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Beyond our “ancient roots”: Toward a broader understanding of the motivational power of societal meta-narratives

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 January 2025

Laura Akers*
Affiliation:
Oregon Research Institute, Springfield, OR, USA lauraa@ori.org https://www.ori.org/project/laura-akers/
*
*Corresponding author.

Abstract

The “historical myths” addressed in the target article are but one type of societal meta-narrative, a cognitive framework for understanding the story of one's group: Its origins, purpose, turning points, threats and opportunities, key relationships, and the appropriate affect for group members. Engagement with the broader literature on meta-narratives, including political and sacred myths, and on group entitativity is recommended.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2025. Published by Cambridge University Press

In the target article, Sijilmassi et al. identify “historical myths” as “mental representations of the collective past that are widely shared across individual minds in a given population, and are viewed by group members as foundational for group cohesion” (sect. 1, para. 1). They then elaborate upon this definition, however, with details that go far beyond their “collective past,” including “ancient roots” for an “organic entity tied by ancestral bonds” with a “long history of interactions” and a continuous and distinctive “historical trajectory” providing a “sense of deep connectedness and solidarity through time.”

By “historical myths,” the authors are clearly referring to a type of societal meta-narrative, a cognitive framework for understanding the story of one's group – where it came from and where it's headed. Categories of societal meta-narratives include political myths (Bottici, Reference Bottici2007; Flood, Reference Flood1996; Girardet, Reference Girardet1986; Tismaneanu, Reference Tismaneanu1998; Tudor, Reference Tudor1972), sacred myths (multiple works by Malinowsky, Reference Malinowski1926, Reference Malinowski2014; Levy-Bruhl Reference Lévy-Bruhl[1935] 1983), and group charters (meta-narratives focused on a purpose, as in Liu & Hilton, Reference Liu and Hilton2005). Meta-narratives are also often simply called narratives (Maan, Reference Maan2015, Reference Maan2018; Smith, Reference Smith2003), although they should not be confused with stories about the group. Stories are accounts of specific events, while meta-narratives are the cognitive framings that underlie such stories – the gist of what has happened or will or may happen, with the group as protagonist, providing group members with an interpretive framework for such events.

The nation with ancient roots and a long continuous history described in the target article is only one category of groups with meta-narratives, albeit a powerful and important one. Other groups also use meta-narratives, including nations whose roots are not ancient, like the United States, and countries that are not nations, like Spain and Canada. Many meta-narratives address all of humanity, not specific sub-groups; these include both the appeals of universalist religions like Christianity and Islam and the narratives promoted by environmentalists.

As cultural technologies, meta-narratives have many important purposes. They create our sense of belonging to a group and reinforce its value to us. They may identify who else matters: God, our neighbors, our allies, our enemies and rivals. They tell us whether things are improving or declining for us, sometimes identifying turning points in the past, present, or future. The directions and rates of change they describe for our group tell us how to feel – proud, hopeful, ashamed, fearful, or angry. They may also encourage our participation as individuals within the group – from choosing a career in science or law enforcement to suicide bombing.

Although fitness interdependence may be a reasonable hypothesis for explaining part of the appeal of meta-narratives, I would like to invite the authors to consider a broader approach. Hamilton (Reference Hamilton2007) reviewed the concepts associated with group entitativity – the perception that some category of people constitutes a group rather than a collection of individuals. One of these concepts, that group members share the same essence, may be at the core of the “ancient roots” argument, but there are other ways in which people may be “essentially” the same, such as sharing a particular ideology.

Another concept closely associated with entitativity is agency – the ability to act as a group. Group agency is especially apparent in meta-narratives that describe a group mission (a problem to address or a goal to be achieved), such as claiming a continent (Manifest Destiny), making the world “safe for democracy” (per Woodrow Wilson, Reference Wilson1917) or the restoration of a group's past status (becoming “great again,” as in the rhetoric of Ronald Reagan and Donald Trump).

Further research, taking more of this related scholarship into account, may strengthen or inform the revision of the authors' hypotheses. For example, it would be essential to assess the relative contributions of three dimensions of group identity – shared roots (ancient or otherwise), shared beliefs (religious or secular, e.g., communist, capitalist, or anarchist ideology), and shared commitment to a group mission or other goal. In some cases, the three are combined, as in ethno-nationalist independence movements.

I would also encourage the authors to be more rigorous in their definition of “historical myth,” or in their use of examples. The United States, in particular, does not have an “ancient past,” as it began less than 250 years ago (or 460 years ago if one dates to the earliest European settlement at St. Augustine), and many American citizens today do not have – or do not know whether they have – ancestors who were present at its founding. Indeed, recent immigrants are often more patriotic and less ambivalent about the United States than native-born Americans (Nowrasteh & Forrester, Reference Nowrasteh and Forrester2019). The United States may thus be a case where shared ideology and shared mission outweigh shared roots, at least for many.

Relatedly, empirical work could, for example, compare the strength of group identification of Lebanese who identify as the descendants of the Phoenicians with those whose primary national identity is as post-Ottoman Levantine Arabs. It would also be valuable to study those whose group bonds are based in belief but not shared ancestry or ancient history, such as the Muslims of North Africa and Indonesia.

And finally, many meta-narratives do not address the past at all, but rather the future of the group, based on its current trajectory (as in climate change meta-narratives), potential threats from dangerous neighbors or subversives within (Saucier & Akers, Reference Saucier and Akers2018), or religious prophecies, as in the Christian apocalypse or Rapture. The motivational power of meta-narratives asserting a common and valued past should be compared with those for which history – shared or otherwise – is irrelevant.

Financial support

This research received no specific grant from any funding agency, commercial or not-for-profit sectors.

Competing interest

None.

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