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Positing numerosities may be metaphysically extravagant; positing representation of numerosities is not

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  15 December 2021

Simon A. B. Brown*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, MD21218, USA. simonabbrown@gmail.com; www.simonbrownphilosophy.com

Abstract

Clarke and Beck (C&B) assume that approximate number system (ANS) representations should be assigned referents from our scientific ontology. However, many representations, both in perception and cognition, do not straightforwardly refer to such entities. If we reject C&B's assumption, many possible contents for ANS representations besides number are compatible with the evidence C&B cite.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press

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