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Explaining bias with bias
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 25 October 2022
Abstract
Bermúdez argues that a framing effect is rational, which will be true if one accepts that the biased editing phase is rational. This type of rationality was called procedural by Simon. Despite being procedurally rational in the evaluation phase framing effect stems from biased way we set a reference point against which outcomes are compared.
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Target article
Rational framing effects: A multidisciplinary case
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