Sijilmassi et al. propose that historical myths – narratives of shared ancestral roots and a long history of repeated interactions – are culturally evolved technologies designed to build and maintain large-scale coalitions. However, throughout the target article, Sijilmassi et al. present seemingly conflicting explanations of the psychology of the audiences of historical myths.
At times, the authors argue that audiences are deceived by historical myths. For example, they write: “coalitional recruiters must craft historical myths that are sufficiently credible to bypass the epistemic vigilance of their audience” and explain that the blend of truths and falsehoods in historical myths “reflects the tension between the strategic intentions of producers and the epistemic vigilance of receivers” (target article, sect. 4.3.).
Elsewhere, the authors argue that audiences believe and propagate historical myths because it is in their interests to do so. For example, in section 6.1, they write: “Top-down nation-building endeavors have indeed proven to be highly successful in many countries, but this success might be better explained by individuals’ perception that they actually stand to gain from committing to the nation than by passive indoctrination.”
We propose that this apparent conflict in the target article can be resolved by recognizing that individuals who join large-scale coalitions are socially rather than epistemically motivated. Although historical myths likely serve multiple social functions, one such function might be to signal coalitional commitment (Barlev & Neuberg, Reference Barlev and Neuberg2024). As such, if individuals decide that it is in their interests to join a large-scale coalition and signal their affiliation and commitment to this coalition, they may swing open the gates of their epistemic defenses to welcome historical myths. As the target article stresses, humans are a uniquely social and interdependent species. However, social groups are vulnerable to being undermined by free riders – individuals who reap the benefits of affiliating with the group without incurring the costs of contributing to it. We have therefore evolved a psychology to identify free riders. This psychology is sensitive to intentions, differentiating free riders from individuals who are merely unlucky or who have made innocent mistakes (e.g., Delton, Cosmides, Guemo, Robertson, & Tooby, Reference Delton, Cosmides, Guemo, Robertson and Tooby2012). In line with this, in group tasks, children as young as seven choose to reward those with “authentic” or “sincere” motives and penalize those with motives that can be viewed as self-serving (Shao, Huang, Zhao, & Heyman, Reference Shao, Huang, Zhao and Heyman2023).
We have also evolved to signal our group commitment. We do this in various ways, such as through the slang we use, the clothes we wear, and the ways in which we decorate and modify our bodies. A signal serves this function effectively if the potential costs of broadcasting it are higher for uncommitted group members than for committed ones (Higham, Reference Higham2014; Kurzban & Christner, Reference Kurzban, Christner, Forgas, Kruglanski and Williams2011). Historical myths meet this requirement in at least two ways. First, expressing belief in a historical myth identifies an individual as allied with the coalition, and therefore, not allied with rival coalitions. This both invites potential costs and makes it more difficult for that individual to join a different coalition. Second, compared to more well-documented signals of coalitional commitment (e.g., tattoos), historical myths often feature improbable or even impossible embellishments. When propagating historical myths with such features, individuals might appear unintelligent or even delusional to observers. The more outlandish the myth propagated, the higher the reputational cost with outgroup members, the harder it is for the individual to join a new group, and therefore, the more effective the myth is as a signal of group commitment.
Studies on imitation and conformity are compatible with this proposal. For instance, children readily copy arbitrary gestures by group members and follow new group norms (Tomasello, Reference Tomasello2016; Watson-Jones & Legare, Reference Watson-Jones and Legare2016). Although such findings are often interpreted from a social learning perspective, they align with our proposal here: Following arbitrary norms or behaviors specific to a group can be a way to signal a desire to affiliate with that group. Indeed, even children as young as five understand that strong conformity (i.e., publicly endorsing a majority opinion, even if privately disagreeing with it) can be a way for an individual to affiliate with the majority (Cordonier, Nettles, & Rochat, Reference Cordonier, Nettles and Rochat2018).
We are not suggesting that coalitional recruiters never manipulate their audiences. However, when individuals are persuaded, it is more so in the cost–benefit analysis of joining the coalition, rather than in the veracity of the historical myth. That is, they might be persuaded that it is in their interests to join the coalition when it may not be in reality; this may or may not also involve persuading them – or, when this is based in reality, reminding them – that there exists a long history of repeated interactions among members of the coalition.
In summary, people are not always motivated to represent the world veridically; rather, they are often motivated to hold and propagate beliefs that serve social functions for them. We have proposed that one function historical myths serve is to signal group commitment. As such, people believe and propagate historical myths not because they have been persuaded by coalitional recruiters, but because they decided that it is in their interests to do so.
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Sijilmassi et al. propose that historical myths – narratives of shared ancestral roots and a long history of repeated interactions – are culturally evolved technologies designed to build and maintain large-scale coalitions. However, throughout the target article, Sijilmassi et al. present seemingly conflicting explanations of the psychology of the audiences of historical myths.
At times, the authors argue that audiences are deceived by historical myths. For example, they write: “coalitional recruiters must craft historical myths that are sufficiently credible to bypass the epistemic vigilance of their audience” and explain that the blend of truths and falsehoods in historical myths “reflects the tension between the strategic intentions of producers and the epistemic vigilance of receivers” (target article, sect. 4.3.).
Elsewhere, the authors argue that audiences believe and propagate historical myths because it is in their interests to do so. For example, in section 6.1, they write: “Top-down nation-building endeavors have indeed proven to be highly successful in many countries, but this success might be better explained by individuals’ perception that they actually stand to gain from committing to the nation than by passive indoctrination.”
We propose that this apparent conflict in the target article can be resolved by recognizing that individuals who join large-scale coalitions are socially rather than epistemically motivated. Although historical myths likely serve multiple social functions, one such function might be to signal coalitional commitment (Barlev & Neuberg, Reference Barlev and Neuberg2024). As such, if individuals decide that it is in their interests to join a large-scale coalition and signal their affiliation and commitment to this coalition, they may swing open the gates of their epistemic defenses to welcome historical myths. As the target article stresses, humans are a uniquely social and interdependent species. However, social groups are vulnerable to being undermined by free riders – individuals who reap the benefits of affiliating with the group without incurring the costs of contributing to it. We have therefore evolved a psychology to identify free riders. This psychology is sensitive to intentions, differentiating free riders from individuals who are merely unlucky or who have made innocent mistakes (e.g., Delton, Cosmides, Guemo, Robertson, & Tooby, Reference Delton, Cosmides, Guemo, Robertson and Tooby2012). In line with this, in group tasks, children as young as seven choose to reward those with “authentic” or “sincere” motives and penalize those with motives that can be viewed as self-serving (Shao, Huang, Zhao, & Heyman, Reference Shao, Huang, Zhao and Heyman2023).
We have also evolved to signal our group commitment. We do this in various ways, such as through the slang we use, the clothes we wear, and the ways in which we decorate and modify our bodies. A signal serves this function effectively if the potential costs of broadcasting it are higher for uncommitted group members than for committed ones (Higham, Reference Higham2014; Kurzban & Christner, Reference Kurzban, Christner, Forgas, Kruglanski and Williams2011). Historical myths meet this requirement in at least two ways. First, expressing belief in a historical myth identifies an individual as allied with the coalition, and therefore, not allied with rival coalitions. This both invites potential costs and makes it more difficult for that individual to join a different coalition. Second, compared to more well-documented signals of coalitional commitment (e.g., tattoos), historical myths often feature improbable or even impossible embellishments. When propagating historical myths with such features, individuals might appear unintelligent or even delusional to observers. The more outlandish the myth propagated, the higher the reputational cost with outgroup members, the harder it is for the individual to join a new group, and therefore, the more effective the myth is as a signal of group commitment.
Studies on imitation and conformity are compatible with this proposal. For instance, children readily copy arbitrary gestures by group members and follow new group norms (Tomasello, Reference Tomasello2016; Watson-Jones & Legare, Reference Watson-Jones and Legare2016). Although such findings are often interpreted from a social learning perspective, they align with our proposal here: Following arbitrary norms or behaviors specific to a group can be a way to signal a desire to affiliate with that group. Indeed, even children as young as five understand that strong conformity (i.e., publicly endorsing a majority opinion, even if privately disagreeing with it) can be a way for an individual to affiliate with the majority (Cordonier, Nettles, & Rochat, Reference Cordonier, Nettles and Rochat2018).
We are not suggesting that coalitional recruiters never manipulate their audiences. However, when individuals are persuaded, it is more so in the cost–benefit analysis of joining the coalition, rather than in the veracity of the historical myth. That is, they might be persuaded that it is in their interests to join the coalition when it may not be in reality; this may or may not also involve persuading them – or, when this is based in reality, reminding them – that there exists a long history of repeated interactions among members of the coalition.
In summary, people are not always motivated to represent the world veridically; rather, they are often motivated to hold and propagate beliefs that serve social functions for them. We have proposed that one function historical myths serve is to signal group commitment. As such, people believe and propagate historical myths not because they have been persuaded by coalitional recruiters, but because they decided that it is in their interests to do so.
Financial support
This work received no specific grant from any funding agency, commercial or not-for-profit sectors.
Competing interests
None.