Hostname: page-component-78c5997874-4rdpn Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-14T06:20:37.475Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Defining preferences over framed outcomes does not secure agents' rationality

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 October 2022

Sarah A. Fisher Open the ORCID record for Sarah A. Fisher [Opens in a new window]
Sarah A. Fisher*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Vienna, 1010 Vienna, Austria sarah.fisher@univie.ac.athttps://sites.google.com/view/sarahafisher/
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Bermúdez claims that agents think about framed outcomes, not outcomes themselves; and that seemingly incoherent preferences can be rational, once defined over framed outcomes. However, the agents in his examples know that alternative frames describe the same outcome, neutrally understood. This undermines the restriction of their preferences to framed outcomes and, in turn, the argument for rational framing effects.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 45 , 2022 , e227
Check for updates
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Fisher, S. A. (2022). A Critical Notice of: Frame It Again: New Tools for Rational Decision-Making. International Journal of Philosophical Studies. doi: 10.1080/09672559.2022.2057685Google Scholar