic, technical, and professional resources that Cambodia, as a very poor, post-conflict country, lacks. Despite recent efforts to reconcile the laws, implementation remains uneven and legal ambiguity persists. While it is too early to make conclusive judgments, the Cambodian experience brings into question not only the wisdom of top-down foreign intervention but also the desirability of any form of centralized formal legal construction in a society without the necessary social, political, and institutional prerequisites.

In 2014, the Indonesian president signed a new Village Law (no. 6/2014). This statute started a new phase in the ongoing history of village governance policy, moving the village from a position as an administrative unit in a top-down system towards one of an autonomous community. The present article analyses how distinct “policy communities” in Indonesia started a process that helped shape the 2014 Village Law in order to promote their long-term political agendas, how their involvement was facilitated by the particular features of Indonesia’s law-making process, and how they managed to get a Bill passed that went against considerable vested interest from government bureaucracies. However, they have been less successful in securing implementation of the new law, as this process is still dominated by the government bureaucracies that were “defeated” in the law-making process.