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Rational framing effects: A multidisciplinary case

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 January 2022

José Luis Bermúdez Open the ORCID record for José Luis Bermúdez [Opens in a new window]
José Luis Bermúdez*
Affiliation:
Samuel Rhea Gammon Professor of Liberal Arts and Professor of Philosophy, Texas A&M University, College Station, TX 77843, USAjbermudez@tamu.edu
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Abstract

Frames and framing make one dimension of a decision problem particularly salient. In the simplest case, frames prime responses (as in, e.g., the Asian disease paradigm, where the gain frame primes risk-aversion and the loss frame primes risk-seeking). But in more complicated situations frames can function reflectively, by making salient particular reason-giving aspects of a thing, outcome, or action. For Shakespeare's Macbeth, for example, his feudal commitments are salient in one frame, while downplayed in another in favor of his personal ambition. The role of frames in reasoning can give rise to rational framing effects. Macbeth can prefer fulfilling his feudal duty to murdering the king, while also preferring bravely taking the throne to fulfilling his feudal duty, knowing full well that bravely taking the throne just is murdering the king. Such patterns of quasi-cyclical preferences can be correct and appropriate from the normative perspective of how one ought to reason. The paper explores three less dramatic types of rational framing effects: (1) Consciously framing and reframing long-term goals and short-term temptations can be important tools for self-control. (2) In the prototypical social interactions modeled by game theory, allowing for rational framing effects solves longstanding problems, such as the equilibrium selection problem and explaining the appeal of non-equilibrium solutions (e.g., the cooperative solution in the Prisoner's Dilemma). (3) Processes for resolving interpersonal conflicts and breaking discursive deadlock, because they involve internalizing multiple and incompatible ways of framing actions and outcomes, in effect create rational framing effects.

Keywords

decenteringdecision theoryframinggame theoryperspective takingrationalityself-controlsimulation
Type
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Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 45 , 2022 , e220
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Copyright © The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press

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