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The polyphony principle
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 25 October 2022
Abstract
Bermúdez's “rational framing effects” are consequences of a counterintuitive phenomenon that I call “normative polyphony”: the reality that a single action may, with logical consistency, sustain diverse positive and negative judgments. I show that normative polyphony emerges from “ontological polyphony” – that is, diverse possible framings of relevant details – and illustrate this “polyphony principle” through a reading of Dostoevsky's (1993) Crime and Punishment.
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- Copyright © The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press
References
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Target article
Rational framing effects: A multidisciplinary case
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