No CrossRef data available.
Article contents
Ceteris paribus preferences, rational farming effects, and the extensionality principle
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 25 October 2022
Abstract
Bermúdez argues for rational framing effects in the form of quasi-cyclical preferences. This is supposed to refute the extensionality principle in standard decision theory. In response, I argue that it is better to analyze seemingly quasi-cyclical preferences as ceteris paribus preferences. Furthermore, if frames are included as objects of choice, we can acknowledge rational framing effects without rejecting extensionality.
- Type
- Open Peer Commentary
- Information
- Copyright
- Copyright © The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press
References
Halperin, E., Cohen-Chen, S., & Goldenberg, A. (2014). Indirect emotion regulation in intractable conflicts: A new approach to conflict resolution. European Review of Social Psychology, 25(1), 1–31.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hansson, S. O. (1996). What is ceteris paribus preference?. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 25(3), 307–332.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Jamieson, J. P., Nock, M. K., & Mendes, W. B. (2012). Mind over matter: Reappraising arousal improves cardiovascular and cognitive responses to stress. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 141(3), 417.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Van Benthem, J., Girard, P., & Roy, O. (2009). Everything else being equal: A modal logic for ceteris paribus preferences. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 38(1), 83–125.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Yeager, D. S., & Dweck, C. S. (2012). Mindsets that promote resilience: When students believe that personal characteristics can be developed. Educational Psychologist, 47(4), 302–314.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Target article
Rational framing effects: A multidisciplinary case
Related commentaries (27)
Ceteris paribus preferences, rational farming effects, and the extensionality principle
A reputational perspective on rational framing effects
Biases and suboptimal choice by animals suggest that framing effects may be ubiquitous
Competing reasons, incomplete preferences, and framing effects
Consistent preferences, conflicting reasons, and rational evaluations
Defining preferences over framed outcomes does not secure agents' rationality
Distinguishing self-involving from self-serving choices in framing effects
Even simple framing effects are rational
Explaining bias with bias
Four frames and a funeral: Commentary on Bermúdez (2022)
Frames, trade-offs, and perspectives
Framing is a motivated process
Framing provides reasons
Framing, equivalence, and rational inference
Incomplete preferences and rational framing effects
Probably, approximately useful frames of mind: A quasi-algorithmic approach
Quasi-cyclical preferences in the ethics of Plato, Aristotle, and Kant
Rational framing effects and morally valid reasons
Rationality as the end of thought
Reframing rationality: Exogenous constraints on controlled information search
Self-control modulates information salience
The ecological benefits of being irrationally moral
The framing of decisions “leaks” into the experiencing of decisions
The polyphony principle
The received view of framing
The study of rational framing effects needs developmental psychology
Why framing effects can be rational
Author response
Frames and rationality: Response to commentators